RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[Auke van Breemen]

Gary F.

I advise you to look at the starting point of this exchange. I don't object to 
transferring my message to another heading but I don't therewith give you the 
right to use that transfer to discard my response as not to the point. If you 
hadn't made the transfer you wouldn't have a point with this message. Just to 
recall, it was about semiotics and phaneroscopy an interesting point raised by 
Cathy dealing with the Mona Lisa.

By the way Peirce commented himself on cartesian doubt. It is that take on the 
matter I use, not the conventional one. Whatever that may be.

Auke

 

> Op 19 juni 2021 om 15:47 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca:
> 
> 
> Auke, I’m not suggesting anything different from what Peirce said about 
> phaneroscopy. The trouble is that in order to grasp what it is, you have to 
> take Peirce at his word rather than translating his ideas into habitual 
> categories such as “Cartesian thought experiment,” “absolute doubt” and “the 
> unreal.”
> 
> I know that you have access to a large sampling of Peirce’s texts and can 
> search through it for “phenomenology” and “phanero.” If you’re not willing to 
> wait for some of those texts to turn up in this slow read, I recommend that 
> you find and read them yourself while setting aside your preconceptions. 
> (which is in itself a crucial and challenging aspect of phaneroscopic 
> practice.) Then you’ll be in a position to judge whether anything I’ve said 
> is in conflict with anything Peirce said on the subject.
> 
>  
> 
> Gary f.
> 
>  
> 
> From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  
> On Behalf Of Auke van Breemen
>     Sent: 19-Jun-21 09:18
>     To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4
> 
>  
> 
> Gary F.
> 
> Are you suggesting that doing phaneroscopy is like doing a cartesian 
> thought experiment? Eliminating everything, and building things up from 
> absolute doubt, or, in your case, the unreal?
> 
> Auke
> 
> > > 
> > Op 19 juni 2021 om 14:33 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca 
> > mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca :
> > 
> > AVB: I think I never had you. So how could I lose you?
> > 
> > GF: I guess that’s right! I naively trusted that your question 
> > related to the nature of phaneroscopy as Peirce defines it, and not to some 
> > metaphysical issue which does not exist for phaneroscopy.
> > 
> >  
> > 
> > Gary f.
> > 
> >  
> > 
> >  
> > 
> > From: Auke van Breemen  > mailto:a.bree...@upcmail.nl >
> > Sent: 19-Jun-21 04:06
> > To: g...@gnusystems.ca mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca ; 
> > peirce-l@list.iupui.edu mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> > Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4
> > 
> >  
> > 
> > I think I never had you. So how could I lose you?
> > 
> >  
> > 
> > Auke
> > 
> > > > > 
> > > Op 18 juni 2021 om 22:30 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca 
> > > mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca :
> > > 
> > > Auke, I’m afraid you lost me there. I have no idea what you 
> > > would mean by stating that reality is “an object of which phaneroscopy 
> > > professes to deliver its immediate object” — if you stated that in an 
> > > earlier post, I must have missed it. I also can’t attach any meaning to 
> > > the proposition that “the dynamical object of the science is reality,” so 
> > > I can’t guess whether it would be true or not. Peirce says that 
> > > phaneroscopy is a “science,” not that the semiotic distinction between 
> > > dynamic and immediate objects applies to it as if it were a sign, at 
> > > least not in any text that I can recall.
> > > 
> > > I also don’t know what you could mean by saying that the 
> > > universal categories “do not have a role in reality and are of themselves 
> > > devoid of any reality.” Semiotic and metaphysics take their principles 
> > > from phaneroscopy, not the other way round. The object of attention in 
> > > phaneroscopy is obviously the phaneron. I could say more about Peirce’s 
> > > use of the word “object” in connection with phaneroscopy, and give some 
> > > examples, but that probably wouldn’t answer your question either, so I’ll 
> > > have to leave it at that.
> > > 
> > > Gary f.
> > > 
> > >  
> > > 
> > > From

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[gnox]

Auke, I’m not suggesting anything different from what Peirce said about 
phaneroscopy. The trouble is that in order to grasp what it is, you have to 
take Peirce at his word rather than translating his ideas into habitual 
categories such as “Cartesian thought experiment,” “absolute doubt” and “the 
unreal.”

I know that you have access to a large sampling of Peirce’s texts and can 
search through it for “phenomenology” and “phanero.” If you’re not willing to 
wait for some of those texts to turn up in this slow read, I recommend that you 
find and read them yourself while setting aside your preconceptions. (which is 
in itself a crucial and challenging aspect of phaneroscopic practice.) Then 
you’ll be in a position to judge whether anything I’ve said is in conflict with 
anything Peirce said on the subject.

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Auke van Breemen
Sent: 19-Jun-21 09:18
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

 

Gary F.

Are you suggesting that doing phaneroscopy is like doing a cartesian thought 
experiment? Eliminating everything, and building things up from absolute doubt, 
or, in your case, the unreal?

Auke

Op 19 juni 2021 om 14:33 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> 
: 

AVB: I think I never had you. So how could I lose you?

GF: I guess that’s right! I naively trusted that your question related to the 
nature of phaneroscopy as Peirce defines it, and not to some metaphysical issue 
which does not exist for phaneroscopy. 

  

Gary f. 

  

  

From: Auke van Breemen mailto:a.bree...@upcmail.nl> > 
Sent: 19-Jun-21 04:06
To: g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> ; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu 
<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> 
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

 

I think I never had you. So how could I lose you?

 

Auke

Op 18 juni 2021 om 22:30 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> 
:

Auke, I’m afraid you lost me there. I have no idea what you would mean by 
stating that reality is “an object of which phaneroscopy professes to deliver 
its immediate object” — if you stated that in an earlier post, I must have 
missed it. I also can’t attach any meaning to the proposition that “the 
dynamical object of the science is reality,” so I can’t guess whether it would 
be true or not. Peirce says that phaneroscopy is a “science,” not that the 
semiotic distinction between dynamic and immediate objects applies to it as if 
it were a sign, at least not in any text that I can recall. 

I also don’t know what you could mean by saying that the universal categories 
“do not have a role in reality and are of themselves devoid of any reality.” 
Semiotic and metaphysics take their principles from phaneroscopy, not the other 
way round. The object of attention in phaneroscopy is obviously the phaneron. I 
could say more about Peirce’s use of the word “object” in connection with 
phaneroscopy, and give some examples, but that probably wouldn’t answer your 
question either, so I’ll have to leave it at that. 

Gary f. 

  

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu>  
mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> > On 
Behalf Of Auke van Breemen
Sent: 18-Jun-21 14:38
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> 
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

 

Gary F., list,

Nice summary of pheneroscopy.  But that was not the issue. The issue was 
whether the dynamical object of the science is reality (an object of which 
phaneroscopy professes to deliver its immediate object), as I stated, or not. 

best,

Auke

Op 18 juni 2021 om 16:13 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> 
:

Auke, Gary R, list, 

For me at least, “veracity” only applies to stories or propositions that are 
publicly verifiable. If I tell you about a dream I had last night, I do so 
honestly if what I tell you is what I actually remember; but lacking any 
independent observer of the dream (or of my memory), I can’t claim veracity for 
what I tell you. I have no doubt that the dream actually occurred and thus was 
real in that sense, but I have no way to ascertain how the content of the dream 
relates to any reality external to it; and that is the reality which might be 
definable as the totality of facts expressible in true propositions. The 
phaneron includes much more than that, including dreams, possibilities and so 
on.

The focus of phaneroscopy on what appears precludes any judgments about 
(metaphysical) reality or (logical) truth. Indeed, the ability to discern the 
essential categories or “modes of being” of whatever can appear is what 
generates the concept of reality in the first place. Specifically, Peirce says 
that “In the idea of reality, Secondness is predominant; for the real is that 
which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as somet

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[Auke van Breemen]

Gary F.

Are you suggesting that doing phaneroscopy is like doing a cartesian thought 
experiment? Eliminating everything, and building things up from absolute doubt, 
or, in your case, the unreal?

