At 9:19 -0400 28-06-2006, Jim Piat wrote:
In any case, what I'm doing here is asking a question and would love
for someone to attempt to sort through how the terms real, existent
and true are related.
That's the big one Jim!
I like to start out from Peirce's definition of the real as "that
object for which truth stands"
Regarding what is real, I think Peirce would say that we all have our
opinions, more or well founded about what is real, or what the real
is, and there is always a cheerful hope that we shall develop some
further opinions on the matter that are even more well developed in
this some respect or other.
But of course, we are fallible, and thus no none, however well read,
can claim any kind of absolute monopoly on the truth, so it's better
to always keep an open mind (bearing in mind too, that some matters
have been reasonably well settled for the time being) and keep on
asking questions and making (courageous) speculations about how
matters that cause us puzzlement may best be answered on the basis of
what we already know, or at least think we know.
Regarding existent, I think that Peirce always keeps fairly close to
the whiteheadian notion of "actual occasions" in his conceptions of
this, and again on this matter I think it is most profitable to make
reference to his notion of matter as "effete mind", and Objects as
Things or Existents that are characteristic for our experience of
Secondness as a "Modality of Being".
In a letter to Lady Welby (See EPII: 479), and talking of Secondness
(which he actually refers to in this particular connection as
"Another Universe", distinguished by a particular "Modality of
Being"), Peirce writes:
"Another Universe is that of, first, Objects whose Being consists in
their Brute reactions, and of second, the facts (reactions, events,
qualities etc.) concerning these Objects, all of which facts, in the
last analysis, consist in their reactions. I call the Objects,
Things, or more unambigously, Existents, and the facts about them I
call Facts. Every member of this Universe is either a Single Object
subject, alike to the Principles of Contradiction and to that of
Excluded Middle, or it is expressible by a proposition having such a
singular subject."
Best regards
Patrick
--
Patrick J. Coppock
Researcher: Philosophy and Theory of Language
Department of Social, Cognitive and Quantitative Sciences
University of Modena and Reggio Emilia
Reggio Emilia
Italy
phone: + 39 0522.522404 : fax. + 39 0522.522512
email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
www: http://coppock-violi.com/work/
faculty: http://www.cei.unimore.it
the voice: http://morattiddl.blogspot.com
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