### Re: [peirce-l] A Question About Categories

```hi claudio, I am traveling through the middle of next week, with only my iphone
to hand. that was a rather abbreviated way of explaining categories and would
require supplementation. if it were only a matter of mathematics, that would
suffice, but we are talking about phenomenology, categories of appearance, so
the question is what complexity of mathematical models are forced on us by the
complexity of the phenomenal domain before us.

regards,

jon

On Mar 29, 2012, at 1:15 PM, Claudio Guerri claudiogue...@gmail.com wrote:

Dear Jon,
thanks for the constant 'help' that to give to all listers

I have found your explanation of the categories very practical (below in
red), and since I'd like to quote it, I wanted to ask you if it is yours or
if you can give me the origin.
Thanks again
Best
CL
--
Prof. Dr. Arch. Claudio F. Guerri
Facultad de Arquitectura, Diseño y Urbanismo
Home address: Gral. Lemos 270  (1427) Buenos Aires – Argentina
Telefax: (0054-11) 4553-4895 or 4553-7976
Cell phone: (0054-9-11) 6289-8123
E-mail: claudiogue...@fibertel.com.ar

Jon Awbrey said the following on 14/03/2012 03:14 p.m.:

Diane,

Between any 2 sets of 3 there are 3! (count 'em, 6)
ways of forming a 1-to-1 correspondence, and there
may be reason for considering the sense of each 1.
When it comes to Peirce's categories, which are
best understood as the dimensions of relations,
relations, respectively, have in common, it is
also good to recall that Peirce often stressed
the order: 1st, 2nd, 3rd = First, Last, Middle.

| By the third, I mean the medium or connecting
| bond between the absolute first and last.
| The beginning is first, the end second,
| the middle third.
|
| Peirce, CP 1.337

Regards,

Jon

Diane Stephens wrote:
In the book *Semiotics I* by Donald Thomas, he includes a chart
which shows
concepts associated with firsts, seconds and thirds.  For example, a first
is *quality*, a second is *fact* and a third is *law.*  I understand all
but second as past as in:

First - *present *
Second - *past *
Third - *future *

I would appreciate some help.

Thanks.

--
Prof. Dr. Arch. Claudio F. Guerri
Facultad de Arquitectura, Diseño y Urbanismo
Home address: Gral. Lemos 270  (1427) Buenos Aires – Argentina
Telefax: (0054-11) 4553-4895 or 4553-7976
Cell phone: (0054-9-11) 6289-8123
E-mail: claudiogue...@fibertel.com.ar

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### Re: [peirce-l] a question

```Ben, list:
Thank you for these references on Firstness, Ben, and for reminding us of
Gary Richmond¹s posts; specially for the notion of a ³triadic moment².  It
does not seem to me as an acquiescence to Kant¹s time intuition. I am not
familiar with Schelling¹s ideas on time, yet these Peircean references on
the ego, consciousness and Firstness (with a definite exclusion of the
notion of the Self) reminds me of some references I gathered on this subject
long time ago before CD-ROM and hypertext, but that I cherished immensely
while transcribing: 1.306 and following;  1. 324 and following; 5.265 and
following [mostly from Concerning Certain Faculties] 5.289; 5.44; 5. 462;
7.364 and following;  7.531; 7.540; and many others.
I am most grateful for your recent inklings on this subject and Gary¹s, and
if there is more of Peirce to it (the ³triadic moment²), it would be more
than inklings. Great insights.
Eduardo Forastieri-Braschi

On 3/17/12 1:00 PM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote:

Jason, list,

That's a good question. In the relevant paragraph (CP 7.536, of which I quoted
only the last part), Peirce begins by saying: It remains to be shown that
this element is the third Kainopythagorean category. All flow of time involves
learning; and all learning involves the flow of time. The element that he was
discussing was a continuity which he had just called a direct experience
(CP 7.535). (This is also another 'score' for Gary Richmond in his April 8,
peirce-l, in which he said It seems to me that for Peirce being present means
being present to the flow, which flow implies all three modalities: past,
present, and future)

I'm kind of reluctant to go out on a limb right now, having misinterpreted
Peirce's Oct. 12, 1904 letter to Lady Welby and spent a number of posts
cleaning up after myself. My guess is that, in virtue of their triadic parts
in the flow of learning, inference, and representation and interpretation, all
three times are Thirds, with Secondness, Firstness, and Thirdness strong but
not overwhelmingly so in past, present, and future, respectively. In other
words, learning-past as Secundan Third, learning-present as Priman Third, and
learning-future as Tertian Third. But I have no strong opinion at this point!

