RE: [biosemiotics:7087] Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] Example of Dicisign?

2014-10-05 Thread Gary Fuhrman
Ben, Tom, lists, It’s true that denotation (the noun) is one of the synonyms for extension or breadth (as opposed to comprehension or depth) when applied to a term. But Peirce, from early on, extended the application of these terms from terms to propositions; and in any context where he is

[PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:7091] Re: Example of Dicisign?

2014-10-05 Thread Gary Fuhrman
Tom, lists, See my previous message (sorry about the bit before the last sentence that I forgot to delete before sending). My replies to this one are inserted: gary f. From: Tom Gollier [mailto:tgoll...@gmail.com] Sent: 4-Oct-14 7:50 PM Gary and list, A does signify B in the

RE: [biosemiotics:7079] RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6

2014-10-05 Thread Gary Fuhrman
Howard, I think this is a good explanation of how the word “symbol” is used in the language of physics. As such, it explains why the language of physics is of limited use in semiotics. In discussing Natural Propositions, we are deploying Peirce’s definition of “symbol” as “a sign which is fit

Re: [biosemiotics:7087] Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] Example of Dicisign?

2014-10-05 Thread Benjamin Udell
Gary F., Tom, lists, A predicate's denotation can be narrowed (and anyway can't be broadened) by an index attached to it. The resultant compound's denotation is thus the index's denotation. So one could get to thinking that the index does the denoting, while the icon or symbol does not. Yet

[PEIRCE-L] Resources On Category Theory (ROCT)

2014-10-05 Thread Jon Awbrey
Peircers Others, For the benefit of readers who want to learn about mathematical category theory and may have missed earlier discussions, I will use this thread to collect a few links and texts on the subject. Regards, Jon -- academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey my word

[PEIRCE-L] role of a basic sign

2014-10-05 Thread Edwina Taborsky
I'd like to ask Frederik about the role of what I consider a basic Peircean Sign, the Rhematic Indexical Legisign. This triad operates within all three categorical modes; it's in the centre, so to speak, of the ten classes. I see it as important because of the openness of its Interpretation

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Resources On Category Theory (ROCT)

2014-10-05 Thread Jon Awbrey
o~o~o~o~o~o~o ROCT. Note 2 o~o~o~o~o~o~o My e-neurones tell me that I apparently collected a lot of material from previous discussions here: InterSciWiki : Jon Awbrey : Mathematical Notes

[PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7097] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6

2014-10-05 Thread Howard Pattee
At 08:50 AM 10/5/2014, Gary Fuhrman wrote: Howard, I think this is a good explanation of how the word symbol is used in the language of physics. As such, it explains why the language of physics is of limited use in semiotics. HP: Of course it is of limited use. It only explains why the most

RE: [biosemiotics:7087] Fwd: [PEIRCE-L] Example of Dicisign?

2014-10-05 Thread Gary Fuhrman
Ben, lists, OK, let me put it this way: a rheme can “denote” a range of possibilities — but only if it is a symbol. Same goes for a predicate, which is symbolic by virtue of being a necessary part of a proposition, which is a symbol (and by virtue of being verbal). To elaborate on this,

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7097] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6

2014-10-05 Thread Gary Fuhrman
Howard, HP: Suppose, in context of a Dicisign or a proposition, you ask me: Is it true or false? I can give you a one-bit answer. Isn't that bit some kind of sign? GF: My answer to your question is: 1. (as opposed to 0). But without the symbolic context which makes the bit interpretable *as

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:7077] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6, modern chemistry and icons commit themselves to nothing at all

2014-10-05 Thread Helmut Raulien
But, if chemical icons are a direct consequence of physical laws, that would mean, they can be reduced to them. In a prebiotic world, they would not be icons, but only likenesses not interpreted. I think, an icon is an interpreted likeness, and interpretation of a likeness (icon) requires an

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:7097] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6

2014-10-05 Thread Clark Goble
On Oct 5, 2014, at 2:20 PM, Gary Fuhrman g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: HP: Suppose, in context of a Dicisign or a proposition, you ask me: Is it true or false? I can give you a one-bit answer. Isn't that bit some kind of sign? GF: My answer to your question is: 1. (as opposed to 0). But

RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7097] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6

2014-10-05 Thread Howard Pattee
Gary F, I was responding to your statement: Bits (as the name implies!) can only be small pieces of symbols in the semiotic sense of the word symbol; they are not symbols. Of course, a bit is not a symbol or a piece of symbol. It is a measure of information. I was trying to indicate that

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:7097] Re: Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.6

2014-10-05 Thread Howard Pattee
At 06:41 PM 10/5/2014, Clark Goble wrote: The type/token distinction seems definitely to apply here [Pattee-Fuhrman disagreement]. HP: I agree. Bits are ambiguous. Bit may refer to a measure or type of information, or bit may refer to a token of information, like 0 or 1. Howard

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Resources On Category Theory (ROCT)

2014-10-05 Thread Jon Awbrey
o~o~o~o~o~o~o ROCT. Note 3 o~o~o~o~o~o~o A few years ago I made an attempt to tease out the underlying continuities connecting diverse ideas of categories through history, from their origins in