Re: [HACKERS] Block-level CRC checks

2009-12-01 Thread Heikki Linnakangas
Simon Riggs wrote: There is no creation of corruption events. This scheme detects corruption events that *have* occurred. Now I understand that we previously would have recovered seamlessly from such events, but they were corruption events nonetheless and I think they need to be reported.

Re: [HACKERS] Application name patch - v4

2009-12-01 Thread Marko Kreen
On 12/1/09, Tom Lane t...@sss.pgh.pa.us wrote: Robert Haas robertmh...@gmail.com writes: On Mon, Nov 30, 2009 at 4:54 PM, Dimitri Fontaine dfonta...@hi-media.com wrote: Le 30 nov. 2009 à 22:38, Robert Haas a écrit : I still don't really understand why we wouldn't want RESET ALL to

Re: [HACKERS] Block-level CRC checks

2009-12-01 Thread Simon Riggs
On Tue, 2009-12-01 at 10:04 +0200, Heikki Linnakangas wrote: Simon Riggs wrote: There is no creation of corruption events. This scheme detects corruption events that *have* occurred. Now I understand that we previously would have recovered seamlessly from such events, but they were

Re: [HACKERS] Application name patch - v4

2009-12-01 Thread Dave Page
On Tue, Dec 1, 2009 at 12:26 AM, Andres Freund and...@anarazel.de wrote: Actually I think the poolers make a good case for a SET variant which emulates connection set variables... RESET ALL in a connection pooler does different things than RESET ALL outside of one. Eh? Not sure I follow

Re: [HACKERS] Application name patch - v4

2009-12-01 Thread Andres Freund
On Tuesday 01 December 2009 09:59:17 Dave Page wrote: On Tue, Dec 1, 2009 at 12:26 AM, Andres Freund and...@anarazel.de wrote: Actually I think the poolers make a good case for a SET variant which emulates connection set variables... RESET ALL in a connection pooler does different things

Re: [HACKERS] Application name patch - v4

2009-12-01 Thread Heikki Linnakangas
Dave Page wrote: Upthread, Tom suggested a new 'SET DEFAULT ...' variant of SET which could be used to set the default GUC value that RESET would revert to. This seems to me to be the ideal solution, and I'd somewhat hesitantly volunteer to work on it (hesitantly as it means touching the

Re: [HACKERS] Application name patch - v4

2009-12-01 Thread Dave Page
On Tue, Dec 1, 2009 at 9:16 AM, Heikki Linnakangas heikki.linnakan...@enterprisedb.com wrote: Dave Page wrote: Upthread, Tom suggested a new 'SET DEFAULT ...' variant of SET which could be used to set the default GUC value that RESET would revert to. This seems to me to be the ideal solution,

Re: [HACKERS] Application name patch - v4

2009-12-01 Thread Andres Freund
On Tuesday 01 December 2009 10:16:45 Heikki Linnakangas wrote: Dave Page wrote: Upthread, Tom suggested a new 'SET DEFAULT ...' variant of SET which could be used to set the default GUC value that RESET would revert to. This seems to me to be the ideal solution, and I'd somewhat hesitantly

Re: [HACKERS] Application name patch - v4

2009-12-01 Thread Tatsuo Ishii
The point is that every other thing you can set in a libpq connection string is persistent throughout the connection. For the ones that you can change at all, such as client_encoding, *RESET ALL actually resets it to what was specified in the connection string*. It does not satisfy the POLA

Re: [HACKERS] New VACUUM FULL

2009-12-01 Thread Jeff Davis
On Mon, 2009-11-30 at 14:38 +0900, Itagaki Takahiro wrote: * VACUUM (FULL REPLACE) pg_class should be rejected, not silently turned into VACUUM (FULL INPLACE) pg_class. Hmmm, it requires to remember whether REPLACE is specified or not for the non-INPLACE vacuum, but I don't want to add

Re: [HACKERS] Application name patch - v4

2009-12-01 Thread Marko Kreen
On 12/1/09, Heikki Linnakangas heikki.linnakan...@enterprisedb.com wrote: Dave Page wrote: Upthread, Tom suggested a new 'SET DEFAULT ...' variant of SET which could be used to set the default GUC value that RESET would revert to. This seems to me to be the ideal solution, and I'd

Re: [HACKERS] enable-thread-safety defaults?