Best, Ben

- Original Message -
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Sent: Saturday, March 17, 2012 12:29 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] a question

Would it not be fair to say that the conscious experience of the immediate
present must always be at least a second?  That is the view I hold.

Jason H.

On Sat, Mar 17, 2012 at 11:24 AM, Benjamin Udell wrote:

Claudio, Eduardo, Diane, Gary R., list,

I've found more of Peirce on the present-past-future trichotomy. This time,
from Chapter 1 of the _Minute Logic_ (1902) manuscript, in  CP 2.84 (on the
past as Second), 2.85 (on the present as First), and 2.86  (on the future as
Third). From CP 2.85:

Let us now consider what could appear as being in the present  instant were
it utterly cut off from past and future. We can only guess; for  nothing is
more occult than the absolute present. There plainly could be no  action;
and without the possibility of action, to talk of binarity would be  to
utter words without meaning. There might be a sort of consciousness, or
feeling, with no self; and this feeling might have its tone. Notwithstanding
what William James has said, I do not think there could be any continuity
like space, which, though it may perhaps appear in an instant in an educated
mind, I cannot think could do so if it had no time at all; and without
continuity parts of the feeling could not be synthetized; and therefore
there would be no recognizable parts. There could not even be a degree of
vividness of the feeling; for this [the degree of vividness] is the
comparative amount of disturbance of general consciousness by a feeling. At
any rate, such shall be our hypothesis, and whether it is psychologically
true or not is of no consequence. The world would be reduced to a quality of
unanalyzed feeling. Here would be an utter absence of binarity. I cannot
call it unity; for even unity supposes plurality. I may call its form
Firstness, Orience, or Originality. It would be something _which is what  it
is without reference to anything else_ within it or without it,  regardless
of all force and of all reason. Now the world is full of this  element of
irresponsible, free, Originality. Why should the middle part of  the
spectrum look green rather than violet? There is no conceivable reason  for
it nor compulsion in it. [...]

Note that there he discusses what could appear as being in the present
instant were it utterly cut off from past and future. We can only guess; for
nothing is more occult than the absolute present.

Elsewhere, at the end of CP 7.536```

### Re: [peirce-l] A Question About Peirce's Categories

```Diane, Steven, Jon:

I have tried, but I am not yet happy with these trichotomies concerning
time. However, should ordinary linear time sequencing rather than tenseless
earlier/later relations (so called B-series) be the pivot for their
conception, then, perhaps, actual indexicality (Secondness) and modality
(possible Firstness and possible Thirdness) should be paramount:

First:  may be -now- this/that
Second  is -now- this/that
Thirdwould be -now/then- this/that

Best to you,
Eduardo Forastieri-Braschi

On 3/15/12 9:26 AM, Jon Awbrey jawb...@att.net wrote:

Steven,

I think the point about sequentiality is correct.

Relations are ordered according to their arities or dimensions,
and Peirce holds that three are enough to generate all others,
but not all relations of constraint or determination, that is,
information, are causal or temporal in nature, not even if we
try to imagine some order of triadic causality or temporality.

Attempting to understand the relational categories by setting out ordered
lists
of terms that are regarded as naming absolute, monadic, non-relational
essences
is a sign that our understanding has gone off track and fallen into yet
another
rut of reductionism.  I don't know what to call it -- absolutism? monadicism?
non-relativism? -- but it's just as bad a form of reductionism as nominalism.

Regards,

Jon

Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:
Dear Diane,

I agree with those that question whether Peirce would be comfortable using
notions of linear time, as Jon's quote highlights.

In the context of time conceptions (for me, time is simply a way of speaking)
I would prefer:

1st  = the immediate experience
2nd = the accessible record
3rd = the manifold of unity

In brief: immediacy, record, unification.

It would be important for me to observe that no sequential nature should be
read into the process suggested by these categories, they covary in what I
would call the eternal moment. The conception of time is a product of the
unifying effect of what Peirce calls thirdness.

With respect,
Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
http://iase.info

On Mar 14, 2012, at 8:56 AM, Diane Stephens wrote:

In the book Semiotics I by Donald Thomas, he includes a chart which shows
concepts associated with firsts, seconds and thirds.  For example, a first
is quality, a second is fact and a third is law.  I understand all but
second as past as in:

First - present
Second - past
Third - future

I would appreciate some help.

Thanks.

--
Diane Stephens
Swearingen Chair of Education
Wardlaw 255
College of Education
University of South Carolina
Columbia, SC 29208
803-777-0502
Fax 803-777-3193

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### Re: [peirce-l] a question

