Peircers,
Still trying to catch up with the dailies from November.
Here are links to my latest rewrites of my last couple
of substantive comments. These serve mostly as pegs
to remind me of issues that deserve more discussion.
Peirce's 1903 Lowell Lectures • Comment 9
Kirsti, List,
I have been occupied with other work and not had the
opportunity to keep up with all the list discussions.
I appreciate the work Gary and Jeff and the other SPINners
are doing to reconstruct the text of Peirce's lectures and
I understand all the reasons why people encountering
John, Jon,
I agree with John on the issue of "every word.."
Opening the pdf by John did not succeed. So a little note on his wording
in:
JFS; In summary, the range of contexts for writing or using EGs is as
open ended as the contexts for using any other kinds of signs.
It's best to
John & Jon,
The two paragraphs offered by John to clarify the meaning of the verb
'to indentify' did not do the job for me. Quite the contrary. Many
questions arose.
JFS: "In mathematics, it is common practice to "identify" two
structures that are isomorphic. Some mathematicians call
John,
Okay, recommendation noted.
(I am partly addressing this series of blog posts to the Laws Of Form
discussion group and attempting to focus on the features of Peirce's
logical graphs that were drawn out and developed further in that
line of inquiry, so I sometimes stumble on the
John,
I thought it was clear I was simply echoing and elaborating on your statement
that drew a distinction between the two, the universe of discourse itself and
the sheet paper that represents it.
An earlier version referred to your post only by link, which would be my normal
practice, but
On 12/2/2017 2:20 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
Re: Peirce List Discussion • John Sowa
JFS:
In 1911, Peirce clarified [the] issues by using two distinct terms:
‘the universe’ and ‘a sheet of paper’. The sheet is no longer
identified with the universe, and there is no reason why one
Peircers,
Still cleaning up leftovers from last month ...
I spent some time trying to write a clearer version of that
last post on being vs. representing a universe of discourse.
Here's a link to my blog rewrite:
Peirce's 1903 Lowell Lectures • Comment 9
Gary F, John,
Thanks for this clarification, Gary, as it was very helpful, perhaps
especially.
Gf: Peirce’s terminology in referring to a graph as a “word” is rather
sloppy, but after all, this is a personal letter from a self-described
“garrulous old man” to a new acquaintance. It is not an
John, Gary R,
See my insertions below …
Gary f.
-Original Message-
From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net]
Sent: 28-Nov-17 15:52
On 11/28/2017 3:07 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
> why he and others think Peirce would have written this as late as 1911
> (unless it is. indeed,
On 11/28/2017 3:07 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
why he and others think Peirce would have written this as late as 1911
(unless it is. indeed, simply " sloppy pedagogical rhetoric."
There was nothing sloppy about Peirce's note or my comment.
Following is the context from my note of 12 noon, Nov.
Jon A, John, Kirsti, list,
Jon A wrote:
By the way, to assert “Every word makes an assertion”
is either word magic, word animism (?), or nomimalism,
the very ilk of ills that Peirce's theory of signs is
prescribed to cure us against. In Peirce's case I'll
chalk it up to simple sloppy
Jon A and Kirsti,
Jon, replying to JFS
[In] a proof by contradiction... there would be no universe about
which the statements on the paper could be true.
In that case we may say that a sign's set of denoted objects is empty.
Yes, but there are several reasons why Peirce's original
John, Jon, list,
Thank you for a most interesting discussion.
Not being so keen on set theory, or the utterly simple assertions formal
logic has so far dealt with, I would like to draw your attention to
these assertion of mine:
If there exists a sheet of assertion, for example a blackboard
Jon,
I agree!
Kirsti
Jon Awbrey kirjoitti 27.11.2017 17:30:
John, Kirsti, List ...
JFS:
In 1911, Peirce clarified that issues by using two distinct terms:
'the universe' and 'a sheet of paper'. The sheet is no longer
identified with the universe, and there is no reason why one
couldn't or
John, List ...
JFS:
> This is less restrictive than the definition in the Lowell lectures.
> For example, it would allow a logician to use a sheet of paper to
> write a proof by contradiction. In that case, there would be no
> universe about which the statements on the paper could be true.
In
John, List ...
JFS:
This is less restrictive than the definition in the Lowell lectures.
For example, it would allow a logician to use a sheet of paper to
write a proof by contradiction. In that case, there would be no
universe about which the statements on the paper could be true.
In that
On 11/27/2017 10:30 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
JFS:
In 1911, Peirce clarified the issues by using two distinct terms:
'the universe' and 'a sheet of paper'. The sheet is no longer
identified with the universe, and there is no reason why one
couldn't or shouldn't shade a blank area of a sheet.
John, Kirsti, List ...
JFS:
> In 1911, Peirce clarified that issues by using two distinct terms:
> 'the universe' and 'a sheet of paper'. The sheet is no longer
> identified with the universe, and there is no reason why one
> couldn't or shouldn't shade a blank area of a sheet.
There is a
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