2009-12-01 Thread Bruce Momjian
Peter Eisentraut wrote: On m?n, 2009-11-30 at 12:21 -0500, Bruce Momjian wrote: ! for thread safety; use --disable-thread-safety to disable threading.]) --disable-thread-safety does not disable threading, it disables thread safety. Good point! Patch updated and attached. What are we

Re: [HACKERS] Block-level CRC checks

2009-12-01 Thread Bruce Momjian
Simon Riggs wrote: The way we handle torn page corruptions *hides* actual corruptions from us. The frequency of true positives and false positives is important here. If the false positive ratio is very small, then reporting them is not a problem because of the benefit we get from having

Re: [HACKERS] CommitFest status/management

2009-12-01 Thread Robert Haas
On Mon, Nov 30, 2009 at 10:16 PM, Greg Smith g...@2ndquadrant.com wrote: Considering that one of those was a holiday week with a lot of schedule disruption proceeding it, I don't know how much faster things could have moved.  There were large chunks of the reviewer volunteers who wanted only

Re: [HACKERS] Application name patch - v4

2009-12-01 Thread Brar Piening
On Tue, 1 Dec 2009 09:59:17 +0100, Dave Page dp...@pgadmin.org wrote: I do see the argument that RESET ALL should revert user changes to application_name though, but I maintain they should reset to the value set at connection time, not to null. As has been pointed out already, other values set

[HACKERS] [PATCH] Windows x64

2009-12-01 Thread Tsutomu Yamada
Hello. The following patches support Windows x64. 1) use intptr_t for Datum and pointer macros. (to support Windows LLP64) almost the same as that post before. http://archives.postgresql.org/pgsql-hackers/2009-06/threads.php#01364 2) use appropriate macro and datatypes for Windows API.

Re: [HACKERS] ProcessUtility_hook

2009-12-01 Thread Euler Taveira de Oliveira
Tom Lane escreveu: Bruce Momjian br...@momjian.us writes: So, if someone writes a patch, and it is reviewed, and the patch author updates the patch and replies, it still should be reviewed again before being committed? Well, that's for the reviewer to say --- if the update satisfies his

Re: [HACKERS] Block-level CRC checks

2009-12-01 Thread Simon Riggs
On Tue, 2009-12-01 at 06:35 -0500, Bruce Momjian wrote: Simon Riggs wrote: The way we handle torn page corruptions *hides* actual corruptions from us. The frequency of true positives and false positives is important here. If the false positive ratio is very small, then reporting them is

Re: [HACKERS] CommitFest status/management

2009-12-01 Thread Robert Haas
On Mon, Nov 30, 2009 at 11:08 PM, Tom Lane t...@sss.pgh.pa.us wrote: Andrew Dunstan and...@dunslane.net writes: As I have observed before, I think we need some infrastructure to help committers claim items, so we don't duplicate work. Robert acknowledged the need for a claimed by committer

Re: [HACKERS] Block-level CRC checks

2009-12-01 Thread Bruce Momjian
Simon Riggs wrote: I think the problem is that the existing proposal can't distinguish between these two cases so the user has no idea how to respond to the report. If 99.5% of cases are real corruption then there is little need to distinguish between the cases, nor much value in doing

Re: [HACKERS] Block-level CRC checks

2009-12-01 Thread Robert Haas
On Mon, Nov 30, 2009 at 3:27 PM, Heikki Linnakangas heikki.linnakan...@enterprisedb.com wrote: Simon Riggs wrote: Proposal * We reserve enough space on a disk block for a CRC check. When a dirty block is written to disk we calculate and annotate the CRC value, though this is *not* WAL

Re: [HACKERS] CommitFest status/management

2009-12-01 Thread Bruce Momjian
Robert Haas wrote: On Mon, Nov 30, 2009 at 11:08 PM, Tom Lane t...@sss.pgh.pa.us wrote: Andrew Dunstan and...@dunslane.net writes: As I have observed before, I think we need some infrastructure to help committers claim items, so we don't duplicate work. Robert acknowledged the need for