Auke

> Op 19 juni 2021 om 14:33 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca:
> 
> 
> AVB: I think I never had you. So how could I lose you?
> 
> GF: I guess that’s right! I naively trusted that your question related to 
> the nature of phaneroscopy as Peirce defines it, and not to some metaphysical 
> issue which does not exist for phaneroscopy.
> 
>  
> 
> Gary f.
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> From: Auke van Breemen 
> Sent: 19-Jun-21 04:06
> To: g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4
> 
>  
> 
> I think I never had you. So how could I lose you?
> 
>  
> 
> Auke
> 
> > > 
> > Op 18 juni 2021 om 22:30 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca 
> > mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca :
> > 
> > Auke, I’m afraid you lost me there. I have no idea what you would 
> > mean by stating that reality is “an object of which phaneroscopy professes 
> > to deliver its immediate object” — if you stated that in an earlier post, I 
> > must have missed it. I also can’t attach any meaning to the proposition 
> > that “the dynamical object of the science is reality,” so I can’t guess 
> > whether it would be true or not. Peirce says that phaneroscopy is a 
> > “science,” not that the semiotic distinction between dynamic and immediate 
> > objects applies to it as if it were a sign, at least not in any text that I 
> > can recall.
> > 
> > I also don’t know what you could mean by saying that the universal 
> > categories “do not have a role in reality and are of themselves devoid of 
> > any reality.” Semiotic and metaphysics take their principles from 
> > phaneroscopy, not the other way round. The object of attention in 
> > phaneroscopy is obviously the phaneron. I could say more about Peirce’s use 
> > of the word “object” in connection with phaneroscopy, and give some 
> > examples, but that probably wouldn’t answer your question either, so I’ll 
> > have to leave it at that.
> > 
> > Gary f.
> > 
> >  
> > 
> > From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 
> > mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  > mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu > On Behalf Of Auke van Breemen
> > Sent: 18-Jun-21 14:38
> > To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> > Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4
> > 
> >  
> > 
> > Gary F., list,
> > 
> > Nice summary of pheneroscopy.  But that was not the issue. The 
> > issue was whether the dynamical object of the science is reality (an object 
> > of which phaneroscopy professes to deliver its immediate object), as I 
> > stated, or not. 
> > 
> > best,
> > 
> > Auke
> > 
> > > > > 
> > > Op 18 juni 2021 om 16:13 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca 
> > > mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca :
> > > 
> > > Auke, Gary R, list,
> > > 
> > > For me at least, “veracity” only applies to stories or 
> > > propositions that are publicly verifiable. If I tell you about a dream I 
> > > had last night, I do so honestly if what I tell you is what I actually 
> > > remember; but lacking any independent observer of the dream (or of my 
> > > memory), I can’t claim veracity for what I tell you. I have no doubt that 
> > > the dream actually occurred and thus was real in that sense, but I have 
> > > no way to ascertain how the content of the dream relates to any reality 
> > > external to it; and that is the reality which might be definable as the 
> > > totality of facts expressible in true propositions. The phaneron includes 
> > > much more than that, including dreams, possibilities and so on.
> > > 
> > > The focus of phaneroscopy on what appears precludes any 
> > > judgments about (metaphysical) reality or (logical) truth. Indeed, the 
> > > ability to discern the essential categories or “modes of being” of 
> > > whatever can appear is what generates the concept of reality in the first 
> > > place. Specifically, Peirce says that “In the idea of reality, Secondness 
> > > is predominant; for the real is that which insists upon forcing its way 
> > > to recogniti

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[gnox]

AVB: I think I never had you. So how could I lose you?

GF: I guess that’s right! I naively trusted that your question related to the 
nature of phaneroscopy as Peirce defines it, and not to some metaphysical issue 
which does not exist for phaneroscopy.

 

Gary f. 

 

 

From: Auke van Breemen  
Sent: 19-Jun-21 04:06
To: g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

 

I think I never had you. So how could I lose you?

 

Auke

Op 18 juni 2021 om 22:30 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> 
: 

Auke, I’m afraid you lost me there. I have no idea what you would mean by 
stating that reality is “an object of which phaneroscopy professes to deliver 
its immediate object” — if you stated that in an earlier post, I must have 
missed it. I also can’t attach any meaning to the proposition that “the 
dynamical object of the science is reality,” so I can’t guess whether it would 
be true or not. Peirce says that phaneroscopy is a “science,” not that the 
semiotic distinction between dynamic and immediate objects applies to it as if 
it were a sign, at least not in any text that I can recall. 

I also don’t know what you could mean by saying that the universal categories 
“do not have a role in reality and are of themselves devoid of any reality.” 
Semiotic and metaphysics take their principles from phaneroscopy, not the other 
way round. The object of attention in phaneroscopy is obviously the phaneron. I 
could say more about Peirce’s use of the word “object” in connection with 
phaneroscopy, and give some examples, but that probably wouldn’t answer your 
question either, so I’ll have to leave it at that. 

Gary f. 

  

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu>  
mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> > On 
Behalf Of Auke van Breemen
Sent: 18-Jun-21 14:38
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> 
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

 

Gary F., list,

Nice summary of pheneroscopy.  But that was not the issue. The issue was 
whether the dynamical object of the science is reality (an object of which 
phaneroscopy professes to deliver its immediate object), as I stated, or not. 

best,

Auke

Op 18 juni 2021 om 16:13 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> 
:

Auke, Gary R, list, 

For me at least, “veracity” only applies to stories or propositions that are 
publicly verifiable. If I tell you about a dream I had last night, I do so 
honestly if what I tell you is what I actually remember; but lacking any 
independent observer of the dream (or of my memory), I can’t claim veracity for 
what I tell you. I have no doubt that the dream actually occurred and thus was 
real in that sense, but I have no way to ascertain how the content of the dream 
relates to any reality external to it; and that is the reality which might be 
definable as the totality of facts expressible in true propositions. The 
phaneron includes much more than that, including dreams, possibilities and so 
on.

The focus of phaneroscopy on what appears precludes any judgments about 
(metaphysical) reality or (logical) truth. Indeed, the ability to discern the 
essential categories or “modes of being” of whatever can appear is what 
generates the concept of reality in the first place. Specifically, Peirce says 
that “In the idea of reality, Secondness is predominant; for the real is that 
which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as something other than the 
mind's creation” (CP 1.325, R 717). Logic and metaphysics have to develop their 
senses of truth and reality from some method of observing and generalizing that 
does not presuppose them, and that is what Peirce called phenomenology or 
phaneroscopy. 

By the way, I’m using those terms almost interchangeably, because I think 
Peirce’s decision to call it “phaneroscopy” in 1904 was strictly a 
terminological change (he decided there were too many other established uses of 
the term “phenomenology” already). Gary R’s post yesterday suggested that as 
phaneroscopy develops beyond Peirce’s version (as he expected it would), it may 
develop other “branches” or parts to serve as bridges to other sciences such as 
semeiotics. Then the researchers involved will have to make more terminological 
decisions about what to call these branches or whether to call them “branches” 
of phenomenology or phaneroscopy. In this slow read though, all we’re trying to 
do (so far) is to try to develop a clear and distinct idea of what the science 
is that Peirce called phenomenology or phaneroscopy. 

I hope this helps … 

  

Gary f. 

  

  

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu>  
mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> > On 
Behalf Of Auke van Breemen
Sent: 18-Jun-21 08:36
To: 
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

 

Gary, List

I 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[Auke van Breemen]

I think I never had you. So how could I lose you?


Auke

> Op 18 juni 2021 om 22:30 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca:
> 
> 
> Auke, I’m afraid you lost me there. I have no idea what you would mean by 
> stating that reality is “an object of which phaneroscopy professes to deliver 
> its immediate object” — if you stated that in an earlier post, I must have 
> missed it. I also can’t attach any meaning to the proposition that “the 
> dynamical object of the science is reality,” so I can’t guess whether it 
> would be true or not. Peirce says that phaneroscopy is a “science,” not that 
> the semiotic distinction between dynamic and immediate objects applies to it 
> as if it were a sign, at least not in any text that I can recall.
> 
> I also don’t know what you could mean by saying that the universal 
> categories “do not have a role in reality and are of themselves devoid of any 
> reality.” Semiotic and metaphysics take their principles from phaneroscopy, 
> not the other way round. The object of attention in phaneroscopy is obviously 
> the phaneron. I could say more about Peirce’s use of the word “object” in 
> connection with phaneroscopy, and give some examples, but that probably 
> wouldn’t answer your question either, so I’ll have to leave it at that.
> 
> Gary f.
> 
>  
> 
> From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  
> On Behalf Of Auke van Breemen
> Sent: 18-Jun-21 14:38
> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4
> 
>  
> 
> Gary F., list,
> 
> Nice summary of pheneroscopy.  But that was not the issue. The issue was 
> whether the dynamical object of the science is reality (an object of which 
> phaneroscopy professes to deliver its immediate object), as I stated, or not. 
> 
> best,
> 
> Auke
> 
> > > 
> > Op 18 juni 2021 om 16:13 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca 
> > mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca :
> > 
> > Auke, Gary R, list,
> > 
> > For me at least, “veracity” only applies to stories or propositions 
> > that are publicly verifiable. If I tell you about a dream I had last night, 
> > I do so honestly if what I tell you is what I actually remember; but 
> > lacking any independent observer of the dream (or of my memory), I can’t 
> > claim veracity for what I tell you. I have no doubt that the dream actually 
> > occurred and thus was real in that sense, but I have no way to ascertain 
> > how the content of the dream relates to any reality external to it; and 
> > that is the reality which might be definable as the totality of facts 
> > expressible in true propositions. The phaneron includes much more than 
> > that, including dreams, possibilities and so on.
> > 
> > The focus of phaneroscopy on what appears precludes any judgments 
> > about (metaphysical) reality or (logical) truth. Indeed, the ability to 
> > discern the essential categories or “modes of being” of whatever can appear 
> > is what generates the concept of reality in the first place. Specifically, 
> > Peirce says that “In the idea of reality, Secondness is predominant; for 
> > the real is that which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as 
> > something other than the mind's creation” (CP 1.325, R 717). Logic and 
> > metaphysics have to develop their senses of truth and reality from some 
> > method of observing and generalizing that does not presuppose them, and 
> > that is what Peirce called phenomenology or phaneroscopy.
> > 
> > By the way, I’m using those terms almost interchangeably, because I 
> > think Peirce’s decision to call it “phaneroscopy” in 1904 was strictly a 
> > terminological change (he decided there were too many other established 
> > uses of the term “phenomenology” already). Gary R’s post yesterday 
> > suggested that as phaneroscopy develops beyond Peirce’s version (as he 
> > expected it would), it may develop other “branches” or parts to serve as 
> > bridges to other sciences such as semeiotics. Then the researchers involved 
> > will have to make more terminological decisions about what to call these 
> > branches or whether to call them “branches” of phenomenology or 
> > phaneroscopy. In this slow read though, all we’re trying to do (so far) is 
> > to try to develop a clear and distinct idea of what the science is that 
> > Peirce called phenomenology or phaneroscopy.
> > 
> >     I hope this helps …
> > 
> >  
> > 
> > Gary f.
> > 
> >  
> > 
> >  
> > 
> > From: peirce-l-req

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[gnox]

Auke, I’m afraid you lost me there. I have no idea what you would mean by 
stating that reality is “an object of which phaneroscopy professes to deliver 
its immediate object” — if you stated that in an earlier post, I must have 
missed it. I also can’t attach any meaning to the proposition that “the 
dynamical object of the science is reality,” so I can’t guess whether it would 
be true or not. Peirce says that phaneroscopy is a “science,” not that the 
semiotic distinction between dynamic and immediate objects applies to it as if 
it were a sign, at least not in any text that I can recall. 