```Well, in terms of the quality-fact-law trichotomy, if the present is pure
quality, then facts only calcify out of that flux of pure qualities once the
present has passed.

-m

At 11:56 AM -0400 3/14/12, Diane Stephens wrote:
In the book Semiotics I by Donald Thomas, he includes a chart which shows
concepts associated with firsts, seconds and thirds.  For example, a first is
quality, a second is fact and a third is law.  I understand all but second as
past as in:

First - present
Second - past
Third - future

I would appreciate some help.

Thanks.

--
Diane Stephens
Swearingen Chair of Education
Wardlaw 255
College of Education
University of South Carolina
Columbia, SC 29208
803-777-0502
Fax 803-777-3193

-
You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L
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```

### Re: [peirce-l] a question

```Dear Diane,

I agree with those that question whether Peirce would be comfortable using
notions of linear time, as Jon's quote highlights.

In the context of time conceptions (for me, time is simply a way of speaking) I
would prefer:

1st  = the immediate experience
2nd = the accessible record
3rd = the manifold of unity

In brief: immediacy, record, unification.

It would be important for me to observe that no sequential nature should be
read into the process suggested by these categories, they covary in what I
would call the eternal moment. The conception of time is a product of the
unifying effect of what Peirce calls thirdness.

With respect,
Steven

--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
http://iase.info

On Mar 14, 2012, at 8:56 AM, Diane Stephens wrote:

In the book Semiotics I by Donald Thomas, he includes a chart which shows
concepts associated with firsts, seconds and thirds.  For example, a first is
quality, a second is fact and a third is law.  I understand all but second as
past as in:

First - present
Second - past
Third - future

I would appreciate some help.

Thanks.

--
Diane Stephens
Swearingen Chair of Education
Wardlaw 255
College of Education
University of South Carolina
Columbia, SC 29208
803-777-0502
Fax 803-777-3193

-
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### Re: [peirce-l] A Question about Metaphysics and Logic

```Jason,

Universal is an ambiguous word sometimes used to translate Aristotle's
_katholos_ even when Aristotle means merely that which in everyday English is
called general, something true of more than one object.

Some philosophers say universals and particulars where Peirce (with his
better English) said generals and singulars or individuals.

In logic, a universal proposition has the form All G is H, and a
particular proposition has the form Some G is H and is not singular but
merely vague as to which singular or singulars are being referred to.

Universal in its etymological sense means that which is true of everything,
or at least of everything in a given class. Such a universal is maximally
general in some sense. So Peirce's arguments that there are real generals and
not only singulars also support the reality of universals.

I'm willing to distinguish universals such as numbers from among other kinds of
generals, but I haven't found philosophers interested in doing that. I'd also
allow a universal that is singular (but usually polyadic) and non-general,
e.g., a total population cdefgab etc. of a universe of discourse. So, as far as
I know, in something like a response to your question, I'm not aware of
philosophers dealing with universals differently than with generals, although
I'd sure like to know of philosophers who do so.

The word universal also has some other senses. See universal in the Century
Dictionary. The entry looks like it could well have been written by Peirce.

Djvu version
http://triggs.djvu.org/century-dictionary.com/08/index08.djvu?djvuoptspage=415
JPG version
http://triggs.djvu.org/century-dictionary.com/djvu2jpgframes.php?volno=08page=415

See entry below. - Best, Ben
universal (u-ni-ver'sa??l), a. and n. [ F. universel = Sp. Pg. universal = It.
universale,  L. universalis, of or belonging to all or to the 'whole,
universus,all together, whole, entire, collective, general: see universe. Hence
colloq. abbr. vernal, varsal.] I. a. 1. Pertaining to the universe in its
entirety, or to the human race collectively.