Re: [HACKERS] Block-level CRC checks

2009-12-01 Thread Bruce Momjian
Robert Haas wrote: On Mon, Nov 30, 2009 at 3:27 PM, Heikki Linnakangas heikki.linnakan...@enterprisedb.com wrote: Simon Riggs wrote: Proposal * We reserve enough space on a disk block for a CRC check. When a dirty block is written to disk we calculate and annotate the CRC value, though

Re: [HACKERS] Block-level CRC checks

2009-12-01 Thread Simon Riggs
On Tue, 2009-12-01 at 07:05 -0500, Bruce Momjian wrote: I assume torn pages are 99% of the reported problem, which are expected and are fixed, and bad hardware 1%, quite the opposite of your numbers above. On what basis do you make that assumption? -- Simon Riggs

Re: [HACKERS] Block-level CRC checks

2009-12-01 Thread Bruce Momjian
Simon Riggs wrote: On Tue, 2009-12-01 at 07:05 -0500, Bruce Momjian wrote: I assume torn pages are 99% of the reported problem, which are expected and are fixed, and bad hardware 1%, quite the opposite of your numbers above. On what basis do you make that assumption? Because we added

Re: [HACKERS] Block-level CRC checks

2009-12-01 Thread Bruce Momjian
bruce wrote: What might be interesting is to report CRC mismatches if the database was shut down cleanly previously; I think in those cases we shouldn't have torn pages. Sorry, stupid idea on my part. We don't WAL log hit bit changes so there is no guarantee the page is in WAL on recovery.

Re: [HACKERS] Block-level CRC checks

2009-12-01 Thread Simon Riggs
On Tue, 2009-12-01 at 07:58 -0500, Bruce Momjian wrote: bruce wrote: What might be interesting is to report CRC mismatches if the database was shut down cleanly previously; I think in those cases we shouldn't have torn pages. Sorry, stupid idea on my part. We don't WAL log hit bit

Re: [HACKERS] Block-level CRC checks

2009-12-01 Thread Simon Riggs
On Tue, 2009-12-01 at 07:42 -0500, Bruce Momjian wrote: Simon Riggs wrote: On Tue, 2009-12-01 at 07:05 -0500, Bruce Momjian wrote: I assume torn pages are 99% of the reported problem, which are expected and are fixed, and bad hardware 1%, quite the opposite of your numbers above.

Re: [HACKERS] CommitFest status/management

2009-12-01 Thread Andrew Dunstan
Bruce Momjian wrote: It would also like to clarify the use case for this a little bit more. Is this just to track patches which committers are in the process of committing (or have committed)? Or would a committer potentially set this on some patch that was still being reviewed, and if so

Re: [HACKERS] Block-level CRC checks

2009-12-01 Thread Heikki Linnakangas
Bruce Momjian wrote: What might be interesting is to report CRC mismatches if the database was shut down cleanly previously; I think in those cases we shouldn't have torn pages. Unfortunately that's not true. You can crash, leading to a torn page, and then start up the database and shut it

Re: [HACKERS] Block-level CRC checks

2009-12-01 Thread marcin mank
On Mon, Nov 30, 2009 at 9:27 PM, Heikki Linnakangas heikki.linnakan...@enterprisedb.com wrote: Simon Riggs wrote: Proposal * We reserve enough space on a disk block for a CRC check. When a dirty block is written to disk we calculate and annotate the CRC value, though this is *not* WAL

Re: [HACKERS] Block-level CRC checks

2009-12-01 Thread Andres Freund
On Tuesday 01 December 2009 14:38:26 marcin mank wrote: On Mon, Nov 30, 2009 at 9:27 PM, Heikki Linnakangas heikki.linnakan...@enterprisedb.com wrote: Simon Riggs wrote: Proposal * We reserve enough space on a disk block for a CRC check. When a dirty block is written to disk we

Re: [HACKERS] Feature request: permissions change history for auditing

2009-12-01 Thread Euler Taveira de Oliveira
Thom Brown escreveu: As far as I am aware, there is no way to tell when a user/role was granted permissions or had permissions revoked, or who made these changes. I'm wondering if it would be useful for security auditing to maintain a history of permissions changes only accessible to