I also don’t know what you could mean by saying that the universal categories 
“do not have a role in reality and are of themselves devoid of any reality.” 
Semiotic and metaphysics take their principles from phaneroscopy, not the other 
way round. The object of attention in phaneroscopy is obviously the phaneron. I 
could say more about Peirce’s use of the word “object” in connection with 
phaneroscopy, and give some examples, but that probably wouldn’t answer your 
question either, so I’ll have to leave it at that.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Auke van Breemen
Sent: 18-Jun-21 14:38
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

 

Gary F., list,

Nice summary of pheneroscopy.  But that was not the issue. The issue was 
whether the dynamical object of the science is reality (an object of which 
phaneroscopy professes to deliver its immediate object), as I stated, or not. 

best,

Auke

Op 18 juni 2021 om 16:13 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> 
: 

Auke, Gary R, list, 

For me at least, “veracity” only applies to stories or propositions that are 
publicly verifiable. If I tell you about a dream I had last night, I do so 
honestly if what I tell you is what I actually remember; but lacking any 
independent observer of the dream (or of my memory), I can’t claim veracity for 
what I tell you. I have no doubt that the dream actually occurred and thus was 
real in that sense, but I have no way to ascertain how the content of the dream 
relates to any reality external to it; and that is the reality which might be 
definable as the totality of facts expressible in true propositions. The 
phaneron includes much more than that, including dreams, possibilities and so 
on.

The focus of phaneroscopy on what appears precludes any judgments about 
(metaphysical) reality or (logical) truth. Indeed, the ability to discern the 
essential categories or “modes of being” of whatever can appear is what 
generates the concept of reality in the first place. Specifically, Peirce says 
that “In the idea of reality, Secondness is predominant; for the real is that 
which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as something other than the 
mind's creation” (CP 1.325, R 717). Logic and metaphysics have to develop their 
senses of truth and reality from some method of observing and generalizing that 
does not presuppose them, and that is what Peirce called phenomenology or 
phaneroscopy. 

By the way, I’m using those terms almost interchangeably, because I think 
Peirce’s decision to call it “phaneroscopy” in 1904 was strictly a 
terminological change (he decided there were too many other established uses of 
the term “phenomenology” already). Gary R’s post yesterday suggested that as 
phaneroscopy develops beyond Peirce’s version (as he expected it would), it may 
develop other “branches” or parts to serve as bridges to other sciences such as 
semeiotics. Then the researchers involved will have to make more terminological 
decisions about what to call these branches or whether to call them “branches” 
of phenomenology or phaneroscopy. In this slow read though, all we’re trying to 
do (so far) is to try to develop a clear and distinct idea of what the science 
is that Peirce called phenomenology or phaneroscopy. 

I hope this helps … 

  

Gary f. 

  

  

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu>  
mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> > On 
Behalf Of Auke van Breemen
Sent: 18-Jun-21 08:36
To: 
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

 

Gary, List

I wrote:

Or the veracity of a pheneroscopic excercize.

--

You wrote:

“Veracity” does not apply to it in the way it does to a proposition, because 
what is predominant in phaneroscopy is not Secondness but Firstness.

--

In my non native estimate the word veracity applies to stories. Maybe honest or 
single minded would have been a better choice. 

But, I didn't claim that it does apply in the same way as propositions. And, I 
did apply it to the excercize.   

 

The issue is the elements of the phaneron, also known as the “universal 
categories.”

--

yes, but to what end should we delve them up if they do not have a role in 
reality and are of themselves devoid of any reality? It makes me wonder what 
your concep

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[Auke van Breemen]

Gary F., list,

Nice summary of pheneroscopy.  But that was not the issue. The issue was 
whether the dynamical object of the science is reality (an object of which 
phaneroscopy professes to deliver its immediate object), as I stated, or not. 

best,

Auke

> Op 18 juni 2021 om 16:13 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca:
> 
> 
> Auke, Gary R, list,
> 
> For me at least, “veracity” only applies to stories or propositions that 
> are publicly verifiable. If I tell you about a dream I had last night, I do 
> so honestly if what I tell you is what I actually remember; but lacking any 
> independent observer of the dream (or of my memory), I can’t claim veracity 
> for what I tell you. I have no doubt that the dream actually occurred and 
> thus was real in that sense, but I have no way to ascertain how the content 
> of the dream relates to any reality external to it; and that is the reality 
> which might be definable as the totality of facts expressible in true 
> propositions. The phaneron includes much more than that, including dreams, 
> possibilities and so on.
> 
> The focus of phaneroscopy on what appears precludes any judgments about 
> (metaphysical) reality or (logical) truth. Indeed, the ability to discern the 
> essential categories or “modes of being” of whatever can appear is what 
> generates the concept of reality in the first place. Specifically, Peirce 
> says that “In the idea of reality, Secondness is predominant; for the real is 
> that which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as something other 
> than the mind's creation” (CP 1.325, R 717). Logic and metaphysics have to 
> develop their senses of truth and reality from some method of observing and 
> generalizing that does not presuppose them, and that is what Peirce called 
> phenomenology or phaneroscopy.
> 
> By the way, I’m using those terms almost interchangeably, because I think 
> Peirce’s decision to call it “phaneroscopy” in 1904 was strictly a 
> terminological change (he decided there were too many other established uses 
> of the term “phenomenology” already). Gary R’s post yesterday suggested that 
> as phaneroscopy develops beyond Peirce’s version (as he expected it would), 
> it may develop other “branches” or parts to serve as bridges to other 
> sciences such as semeiotics. Then the researchers involved will have to make 
> more terminological decisions about what to call these branches or whether to 
> call them “branches” of phenomenology or phaneroscopy. In this slow read 
> though, all we’re trying to do (so far) is to try to develop a clear and 
> distinct idea of what the science is that Peirce called phenomenology or 
> phaneroscopy.
> 
> I hope this helps …
> 
>  
> 
> Gary f.
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  
> On Behalf Of Auke van Breemen
> Sent: 18-Jun-21 08:36
> To:
> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4
> 
>  
> 
> Gary, List
> 
> I wrote:
> 
> Or the veracity of a pheneroscopic excercize.
> 
> --
> 
> You wrote:
> 
> “Veracity” does not apply to it in the way it does to a proposition, 
> because what is predominant in phaneroscopy is not Secondness but Firstness.
> 
> --
> 
> In my non native estimate the word veracity applies to stories. Maybe 
> honest or single minded would have been a better choice. 
> 
> But, I didn't claim that it does apply in the same way as propositions. 
> And, I did apply it to the excercize.   
> 
>  
> 
> The issue is the elements of the phaneron, also known as the “universal 
> categories.”
> 
> --
> 
> yes, but to what end should we delve them up if they do not have a role 
> in reality and are of themselves devoid of any reality? It makes me wonder 
> what your conception is of reality. The totality of facts expressible in 
> (trutfunctional) propositions?
> 
> best,
> 
> Auke
> 
> > > 
> > Op 17 juni 2021 om 14:05 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca 
> > mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca :
> > 
> > Helmut, Auke, list,
> > 
> > I think Helmut’s point is well taken (though perhaps a bit 
> > overstated): it’s very difficult to have a dialogue with someone who reacts 
> > so violently to a word (or other part of a sign) that they lose the ability 
> > to focus on the object of the sign or the subject under discussion. 
> > Consequently I don’t think either Jon or Edwina can be blamed for driving 
> > Cathy away from the discussion; neither of them could have guessed that 
> > their use of the word “embodied” would have such an effect on 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[Gary Richmond]