Sole monarch of the universal earth.

Shak., K. and J., ilL 2. 94.

All partial evil, universal good.

Pope, Essay on Man, i. 292.

2. Pertaining to all things or to all mankind distributively. This is the
original and most proper signification.

Those men which have no written law of God to shew what Is good or evil carry
written in their hearts the universal law of mankind, the Law of Reason,
whereby they judge, as by a rule which God hath given unto all men for that
purpose. Hooker, Eccles. Polity, L 16.

Nothing can be to us Catholic or universal in Religion but what the
Scripture teaches.

Milton, Eikonoklastes, xiii.

Which had the universal sanction of their own and all former ages. Story,
Speech, Salem, Sept. 18,1828.

3. Belonging to or predicated of all the members of a class considered without
exception: as, a universal rule. This meaning arose In logic, where it is
called the complex sense of universal, and has been common in Latin since the
second century.

Hearing applause and universal shout.

Shak., M. of V..11L 2. 144.

We say that every argument which tells in favour of the universal suffrage
of the males tells equally in favour of female suffrage. Macaulay, West. Rev.
Def. of Mill.

4. In logic, capable of being predicated of many individuals or single cases;
general. This, called the simple sense of universal, in which the word is
precisely equivalent to general, is quite opposed to its etymology, and
perpetuates a confusion of thought due to Aristotle, whose ??? it
translates. (See II., 1 (b).) In Latin it is nearly as old, perhaps older, than
def. 3.- Universal agent, in law, on agent with unqualified power to act, in
place of his principal, in all things which the latter can delegate, as
distinguished from a general agent, who has unrestricted power in respect to a
particular kind of business or at a particular place.-Universal arithmetic,
algebra.-Universal chuck, a form of chuck having a face-plate with dogs which
can move radially and simultaneously, to hold objects of different sizes.-
Universal church, in theol., the church of God throughout the world.-Universal
cognition. See cognition. -Universal compass, a compass with extension legs
adapted for striking circles of either large or small size.- Universal
conception, a general concept.-Universal conversion. See conversion,
2.-Universal coupling, a coupling so made that the parts united may meet at
various angles, as a gimbal Joint-Universal deluge. See deluge, 1.-Universal
dial. See dial.-Universal ferment. See ferment.-Universal Friends, an American
sect of the eighteenth century, followers of Jemima Wilkinson, who professed to
have prophetic and miraculous powers.-Universal galvanometer, a galvanometer
capable of measuring either currents or ```

### Re: [peirce-l] A Question about Metaphysics and Logic

```Dear Jason,

I've published a paper which distinguishes between 'universals' as
discussed in contemporary Australian metaphysics (most particularly in
the work of D.M. Armstrong), and 'generals' as discussed by Peirce.

Here is the abstract:
This paper contrasts the scholastic realists of David Armstrong and
Charles Peirce. It is argued that the so-called 'problem of
universals' is not a problem in pure ontology (concerning whether
universals exist) as Armstrong construes it to be. Rather, it extends
to issues concerning which predicates should be applied where, issues
which Armstrong sets aside under the label of 'semantics', and which
from a Peircean perspective encompass even the fundamentals of
scientific methodology. It is argued that Peirce's scholastic realism
not only presents a more nuanced ontology (distinguishing the existent
front the real) but also provides more of a sense of why realism
should be a position worth fighting for.

If that sounds of interest, the link is here:
http://hdl.handle.net/10289/2918

Cheers, Cathy
And here is the abstract:

Greetings,

I have a question for those knowledgeable and willing to answer a general
question for those more steeping in classical metaphysics and logic than I.

What are the distinctions between claiming the reality of universals vs.
generals?  How would one argue that universals are not merely merely
generals?  By the latter, for example, I mean general concepts created
through a process of induction or what Locke called abstraction.  I offer
an example to indicate what I mean by generality, though the definition is
informal.  I am familiar with Peirce's article on Berkeley, which I enjoy,
and I would look forward to Peircean and other views on the matter.
Citations and references with limited explanation would be a fine way to

Best and Thank You,
Jason Hills
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