Re: [HACKERS] Block-level CRC checks

2009-12-01 Thread Aidan Van Dyk
* Andres Freund and...@anarazel.de [091201 08:42]: On Tuesday 01 December 2009 14:38:26 marcin mank wrote: On Mon, Nov 30, 2009 at 9:27 PM, Heikki Linnakangas heikki.linnakan...@enterprisedb.com wrote: Simon Riggs wrote: Proposal * We reserve enough space on a disk block for a

Re: [HACKERS] Block-level CRC checks

2009-12-01 Thread Robert Haas
On Tue, Dec 1, 2009 at 8:30 AM, Heikki Linnakangas heikki.linnakan...@enterprisedb.com wrote: Bruce Momjian wrote: What might be interesting is to report CRC mismatches if the database was shut down cleanly previously;  I think in those cases we shouldn't have torn pages. Unfortunately

Re: [HACKERS] CommitFest status/management

2009-12-01 Thread Robert Haas
On Tue, Dec 1, 2009 at 8:27 AM, Andrew Dunstan and...@dunslane.net wrote: Bruce Momjian wrote: It would also like to clarify the use case for this a little bit more.  Is this just to track patches which committers are in the process of committing (or have committed)?  Or would a committer

Re: [HACKERS] CommitFest status/management

2009-12-01 Thread Tom Lane
Robert Haas robertmh...@gmail.com writes: On Mon, Nov 30, 2009 at 11:08 PM, Tom Lane t...@sss.pgh.pa.us wrote: Robert acknowledged the need for a claimed by committer field in the fest application, but he hasn't got round to it yet. Sorry I haven't gotten around to this. Beyond being a

Re: [HACKERS] Block-level CRC checks

2009-12-01 Thread Andres Freund
On Tuesday 01 December 2009 15:26:21 Aidan Van Dyk wrote: * Andres Freund and...@anarazel.de [091201 08:42]: On Tuesday 01 December 2009 14:38:26 marcin mank wrote: On Mon, Nov 30, 2009 at 9:27 PM, Heikki Linnakangas heikki.linnakan...@enterprisedb.com wrote: Simon Riggs wrote:

Re: [HACKERS] Block-level CRC checks

2009-12-01 Thread Heikki Linnakangas
Robert Haas wrote: On Tue, Dec 1, 2009 at 8:30 AM, Heikki Linnakangas heikki.linnakan...@enterprisedb.com wrote: Bruce Momjian wrote: What might be interesting is to report CRC mismatches if the database was shut down cleanly previously; I think in those cases we shouldn't have torn pages.

Re: [HACKERS] CommitFest status/management

2009-12-01 Thread Tom Lane
Robert Haas robertmh...@gmail.com writes: If we went with Bruce's interpretation, we could have a committer field that only appears when the status is Claimed by Committer or Committed and the contents of that field could be displayed in parentheses in the status column, like this: Claimed by

Re: [HACKERS] CommitFest status/management

2009-12-01 Thread Robert Haas
On Tue, Dec 1, 2009 at 9:42 AM, Tom Lane t...@sss.pgh.pa.us wrote: Robert Haas robertmh...@gmail.com writes: If we went with Bruce's interpretation, we could have a committer field that only appears when the status is Claimed by Committer or Committed and the contents of that field could be

Re: [HACKERS] Block-level CRC checks

2009-12-01 Thread Simon Riggs
On Tue, 2009-12-01 at 15:30 +0200, Heikki Linnakangas wrote: Bruce Momjian wrote: What might be interesting is to report CRC mismatches if the database was shut down cleanly previously; I think in those cases we shouldn't have torn pages. Unfortunately that's not true. You can crash,

Re: [HACKERS] Block-level CRC checks

2009-12-01 Thread Robert Haas
On Tue, Dec 1, 2009 at 9:40 AM, Heikki Linnakangas heikki.linnakan...@enterprisedb.com wrote: Even if rescanning every page in the cluster was feasible from a performance point-of-view, it would make the CRC checking a lot less useful. It's not hard to imagine that when a hardware glitch