py develops beyond Peirce’s version (as he
> expected it would), it may develop other “branches” or parts to serve as
> bridges to other sciences such as semeiotics. Then the researchers involved
> will have to make more terminological decisions about what to call these
> branches or whether to call them “branches” of phenomenology or
> phaneroscopy. In this slow read though, all we’re trying to do (so far) is
> to try to develop a clear and distinct idea of *what the science is* that
> Peirce called phenomenology or phaneroscopy.
>
> I hope this helps …
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  *On
> Behalf Of *Auke van Breemen
> *Sent:* 18-Jun-21 08:36
> *To:*
> *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4
>
>
>
> Gary, List
>
> I wrote:
>
> Or the veracity of a pheneroscopic excercize.
>
> --
>
> You wrote:
>
> “Veracity” does not apply to it in the way it does to a proposition,
> because what is predominant in phaneroscopy is not Secondness but Firstness.
>
> --
>
> In my non native estimate the word veracity applies to stories. Maybe
> honest or single minded would have been a better choice.
>
> But, I didn't claim that it does apply in the same way as propositions.
> And, I did apply it to the excercize.
>
>
>
> The issue is the elements of the phaneron, also known as the “universal
> categories.”
>
> --
>
> yes, but to what end should we delve them up if they do not have a role in
> reality and are of themselves devoid of any reality? It makes me wonder
> what your conception is of reality. The totality of facts expressible in
> (trutfunctional) propositions?
>
> best,
>
> Auke
>
> Op 17 juni 2021 om 14:05 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca:
>
> Helmut, Auke, list,
>
> I think Helmut’s point is well taken (though perhaps a bit overstated):
> it’s very difficult to have a dialogue with someone who reacts so violently
> to a *word* (or other part of a sign) that they lose the ability to focus
> on the *object* of the sign or the subject under discussion. Consequently
> I don’t think either Jon or Edwina can be blamed for driving Cathy away
> from the discussion; neither of them could have guessed that their use of
> the word “embodied” would have such an effect on her.
>
> Auke, I hope you don’t mind if I import your post from the other thread,
> because it does have a bearing on phaneroscopy. Here it is complete:
>
> [[ Jon,
>
> CP 1. 175 The reality of things consists in their persistent forcing
> themselves upon our recognition.
>
> CP 1.325 In the idea of reality, Secondness is predominant; for the real
> is that which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as something *other
> *than the mind's creation.
>
> This quote comes from your recent reponse to Edwina:
>
> CSP: That which any true proposition asserts is *real*, in the sense of
> being as it is regardless of what you or I may think about it. (CP 5.432,
> EP 2:343, 1905)
>
> And here we see what the relation is between propositions and reality.
>
> In short: Real is that what is independed of individual thought. And it is
> because of this independence of individual thought that we can talk about
> the truth of propositions. Or the veracity of a pheneroscopic excercize. ]]
>
> GF: This is all accurate and to the point, *except* your last sentence.
> It is the predominance of Secondness that separates logic as a normative
> science from phaneroscopy, which for Peirce is a positive *but not
> normative* science. “Veracity” does not apply to it in the way it does to
> a proposition, because what is predominant in phaneroscopy is not
> Secondness but Firstness.
>
> CSP: Phenomenology treats of the universal Qualities of Phenomena in their
> immediate phenomenal character, in themselves as phenomena. It, thus,
> treats of Phenomena in their Firstness (CP 5.122, 1903).
>
> GF: The Firstness of Secondness is what Peirce called “dyadic
> consciousness.” But in phenomenology, we don’t talk about “what is
> independent of individual thought,” because the existence of individual
> thinkers *does not appear in the direct consciousness* of the
> phaneroscopist. That is why Peircean phaneroscopy pointedly ignores the
> differences between individual minds and treats all possible minds as
> *one* mind.
>
> CSP: Phaneroscopy is the description of the *phaneron;* and by the
> *phaneron* I mean the collective total of all that is in any way or in
> any sense present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds
> to any real thing or not. If you ask present *when,* and to *whose* mind,
> I reply that I leave these questions unanswered, nev

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

Thank you for this remarkably concise and lucid explanation of why it is
important to recognize phaneroscopy as a distinct science, and why Peirce
situates it where he does within his overall classification. I find the
following statement to be especially illuminating, and I have bolded the
key phrase within it.

GF: Logic and metaphysics have to develop their senses of truth and reality
from some method of observing and generalizing *that does not presuppose
them*, and that is what Peirce called phenomenology or phaneroscopy.


It is another helpful reminder to me as someone who has a tendency to jump
straight into logic/semeiotic and metaphysics.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Jun 18, 2021 at 9:13 AM  wrote:

> Auke, Gary R, list,
>
> For me at least, “veracity” only applies to stories or propositions that
> are *publicly* verifiable. If I tell you about a dream I had last night,
> I do so *honestly* if what I tell you is what I actually remember; but
> lacking any independent observer of the dream (or of my memory), I can’t
> claim *veracity* for what I tell you. I have no doubt that the dream *actually
> occurred* and thus was real in that sense, but I have no way to ascertain
> how the *content* of the dream relates to any reality *external* to it;
> and *that* is the reality which might be definable as the totality of
> facts expressible in true propositions. The phaneron includes much more
> than that, including dreams, possibilities and so on.
>
> The focus of phaneroscopy on what *appears* precludes any judgments about
> (metaphysical) reality or (logical) truth. Indeed, the ability to discern
> the essential categories or “modes of being” of whatever can *appear* is
> what generates the concept of reality in the first place. Specifically,
> Peirce says that “In the idea of reality, Secondness is predominant; for
> the real is that which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as
> something *other* than the mind's creation” (CP 1.325, R 717). Logic and
> metaphysics have to develop their senses of truth and reality from some
> method of observing and generalizing that does not presuppose them, and
> that is what Peirce called phenomenology or phaneroscopy.
>
> By the way, I’m using those terms almost interchangeably, because I think
> Peirce’s decision to call it “phaneroscopy” in 1904 was strictly a
> terminological change (he decided there were too many other established
> uses of the term “phenomenology” already). Gary R’s post yesterday
> suggested that as phaneroscopy develops beyond Peirce’s version (as he
> expected it would), it may develop other “branches” or parts to serve as
> bridges to other sciences such as semeiotics. Then the researchers involved
> will have to make more terminological decisions about what to call these
> branches or whether to call them “branches” of phenomenology or
> phaneroscopy. In this slow read though, all we’re trying to do (so far) is
> to try to develop a clear and distinct idea of *what the science is* that
> Peirce called phenomenology or phaneroscopy.
>
> I hope this helps …
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
>
>
> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  *On
> Behalf Of *Auke van Breemen
> *Sent:* 18-Jun-21 08:36
> *To:*
> *Subject:* RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4
>
>
>
> Gary, List
>
> I wrote:
>
> Or the veracity of a pheneroscopic excercize.
>
> --
>
> You wrote:
>
> “Veracity” does not apply to it in the way it does to a proposition,
> because what is predominant in phaneroscopy is not Secondness but Firstness.
>
> --
>
> In my non native estimate the word veracity applies to stories. Maybe
> honest or single minded would have been a better choice.
>
> But, I didn't claim that it does apply in the same way as propositions.
> And, I did apply it to the excercize.
>
> The issue is the elements of the phaneron, also known as the “universal
> categories.”
>
> --
>
> yes, but to what end should we delve them up if they do not have a role in
> reality and are of themselves devoid of any reality? It makes me wonder
> what your conception is of reality. The totality of facts expressible in
> (trutfunctional) propositions?
>
> best,
>
> Auke
>
> Op 17 juni 2021 om 14:05 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca:
>
> Helmut, Auke, list,
>
> I think Helmut’s point is well taken (though perhaps a bit overstated):
> it’s very difficult to have a dialogue with someone who reacts so violently
> to a *word* (or other part of a sign) that they lose the ability to focus
> on the *object* of the sign or the subject under d

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[gnox]

Auke, Gary R, list,

For me at least, “veracity” only applies to stories or propositions that are 
publicly verifiable. If I tell you about a dream I had last night, I do so 
honestly if what I tell you is what I actually remember; but lacking any 
independent observer of the dream (or of my memory), I can’t claim veracity for 
what I tell you. I have no doubt that the dream actually occurred and thus was 
real in that sense, but I have no way to ascertain how the content of the dream 
relates to any reality external to it; and that is the reality which might be 
definable as the totality of facts expressible in true propositions. The 
phaneron includes much more than that, including dreams, possibilities and so 
on.

The focus of phaneroscopy on what appears precludes any judgments about 
(metaphysical) reality or (logical) truth. Indeed, the ability to discern the 
essential categories or “modes of being” of whatever can appear is what 
generates the concept of reality in the first place. Specifically, Peirce says 
that “In the idea of reality, Secondness is predominant; for the real is that 
which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as something other than the 
mind's creation” (CP 1.325, R 717). Logic and metaphysics have to develop their 
senses of truth and reality from some method of observing and generalizing that 
does not presuppose them, and that is what Peirce called phenomenology or 
phaneroscopy.

By the way, I’m using those terms almost interchangeably, because I think 
Peirce’s decision to call it “phaneroscopy” in 1904 was strictly a 
terminological change (he decided there were too many other established uses of 
the term “phenomenology” already). Gary R’s post yesterday suggested that as 
phaneroscopy develops beyond Peirce’s version (as he expected it would), it may 
develop other “branches” or parts to serve as bridges to other sciences such as 
semeiotics. Then the researchers involved will have to make more terminological 
decisions about what to call these branches or whether to call them “branches” 
of phenomenology or phaneroscopy. In this slow read though, all we’re trying to 
do (so far) is to try to develop a clear and distinct idea of what the science 
is that Peirce called phenomenology or phaneroscopy.

I hope this helps …

 

Gary f.

 

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Auke van Breemen
Sent: 18-Jun-21 08:36
To: 
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

 

Gary, List

I wrote:

Or the veracity of a pheneroscopic excercize.

--

You wrote:

“Veracity” does not apply to it in the way it does to a proposition, because 
what is predominant in phaneroscopy is not Secondness but Firstness.

--

In my non native estimate the word veracity applies to stories. Maybe honest or 
single minded would have been a better choice. 

But, I didn't claim that it does apply in the same way as propositions. And, I 
did apply it to the excercize.   

 

The issue is the elements of the phaneron, also known as the “universal 
categories.”

--

yes, but to what end should we delve them up if they do not have a role in 
reality and are of themselves devoid of any reality? It makes me wonder what 
your conception is of reality. The totality of facts expressible in 
(trutfunctional) propositions?

best,

Auke

Op 17 juni 2021 om 14:05 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> 
: 

Helmut, Auke, list, 

I think Helmut’s point is well taken (though perhaps a bit overstated): it’s 
very difficult to have a dialogue with someone who reacts so violently to a 
word (or other part of a sign) that they lose the ability to focus on the 
object of the sign or the subject under discussion. Consequently I don’t think 
either Jon or Edwina can be blamed for driving Cathy away from the discussion; 
neither of them could have guessed that their use of the word “embodied” would 
have such an effect on her. 

Auke, I hope you don’t mind if I import your post from the other thread, 
because it does have a bearing on phaneroscopy. Here it is complete: 

[[ Jon, 

CP 1. 175 The reality of things consists in their persistent forcing themselves 
upon our recognition.

CP 1.325 In the idea of reality, Secondness is predominant; for the real is 
that which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as something other than 
the mind's creation.

This quote comes from your recent reponse to Edwina:

CSP: That which any true proposition asserts is real, in the sense of being as 
it is regardless of what you or I may think about it. (CP 5.432, EP 2:343, 1905)

And here we see what the relation is between propositions and reality.

In short: Real is that what is independed of individual thought. And it is 
because of this independence of individual thought that we can talk about the 
truth of propositions. Or the veracity of a pheneroscopic excercize. ]]

GF: This is all accurate and to the point, except your last sentence. It is the 
predominance of Seco

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[Auke van Breemen]

Gary, List

I wrote:

Or the veracity of a pheneroscopic excercize.

--

You wrote:

“Veracity” does not apply to it in the way it does to a proposition, because 
what is predominant in phaneroscopy is not Secondness but Firstness.

--

In my non native estimate the word veracity applies to stories. Maybe honest or 
single minded would have been a better choice. 

But, I didn't claim that it does apply in the same way as propositions. And, I 
did apply it to the excercize.   


The issue is the elements of the phaneron, also known as the “universal 
categories.”

--

yes, but to what end should we delve them up if they do not have a role in 
reality and are of themselves devoid of any reality? It makes me wonder what 
your conception is of reality. The totality of facts expressible in 
(trutfunctional) propositions?

best,

Auke

> Op 17 juni 2021 om 14:05 schreef g...@gnusystems.ca:
> 
> 
> Helmut, Auke, list,
> 
> I think Helmut’s point is well taken (though perhaps a bit overstated): 
> it’s very difficult to have a dialogue with someone who reacts so violently 
> to a word (or other part of a sign) that they lose the ability to focus on 
> the object of the sign or the subject under discussion. Consequently I don’t 
> think either Jon or Edwina can be blamed for driving Cathy away from the 
> discussion; neither of them could have guessed that their use of the word 
> “embodied” would have such an effect on her.
> 
> Auke, I hope you don’t mind if I import your post from the other thread, 
> because it does have a bearing on phaneroscopy. Here it is complete:
> 
> [[ Jon,
> 
> CP 1. 175 The reality of things consists in their persistent forcing 
> themselves upon our recognition.
> 
> CP 1.325 In the idea of reality, Secondness is predominant; for the real 
> is that which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as something other 
> than the mind's creation.
> 
> This quote comes from your recent reponse to Edwina:
> 
> CSP: That which any true proposition asserts is real, in the sense of 
> being as it is regardless of what you or I may think about it. (CP 5.432, EP 
> 2:343, 1905)
> 
> And here we see what the relation is between propositions and reality.
> 
> In short: Real is that what is independed of individual thought. And it 
> is because of this independence of individual thought that we can talk about 
> the truth of propositions. Or the veracity of a pheneroscopic excercize. ]]
> 
> GF: This is all accurate and to the point, except your last sentence. It 
> is the predominance of Secondness that separates logic as a normative science 
> from phaneroscopy, which for Peirce is a positive but not normative science. 
> “Veracity” does not apply to it in the way it does to a proposition, because 
> what is predominant in phaneroscopy is not Secondness but Firstness.
> 
> CSP: Phenomenology treats of the universal Qualities of Phenomena in 
> their immediate phenomenal character, in themselves as phenomena. It, thus, 
> treats of Phenomena in their Firstness (CP 5.122, 1903).
> 
> GF: The Firstness of Secondness is what Peirce called “dyadic 
> consciousness.” But in phenomenology, we don’t talk about “what is 
> independent of individual thought,” because the existence of individual 
> thinkers does not appear in the direct consciousness of the phaneroscopist. 
> That is why Peircean phaneroscopy pointedly ignores the differences between 
> individual minds and treats all possible minds as one mind.
> 
> CSP: Phaneroscopy is the description of the phaneron; and by the phaneron 
> I mean the collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present 
> to the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or 
> not. If you ask present when, and to whose mind, I reply that I leave these 
> questions unanswered, never having entertained a doubt that those features of 
> the phaneron that I have found in my mind are present at all times and to all 
> minds. (CP 1.284, 1905)
> 
> CSP: I propose to use the word Phaneron as a proper name to denote the 
> total content of any one consciousness (for any one is substantially any 
> other), the sum of all we have in mind in any way whatever, regardless of its 
> cognitive value. (EP2:362, 1905)
> 
> GF: If you say this is unrealistic, you are exactly right. Reality is not 
> an issue in phenomenology/phaneroscopy. The issue is the elements of the 
> phaneron, also known as the “universal categories.”
> 
> Gary f.
> 
>  
> 
> From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 
> mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu > On Behalf Of Helmut Raulien
> Sent: 17-Jun-21 02:57
> To: jonalanschm...@gmail.com mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com
> 
> List,
> 
>  
> 
> the term "red flag" is a red flag for me. When I hear or read it, I 
> suspect people at work, who are not interested in a fair discussion, but in 
> 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[gnox]

Helmut, Auke, list,

I think Helmut’s point is well taken (though perhaps a bit overstated): it’s 
very difficult to have a dialogue with someone who reacts so violently to a 
word (or other part of a sign) that they lose the ability to focus on the 
object of the sign or the subject under discussion. Consequently I don’t think 
either Jon or Edwina can be blamed for driving Cathy away from the discussion; 
neither of them could have guessed that their use of the word “embodied” would 
have such an effect on her.

Auke, I hope you don’t mind if I import your post from the other thread, 
because it does have a bearing on phaneroscopy. Here it is complete:

[[ Jon,

CP 1. 175 The reality of things consists in their persistent forcing themselves 
upon our recognition.

CP 1.325 In the idea of reality, Secondness is predominant; for the real is 
that which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as something other than 
the mind's creation.

This quote comes from your recent reponse to Edwina:

CSP: That which any true proposition asserts is real, in the sense of being as 
it is regardless of what you or I may think about it. (CP 5.432, EP 2:343, 1905)

And here we see what the relation is between propositions and reality.

In short: Real is that what is independed of individual thought. And it is 
because of this independence of individual thought that we can talk about the 
truth of propositions. Or the veracity of a pheneroscopic excercize. ]]

GF: This is all accurate and to the point, except your last sentence. It is the 
predominance of Secondness that separates logic as a normative science from 
phaneroscopy, which for Peirce is a positive but not normative science. 
“Veracity” does not apply to it in the way it does to a proposition, because 
what is predominant in phaneroscopy is not Secondness but Firstness. 

CSP: Phenomenology treats of the universal Qualities of Phenomena in their 
immediate phenomenal character, in themselves as phenomena. It, thus, treats of 
Phenomena in their Firstness (CP 5.122, 1903).

GF: The Firstness of Secondness is what Peirce called “dyadic consciousness.” 
But in phenomenology, we don’t talk about “what is independent of individual 
thought,” because the existence of individual thinkers does not appear in the 
direct consciousness of the phaneroscopist. That is why Peircean phaneroscopy 
pointedly ignores the differences between individual minds and treats all 
possible minds as one mind.

CSP: Phaneroscopy is the description of the phaneron; and by the phaneron I 
mean the collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present to 
the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or not. 
If you ask present when, and to whose mind, I reply that I leave these 
questions unanswered, never having entertained a doubt that those features of 
the phaneron that I have found in my mind are present at all times and to all 
minds. (CP 1.284, 1905)

CSP: I propose to use the word Phaneron as a proper name to denote the total 
content of any one consciousness (for any one is substantially any other), the 
sum of all we have in mind in any way whatever, regardless of its cognitive 
value. (EP2:362, 1905)

GF: If you say this is unrealistic, you are exactly right. Reality is not an 
issue in phenomenology/phaneroscopy. The issue is the elements of the phaneron, 
also known as the “universal categories.”

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu   
mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> > On 
Behalf Of Helmut Raulien
Sent: 17-Jun-21 02:57
To: jonalanschm...@gmail.com  

List,

 

the term "red flag" is a red flag for me. When I hear or read it, I suspect 
people at work, who are not interested in a fair discussion, but in 
tribalistically separating the discussers in one group of the good ones, and 
one of the bad ones, identifying the bad ones due to their use of the wrong 
codes. I said "I suspect", to try to avoid the paradoxon of doing the same now. 
Though I know it sounds as if I am. That is because if once this sort of 
manichaeism is started, it is hard to stop.

I am not completely against identity politics, but against essentialism. It 
originally is a rightist domain. Sadly, some leftists too do not pay enough 
attention that the defence of discriminated identity groups does not switch 
into essentialism.

 

Best

Helmut

 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., List:

CT: As I was contemplating whether or not I was in the right place by
having joined the list, someone then used the term embodied, and that made
my mind up for me.  .  The term 'embodied' is now a red flag for me."

GR: I may have used it in commenting on Merleau-Ponty, but I don't just now
recall.