Re: [HACKERS] CommitFest status/management

2009-12-01 Thread Tom Lane
BTW, if you have time for any purely cosmetic details ... the way the CommitFest field on a patch detail page works has always struck me as weird. It's a data field, and so if it has any behavior at all that behavior ought to involve modifying its value. But what it actually is is a navigation

Re: [HACKERS] Block-level CRC checks

2009-12-01 Thread Florian Weimer
* Simon Riggs: * Put all hint bits in the block header to allow them to be excluded more easily from CRC checking. If we used 3 more bits from ItemIdData.lp_len (limiting tuple length to 4096) then we could store some hints in the item pointer. HEAP_XMIN_INVALID can be stored as LP_DEAD,

Re: [HACKERS] Deleted WAL files held open by backends in Linux

2009-12-01 Thread Kevin Grittner
Tom Lane t...@sss.pgh.pa.us wrote: How old were the sessions you were looking at? Days to months old. If we think this is worth doing something about (I'm not convinced yet) Once one knows about the issue, it's only a minor annoyance, and that infrequently, so it's not worth anything

Re: [HACKERS] CommitFest status/management

2009-12-01 Thread Andrew Dunstan
Robert Haas wrote: OK, I'll add a separate text field for the committer's name, but for now it won't display on the summary page, just the detail page. Perhaps it could go underneath the reviewer names, maybe in a different color. (And yes, like many of us I suck at GUI design, so

Re: [HACKERS] [PATCH] Windows x64

2009-12-01 Thread Robert Haas
On Tue, Dec 1, 2009 at 6:25 AM, Tsutomu Yamada tsut...@sraoss.co.jp wrote: Hello. The following patches support Windows x64. 1) use intptr_t for Datum and pointer macros. (to support Windows LLP64)   almost the same as that post before.  

Re: [HACKERS] Deleted WAL files held open by backends in Linux

2009-12-01 Thread Tom Lane
Kevin Grittner kevin.gritt...@wicourts.gov writes: Is there a reasonably cheap way to check whether the backend has a WAL file open and whether that one is the current append target? Detecting whether we have a WAL file open is trivial (just look at the static variable holding the file

Re: [HACKERS] Block-level CRC checks

2009-12-01 Thread Tom Lane
Florian Weimer fwei...@bfk.de writes: What about putting the whole visibility information out-of-line, into its own B-tree, indexed by page number? Hint bits need to be *cheap* to examine. Otherwise there's little point in having them at all. regards, tom lane --

Re: [HACKERS] Fwd: psql+krb5

2009-12-01 Thread Robert Haas
2009/11/30 rahimeh khodadadi rahimeh.khodad...@gmail.com: -- Forwarded message -- From: rahimeh khodadadi rahimeh.khodad...@gmail.com Date: 2009/11/29 Subject: Re: psql+krb5 To: Denis Feklushkin denis.feklush...@gmail.com Please review the guidelines for reporting a

Re: [HACKERS] Block-level CRC checks

2009-12-01 Thread Simon Riggs
On Tue, 2009-12-01 at 16:40 +0200, Heikki Linnakangas wrote: It's not hard to imagine that when a hardware glitch happens causing corruption, it also causes the system to crash. Recalculating the CRCs after crash would mask the corruption. They are already masked from us, so continuing to

Re: [HACKERS] Block-level CRC checks

2009-12-01 Thread Tom Lane
Simon Riggs si...@2ndquadrant.com writes: On Tue, 2009-12-01 at 16:40 +0200, Heikki Linnakangas wrote: It's not hard to imagine that when a hardware glitch happens causing corruption, it also causes the system to crash. Recalculating the CRCs after crash would mask the corruption. They are

Re: [HACKERS] Block-level CRC checks

2009-12-01 Thread Robert Haas
On Tue, Dec 1, 2009 at 10:35 AM, Simon Riggs si...@2ndquadrant.com wrote: On Tue, 2009-12-01 at 16:40 +0200, Heikki Linnakangas wrote: It's not hard to imagine that when a hardware glitch happens causing corruption, it also causes the system to crash. Recalculating the CRCs after crash would

Re: [HACKERS] Application name patch - v4

2009-12-01 Thread Tom Lane
Dave Page dp...@pgadmin.org writes: On Tue, Dec 1, 2009 at 9:16 AM, Heikki Linnakangas heikki.linnakan...@enterprisedb.com wrote: If an application can do SET DEFAULT, how does the connection pooler *really* reset the value back to what it was? There has to be some level of trust here :-).