For the record, there were three posts yesterday that included the term
"embodied," and none of them were yours.

JAS: In accordance with CP 2.276 (quoted below), I understand "hypoicon" to
be Peirce's term for any *embodied *sign that is *primarily *iconic, a
sinsign/token that represents its object by qualitatively resembling it and
does not otherwise indicate what that object is.

JAS: These are distinctions between different classes of hypoicons--images,
diagrams, and metaphors, respectively--rather than having anything to do
with distinguishing a hypoicon from an icon. Again, my understanding of the
latter is that a hypoicon is simply an *embodied *iconic sign.

ET: Firstness doesn't function per se but refers to an interactional
stimulus that has to be *embodied*, as a 'mode of being', even though it is
completely without awareness or consciousness. ..which would bring in
Secondness.


Cathy did not disclose which of these (perhaps all of them) she found so
problematic, but Peirce himself frequently employs "embodied" or
"embodiment"--a total of 63 times in CP. That being the case, why would
anyone who is genuinely seeking to understand and apply his thought
consider it to be a "red flag," let alone evidence supporting the
allegation that "Plato and Descartes influences" are "a little too
entrenched here"? I asked Cathy off-List first thing this morning if she
would mind elaborating on what she meant by that on-List remark, and she
replied that she would do so "as time permits," but so far I have not
received any further clarification.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Wed, Jun 16, 2021 at 7:31 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Edwina, List,
>
> Edwina wrote: Incredible - someone joins the list and then leaves it, and
> gives their reason for leaving with a critique  - and instead of examining
> why she left the list, ie, examining the validity of her critique - you
> turn her comments into a rather vicious attack on me.
>
> GR: What vicious attack? The thrust of my earlier post was this: "It is
> you [Edwina] who keeps making the claim that certain members of the List
> express Cartesian and, especially, Platonic ideas. But you have not been
> able to support that claim because it is empty and patently false." It is
> your comment, "I think that Cathy's leaving this list, and her critique of
> it [Cartesian, Platonic] should not be overlooked," which prompted my
> response. What 'critique'? She didn't support reason -- such as it was --
> with any explanation, argumentation; she didn't cite messages which had led
> her to that view, etc. And so, I decided *not *to overlook why she left
> so abruptly after such a promising start.
>
> Edwina: Instead - you should be asking HER what SHE sees as Cartesian and
> Platonic, and what she sees as confined - since SHE is the one who made
> those statements. Have you asked her? Why do you think she thought this
> way?  Or are you just brushing her off as you do with me?
>
> GR: (1) I did indeed ask her to expand on why she decided to leave the
> List in several off List exchanges today (see brief excerpts below); (2) I
> didn't "brush her off" at all. What a weird and, if not exactly 'vicious',
> certainly baseless and untoward thing to say. And I don't believe anyone
> else has ever accused me of being vicious (I am *not* vicious) -- it
> seems to me that making such accusations is *your* way of dealing with
> virtually any criticism coming your way; (3) I don't "brush you off" and,
> my engaging you in this exchange is an expression, if not exactly, proof of
> that. I do tend to disagree with you on many phenomenological, semeiotic,
> pragmatic, and metaphysical positions you've taken on the List, while I
> find that it is you who tends to dismiss out of hand the ideas of mine and
> those of certain other members of this List, you who *angrily* "brush
> off" certain others, especially when they disagree with you.
>
> GR: As for her off List comments on why she decided to leave the List,
> Cathy wrote, in part, that her "perspective about Plato and Descartes
> being too entrenched in what I have read of the 'list' is not influenced *by
> anyone other than Peirce*." When asked to explain that last phrase a bit
> further, Cathy wrote:
>
> CT: As I was contemplating whether or not I was in the right place by
> having joined the list, someone then used the term *embodied*, and that
> made my mind up for me.  .  The term 'embodied' is now a red flag for
> me."
>
> GR: I may have used it in commenting on 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, List,

Edwina wrote: Incredible - someone joins the list and then leaves it, and
gives their reason for leaving with a critique  - and instead of examining
why she left the list, ie, examining the validity of her critique - you
turn her comments into a rather vicious attack on me.

GR: What vicious attack? The thrust of my earlier post was this: "It is you
[Edwina] who keeps making the claim that certain members of the List
express Cartesian and, especially, Platonic ideas. But you have not been
able to support that claim because it is empty and patently false." It is
your comment, "I think that Cathy's leaving this list, and her critique of
it [Cartesian, Platonic] should not be overlooked," which prompted my
response. What 'critique'? She didn't support reason -- such as it was --
with any explanation, argumentation; she didn't cite messages which had led
her to that view, etc. And so, I decided *not *to overlook why she left so
abruptly after such a promising start.

Edwina: Instead - you should be asking HER what SHE sees as Cartesian and
Platonic, and what she sees as confined - since SHE is the one who made
those statements. Have you asked her? Why do you think she thought this
way?  Or are you just brushing her off as you do with me?

GR: (1) I did indeed ask her to expand on why she decided to leave the List
in several off List exchanges today (see brief excerpts below); (2) I
didn't "brush her off" at all. What a weird and, if not exactly 'vicious',
certainly baseless and untoward thing to say. And I don't believe anyone
else has ever accused me of being vicious (I am *not* vicious) -- it seems
to me that making such accusations is *your* way of dealing with virtually
any criticism coming your way; (3) I don't "brush you off" and, my engaging
you in this exchange is an expression, if not exactly, proof of that. I do
tend to disagree with you on many phenomenological, semeiotic, pragmatic,
and metaphysical positions you've taken on the List, while I find that it
is you who tends to dismiss out of hand the ideas of mine and those of
certain other members of this List, you who *angrily* "brush off" certain
others, especially when they disagree with you.

GR: As for her off List comments on why she decided to leave the List,
Cathy wrote, in part, that her "perspective about Plato and Descartes
being too entrenched in what I have read of the 'list' is not influenced *by
anyone other than Peirce*." When asked to explain that last phrase a bit
further, Cathy wrote:

CT: As I was contemplating whether or not I was in the right place by
having joined the list, someone then used the term *embodied*, and that
made my mind up for me.  .  The term 'embodied' is now a red flag for
me."

GR: I may have used it in commenting on Merleau-Ponty, but I don't just now
recall. In any case, I guess that is that; especially as it seems to me
that 'embodiment' is a concept hard to avoid in consideration of certain
areas of philosophy. And I do not at all see what makes references to
"embodiment" particularly Platonic or Cartesian.

Edwina: As for the Cartesian/Platonic ideologies - well, we've been through
that with the rejection of hylomorphic objective idealism - which posits NO
primordial laws but a correlation of the two.

GR: Yes, we've been through *that* again and again; and if Peirce's own
clear arguments in numerous quotations haven't convinced you, well
certainly those of us who take Peirce at his word (e.g. see: W 8:105-6; CP
6.24-5) haven't a chance. But is this alleged "rejection of hylomorphic
objective idealism" all you've got to claim that some here hold
"Cartesian/Platonic ideologies"? There's *got* to be more.

ET: How odd; you have set up a trio, yourself, JAS and Gary F, as some kind
of contained 'set' on this list.

GR: How odd that you should say that as I have done nothing of the sort.
JAS, Gary f, and I worked with Andre De Tienne to develop the current slow
read. We occasionally work together because we are interested in
and respect the work of each other and, so, have been known to collaborate
on projects together, cite each other's work, etc. None of this makes us a
dogmatic set of three, for both on and off List we both agree and disagree
with each other on various matters, have our own independent ideas and
work, etc. As we proceed in our slow read I think it is very likely that
you'll find us disagreeing on any number of points.

Edwina: But there are others in the field of Peircean semiotics - who DO
want to see how it operates pragmatically.

GR: Not one of this supposed triadic 'set' that you've imagined isn't
keenly interested in semeiotic and pragmatism. On the other hand, the slow
read is principally concerned with phaneroscopy and not semeiotic,
especially at this point in the discussion.

 Edwina: And they shouldn't be treated viciously.

GR: No one is being treated viciously in this forum: you are *not* a
victim, Edwina. In fact when I, as List moderator, have seen that 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,


Before getting swept away by the emotional content of what is *here*,

perhaps we ought to apply this method of phaneroscopy,

(which we run up the flagpole and salute),

to ourselves,

as he himself would see himself if he could duplicate himself and observe
himself with a critical eye.


I mean, *everybody* knows what Cathy meant by her farewell, *already*,
amirite?


“Thank you so much, but I'm finding some Plato and Descartes influences to
be a little too entrenched

here.”


With best wishes,
Jerry R

On Wed, Jun 16, 2021 at 3:04 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Incredible - someone joins the list and then leaves it, and gives their
> reason for leaving with a critique  - and instead of examining why she left
> the list, ie, examining the validity of her critique - you turn her
> comments into a rather vicious attack on me.
>
> Instead - you should be asking HER what SHE sees as Cartesian and
> Platonic, and what she sees as confined - since SHE is the one who made
> those statements. Have you asked her? Why do you think she thought this
> way?  Or are you just brushing her off as you do with me?
>
> As for the Cartesian/Platonic ideologies - well, we've been through that
> with the rejection of hylomorphic objective idealism - which posits NO
> primordial laws but a correlation of the two. .
>
> How odd; you have set up a trio, yourself, JAS and Gary F, as some kind of
> contained 'set' on this list. But there are others in the field of Peircean
> semiotics - who DO want to see how it operates pragmatically.  And they
> shouldn't be treated viciously.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Wed 16/06/21 3:33 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List,
>
> Edwina wrote: "I think that Cathy's leaving this list, and her critique
> of it [Cartesian, Platonic] should not be overlooked."
>
> What do you mean that her critique of the List "should not be
> overlooked"? What I think should not be 'overlooked' is outlined in what
> I write below.
>
> In truth, I was surprised at the reason Cathy gave for leaving the List:
> "finding some Plato and Descartes influences to be a little too entrenched
> here." I can say with some confidence that, for example, the principal
> organizers of this slow read (not do mention De TIenne himself) are about
> as influenced by Plato and Descartes as Peirce was, which is to say
> essentially rejecting Platonism (pure, as opposed to objective idealism,
> etc.) and Cartesianism (Cartesian dualism, etc.) And none of us has written
> anything whatsoever since this slow read began which could even be vaguely
> interpreted as even referring to Plato or Descartes.
>
> It is you who keeps making the claim that certain members of the List
> express Cartesian and, especially, Platonic ideas. But you have not been
> able to support that claim because it is empty and patently false. Please
> offer some quotations from, for example, any of Gary Fuhrman's, Jon Alan
> Schmidt's, or my (or others') posts which you believe show these
> influences. You make these entirely bogus claims about forum members who
> are just going about doing what I see to be serious work in philosophy,
> this work being appreciated by a number of members of the larger Peirce
> community, being published in the doing, etc. It is as if you seemed to
> imagine that your own fields of interest countered the very legitimacy of
> the fields in which they work, denigrating their work as being " confined
> to the seminar room" as you wrote just yesterday and as you've written on
> several occasions. Do you think that we should all just stop doing
> cenoscopic philosophy because you've determined that all that's really
> important are applications of semeiotic?
>
> Perhaps it is that kind of baseless critique which "should not be
> overlooked" because, perhaps it suggests to potential new members, for
> example, a kind of narrowness of perspective, one which it seems to me to
> be reflected more in your often contemptuous critique than in the work of
> those whom you not infrequently disparagingly criticize.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> “Let everything happen to you
> Beauty and terror
> Just keep going
> No feeling is final”
> ― Rainer Maria Rilke
>
> Gary Richmond
> Philosophy and Critical Thinking
> Communication Studies
> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Wed, Jun 16, 2021 at 12:46 PM Edwina Taborsky < tabor...@primus.ca>
> wrote:
>
>> List
>>
>> I think that Cathy's leaving this list, and her critique of it
>> [Cartesian, Platonic] should not be overlooked.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed 16/06/21 10:32 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
>>
>> Jon AS, list,
>>
>> I’m looking forward to the part of our slow read that delves into
>> Peirce’s classification of sciences, as I think that will explain what
>> André means by saying that phaneroscopists are “pre-truthists.” But you’re
>> right, some of the ideas floated in the other thread show what happens when
>> people try to fit 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Incredible - someone joins the list and then leaves it, and gives
their reason for leaving with a critique  - and instead of examining
why she left the list, ie, examining the validity of her critique -
you turn her comments into a rather vicious attack on me. 

Instead - you should be asking HER what SHE sees as Cartesian and
Platonic, and what she sees as confined - since SHE is the one who
made those statements. Have you asked her? Why do you think she
thought this way?  Or are you just brushing her off as you do with
me?

As for the Cartesian/Platonic ideologies - well, we've been through
that with the rejection of hylomorphic objective idealism - which
posits NO primordial laws but a correlation of the two. .

How odd; you have set up a trio, yourself, JAS and Gary F, as some
kind of contained 'set' on this list. But there are others in the
field of Peircean semiotics - who DO want to see how it operates
pragmatically.  And they shouldn't be treated viciously. 

Edwina
 On Wed 16/06/21  3:33 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List,
 Edwina wrote: "I think that Cathy's leaving this list, and her
critique of it [Cartesian, Platonic] should not be overlooked."
 What do you mean that her critique of the List "should not be
overlooked"? What  I think should not be 'overlooked' is outlined in
what I write below.
 In truth, I was surprised at the reason Cathy gave for leaving the
List: "finding some Plato and Descartes influences to be a little too
entrenched here." I can say with some confidence that, for example,
the principal organizers of this slow read (not do mention De TIenne
himself) are about as influenced by Plato and Descartes as Peirce
was, which is to say essentially rejecting Platonism (pure, as
opposed to objective idealism, etc.) and Cartesianism (Cartesian
dualism, etc.) And none of us has written anything whatsoever since
this slow read began which could even be vaguely interpreted as even
referring to Plato or Descartes. 
 It is you who keeps making the claim that certain members of the
List express Cartesian and, especially, Platonic ideas. But you have
not been able to support that claim because it is empty and patently
false. Please offer some quotations from, for example, any of Gary
Fuhrman's, Jon Alan Schmidt's, or my (or others') posts which you
believe show these influences. You make these entirely bogus claims
about forum members who are just going about doing what I see to be
serious work in philosophy, this work being appreciated by a number
of members of the larger Peirce community, being published in the
doing, etc. It is as if you seemed to imagine that your own fields of
interest countered the very legitimacy of the fields in which they
work, denigrating their work as being " confined to the seminar room"
as you wrote just yesterday and as you've written on several
occasions. Do you think that we should all just stop doing cenoscopic
philosophy because you've determined that all that's really important
are applications of semeiotic? 
  Perhaps it is that kind of baseless critique which "should not be
overlooked" because, perhaps it suggests to potential new members,
for example, a kind of narrowness of perspective, one which it seems
to me to be reflected more in your often contemptuous critique than
in the work of those whom you not infrequently disparagingly
criticize.
  Best,
 Gary R  
“LET EVERYTHING HAPPEN TO YOU
 BEAUTY AND TERROR
 JUST KEEP GOING
 NO FEELING IS FINAL”
 ― RAINER MARIA RILKE
  Gary Richmond
 Philosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication StudiesLaGuardia
College of the City University of New York
 On Wed, Jun 16, 2021 at 12:46 PM Edwina Taborsky <
tabor...@primus.ca [1]> wrote:
List

I think that Cathy's leaving this list, and her critique of it
[Cartesian, Platonic] should not be overlooked.

Edwina
 On Wed 16/06/21 10:32 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca [2] sent:
Jon AS, list,

I’m looking forward to the part of our slow read that delves into
Peirce’s classification of sciences, as I think that will explain
what André means by saying that phaneroscopists are
“pre-truthists.” But you’re right, some of the ideas floated in
the other thread show what happens when people try to fit phaneroscopy
(or the universal categories) into a preconceived framework such as a
semiotic theory. For instance, one result is a confusion of Firstness
with iconicity.  

The pragmatic relationships among phaneroscopy, mathematics, logic
and semeiotic are actually quite complex and sometimes recursive, as
I hope will become clear as we take a closer look at Peirce’s texts
on the subject. For today I’d just like to share a paragraph from
André De Tienne’s 1993 paper on “Peirce’s Definitions of the
Phaneron”: 

[[ Our awareness of a phaneron is always total and puts it into our
“Immediate and Complete 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, List,

Edwina wrote: "I think that Cathy's leaving this list, and her critique of
it [Cartesian, Platonic] should not be overlooked."

What do *you* mean that her critique of the List "should not be
overlooked"? What *I* think should not be 'overlooked' is outlined in what
I write below.

In truth, I was surprised at the reason Cathy gave for leaving the List:
"finding some Plato and Descartes influences to be a little too entrenched
here." I can say with some confidence that, for example, the principal
organizers of this slow read (not do mention De TIenne himself) are about
as influenced by Plato and Descartes as Peirce was, which is to say
essentially rejecting Platonism (pure, as opposed to objective idealism,
etc.) and Cartesianism (Cartesian dualism, etc.) And none of us has written
anything whatsoever since this slow read began which could even be vaguely
interpreted as even referring to Plato or Descartes.

It is you who keeps making the claim that certain members of the List
express Cartesian and, especially, Platonic ideas. But you have not been
able to support that claim because it is empty and patently false. Please
offer some quotations from, for example, any of Gary Fuhrman's, Jon Alan
Schmidt's, or my (or others') posts which you believe show these
influences. You make these entirely bogus claims about forum members who
are just going about doing what I see to be serious work in philosophy,
this work being appreciated by a number of members of the larger Peirce
community, being published in the doing, etc. It is as if you seemed to
imagine that your own fields of interest countered the very legitimacy of
the fields in which they work, denigrating their work as being "confined to
the seminar room" as you wrote just yesterday and as you've written on
several occasions. Do you think that we should all just stop doing
cenoscopic philosophy because you've determined that all that's really
important are applications of semeiotic?

Perhaps it is *that* kind of baseless critique which "should not be
overlooked" because, perhaps it suggests to potential new members, for
example, a kind of narrowness of perspective, one which it seems to me to
be reflected more in your often contemptuous critique than in the work of
those whom you not infrequently disparagingly criticize.

Best,

Gary R

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Wed, Jun 16, 2021 at 12:46 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> List
>
> I think that Cathy's leaving this list, and her critique of it [Cartesian,
> Platonic] should not be overlooked.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Wed 16/06/21 10:32 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
>
> Jon AS, list,
>
> I’m looking forward to the part of our slow read that delves into Peirce’s
> classification of sciences, as I think that will explain what André means
> by saying that phaneroscopists are “pre-truthists.” But you’re right, some
> of the ideas floated in the other thread show what happens when people try
> to fit phaneroscopy (or the universal categories) into a preconceived
> framework such as a semiotic theory. For instance, one result is a
> confusion of Firstness with iconicity.
>
> The pragmatic relationships among phaneroscopy, mathematics, logic and
> semeiotic are actually quite complex and sometimes recursive, as I hope
> will become clear as we take a closer look at Peirce’s texts on the
> subject. For today I’d just like to share a paragraph from André De
> Tienne’s 1993 paper on “Peirce’s Definitions of the Phaneron”:
>
> [[ Our awareness of a phaneron is always total and puts it into our
> “Immediate and Complete possession” (MS 645:3, 1909). The most important
> feature is the immediacy, the directness, with which one is aware of the
> phaneron. The appearance and the mind are conflated, which means that there
> is nothing to mediate between the two: there is no intervening sign. We are
> put  facie ad faciem before the very phaneron itself, Peirce says (MS 645:5).
> Direct awareness is a face-to-face encounter, which is the same as saying
> that that which appears to a mind is not represented. A seeming is not a
> representation, at least not in the first place, and thus a phaneron never
> conveys any cognitive information. Direct awareness is therefore not to be
> confounded with cognitive intuition, which is a faculty whose existence
> Peirce denies. It follows, then, that the mode of manifestation of a
> phaneron must be in some essential respect quite different from that of a
> sign.] (De Tienne 1993, 282) ]
>
> The “direct awareness” at the heart of phaneroscopy requires its
> observations to be pre-theoretical and pre-logical (and a fortiori,
> pre-truth!). But as Peirce said, it takes a ““great effort not to be
> influenced” by one’s habitual preconceptions (especially if one 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

List

I think that Cathy's leaving this list, and her critique of it
[Cartesian, Platonic] should not be overlooked.

Edwina
 On Wed 16/06/21 10:32 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca sent:
Jon AS, list,

I’m looking forward to the part of our slow read that delves into
Peirce’s classification of sciences, as I think that will explain
what André means by saying that phaneroscopists are
“pre-truthists.” But you’re right, some of the ideas floated in
the other thread show what happens when people try to fit phaneroscopy
(or the universal categories) into a preconceived framework such as a
semiotic theory. For instance, one result is a confusion of Firstness
with iconicity. 

The pragmatic relationships among phaneroscopy, mathematics, logic
and semeiotic are actually quite complex and sometimes recursive, as
I hope will become clear as we take a closer look at Peirce’s texts
on the subject. For today I’d just like to share a paragraph from
André De Tienne’s 1993 paper on “Peirce’s Definitions of the
Phaneron”: 

[[ Our awareness of a phaneron is always total and puts it into our
“Immediate and Complete possession” (MS 645:3, 1909). The most
important feature is the immediacy, the directness, with which one is
aware of the phaneron. The appearance and the mind are conflated,
which means that there is nothing to mediate between the two: there
is no intervening sign. We are put  facie ad faciem before the very
phaneron itself, Peirce says (MS 645:5). Direct awareness is a
face-to-face encounter, which is the same as saying that that which
appears to a mind is not represented. A seeming is not a
representation, at least not in the first place, and thus a phaneron
never conveys any cognitive information. Direct awareness is
therefore not to be confounded with cognitive intuition, which is a
faculty whose existence Peirce denies. It follows, then, that the
mode of manifestation of a phaneron must be in some essential respect
quite different from that of a sign.] (De Tienne 1993, 282) ] 

The “direct awareness” at the heart of phaneroscopy requires its
observations to be pre-theoretical and pre-logical (and a fortiori,
pre-truth!). But as Peirce said, it takes a ““great effort not to
be influenced” by one’s habitual preconceptions (especially if one
believes that all awareness is semiotic, i.e. mediated). This is
exactly the kind of opinion that one has to set aside in order to 
develop a well-grounded conception of semiosis is in the first place.
Gary f.
 From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 

 On Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
 Sent: 15-Jun-21 12:17
Gary F., List:

I agree that the last line on this slide is especially important,
but several recent posts have exhibited evidence of the mistake
described in the one right above it. In fact, at times I myself have
surely been guilty of jumping too quickly from phaneroscopy into
semeiotic. The problem is that if we focus exclusively on
representation and mediation, which are paradigmatic manifestations
of 3ns, then we effectively skip right over 1ns as quality and 2ns as
reaction. Moreover, Peirce makes it very clear that phaneroscopy is an
activity in which  every inquirer must engage.

CSP: Understand me well. My appeal is to observation,--observation
that each of you must make for himself. (CP 5.52, EP 2:154, 1903)

CSP: There is nothing quite so directly open to observation as
phanerons; and since I shall have no need of referring to any but
those which (or the like of which) are perfectly familiar to
everybody, every reader can control the accuracy of what I am going
to say about them. Indeed, he must actually repeat my observations
and experiments for himself, or else I shall more utterly fail to
convey my meaning than if I were to discourse of effects of chromatic
decoration to a man congenitally blind. ... 

The reader, upon his side, must repeat the author's observations for
himself, and decide from his own observations whether the author's
account of the appearances is correct or not. (CP 1.286-287, 1904)
Thanks,

 Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1] - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
[2] 
On Tue, Jun 15, 2021 at 6:10 AM  wrote:

  Continuing our slow read, here is the next slide of André De
Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu)
[4] site. (You will notice André’s characteristic sense of humor
here, but the last line should be taken quite seriously.)

  Text:

“Phaneroscopy”? What a strange word! Can it possibly mean
anything? 

Is it really a science? How come I have never heard of it before? 

Can I get a Ph.D. in phaneroscopy? In what university?

Are phaneroscopists well paid? Is their job useful and interesting?
Does it help 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 4

[gnox]

Jon AS, list,

I’m looking forward to the part of our slow read that delves into Peirce’s 
classification of sciences, as I think that will explain what André means by 
saying that phaneroscopists are “pre-truthists.” But you’re right, some of the 
ideas floated in the other thread show what happens when people try to fit 
phaneroscopy (or the universal categories) into a preconceived framework such 
as a semiotic theory. For instance, one result is a confusion of Firstness with 
iconicity.

The pragmatic relationships among phaneroscopy, mathematics, logic and 
semeiotic are actually quite complex and sometimes recursive, as I hope will 
become clear as we take a closer look at Peirce’s texts on the subject. For 
today I’d just like to share a paragraph from André De Tienne’s 1993 paper on 
“Peirce’s Definitions of the Phaneron”:

[[ Our awareness of a phaneron is always total and puts it into our “Immediate 
and Complete possession” (MS 645:3, 1909). The most important feature is the 
immediacy, the directness, with which one is aware of the phaneron. The 
appearance and the mind are conflated, which means that there is nothing to 
mediate between the two: there is no intervening sign. We are put facie ad 
faciem before the very phaneron itself, Peirce says (MS 645:5). Direct 
awareness is a face-to-face encounter, which is the same as saying that that 
which appears to a mind is not represented. A seeming is not a representation, 
at least not in the first place, and thus a phaneron never conveys any 
cognitive information. Direct awareness is therefore not to be confounded with 
cognitive intuition, which is a faculty whose existence Peirce denies. It 
follows, then, that the mode of manifestation of a phaneron must be in some 
essential respect quite different from that of a sign.] (De Tienne 1993, 282) ]

The “direct awareness” at the heart of phaneroscopy requires its observations 
to be pre-theoretical and pre-logical (and a fortiori, pre-truth!). But as 
Peirce said, it takes a ““great effort not to be influenced” by one’s habitual 
preconceptions (especially if one believes that all awareness is semiotic, i.e. 
mediated). This is exactly the kind of opinion that one has to set aside in 
order to develop a well-grounded conception of semiosis is in the first place.

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 15-Jun-21 12:17



Gary F., List:

I agree that the last line on this slide is especially important, but several 
recent posts have exhibited evidence of the mistake described in the one right 
above it. In fact, at times I myself have surely been guilty of jumping too 
quickly from phaneroscopy into semeiotic. The problem is that if we focus 
exclusively on representation and mediation, which are paradigmatic 
manifestations of 3ns, then we effectively skip right over 1ns as quality and 
2ns as reaction. Moreover, Peirce makes it very clear that phaneroscopy is an 
activity in which every inquirer must engage.

CSP: Understand me well. My appeal is to observation,--observation that each of 
you must make for himself. (CP 5.52, EP 2:154, 1903)

CSP: There is nothing quite so directly open to observation as phanerons; and 
since I shall have no need of referring to any but those which (or the like of 
which) are perfectly familiar to everybody, every reader can control the 
accuracy of what I am going to say about them. Indeed, he must actually repeat 
my observations and experiments for himself, or else I shall more utterly fail 
to convey my meaning than if I were to discourse of effects of chromatic 
decoration to a man congenitally blind. ...

The reader, upon his side, must repeat the author's observations for himself, 
and decide from his own observations whether the author's account of the 
appearances is correct or not. (CP 1.286-287, 1904)

 

Thanks,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt   
- twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt  

 

On Tue, Jun 15, 2021 at 6:10 AM mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> 
> wrote:

 Continuing our slow read, here is the next slide of André De Tienne’s 
slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) 
  site. (You will 
notice André’s characteristic sense of humor here, but the last line should be 
taken quite seriously.)

 Text:

“Phaneroscopy”? What a strange word! Can it possibly mean anything? 

Is it really a science? How come I have never heard of it before?

Can I get a Ph.D. in phaneroscopy? In what university?

Are phaneroscopists well paid? Is their job useful and interesting? Does it 
help save lives? 

Some say that Peirce did everything that needed to be done in phaneroscopy, and 
that everything else is semiotics. Is that right? 

Is it true that phaneroscopists never