Re: [HACKERS] EOL for 7.4?

2009-12-01 Thread Greg Sabino Mullane
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: RIPEMD160 I wrote: No, it should be longer. June is practically around the corner as far as business planning is concerned. Make it a year. Since it's mid November, why not just say 2011? This thread never got resolved. I think we can all agree that

Re: [HACKERS] Application name patch - v4

2009-12-01 Thread Dave Page
On Tue, Dec 1, 2009 at 4:19 PM, Tom Lane t...@sss.pgh.pa.us wrote: I don't think that we need to bump the protocol version.  The real alternative here would be that libpq sends a startup packet that includes application_name, and if it gets an error back from that, it starts over without the

Re: [GENERAL] [HACKERS] Fwd: psql+krb5

2009-12-01 Thread Scott Marlowe
Except that he posted a month ago and got no answers... On Tue, Dec 1, 2009 at 8:22 AM, Robert Haas robertmh...@gmail.com wrote: 2009/11/30 rahimeh khodadadi rahimeh.khodad...@gmail.com: -- Forwarded message -- From: rahimeh khodadadi rahimeh.khodad...@gmail.com Date:

Re: [HACKERS] Application name patch - v4

2009-12-01 Thread Tom Lane
Dave Page dp...@pgadmin.org writes: On Tue, Dec 1, 2009 at 4:19 PM, Tom Lane t...@sss.pgh.pa.us wrote: I don't think that we need to bump the protocol version.  The real alternative here would be that libpq sends a startup packet that includes application_name, and if it gets an error back

Re: [HACKERS] Application name patch - v4

2009-12-01 Thread Dave Page
On Tue, Dec 1, 2009 at 4:28 PM, Tom Lane t...@sss.pgh.pa.us wrote: If people are agreed that double connect is a better alternative I still kinda like 'SET DEFAULT', but I'm far from wed to it. A double connect certainly seems like it would be better than the inconsistency. I'm willing to go

Re: [HACKERS] Re: [COMMITTERS] pgsql: Rewrite GEQO`s gimme_tree function so that it always finds a

2009-12-01 Thread Greg Sabino Mullane
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: RIPEMD160 Playing around with this a bit, I was easily able to get 2-second planing times on 15 table join, 6-second planning times on a 16 table join and 30-second planning times on a 17 table join. This makes it

Re: [CORE] [HACKERS] EOL for 7.4?

2009-12-01 Thread Tom Lane
Greg Sabino Mullane g...@turnstep.com writes: This thread never got resolved. I think we can all agree that EOL for 7.4 is a when, not an if? Can we get -core to take a stance here and pick a date? I like the clean smooth lines of January 2011, and thus saying that 2010 is the last year in

Re: [CORE] [HACKERS] EOL for 7.4?

2009-12-01 Thread Dave Page
On Tue, Dec 1, 2009 at 4:41 PM, Tom Lane t...@sss.pgh.pa.us wrote: Greg Sabino Mullane g...@turnstep.com writes: This thread never got resolved. I think we can all agree that EOL for 7.4 is a when, not an if? Can we get -core to take a stance here and pick a date? I like the clean smooth lines

Re: [HACKERS] Application name patch - v4

2009-12-01 Thread Marko Kreen
On 12/1/09, Tom Lane t...@sss.pgh.pa.us wrote: Dave Page dp...@pgadmin.org writes: On Tue, Dec 1, 2009 at 4:19 PM, Tom Lane t...@sss.pgh.pa.us wrote: I don't think that we need to bump the protocol version. The real alternative here would be that libpq sends a startup packet that

[HACKERS] Empty dictionary file when creating text search dictionary

2009-12-01 Thread Robert Gravsjö
Found this a couple of weeks back and just re-tested against head: CREATE TEXT SEARCH DICTIONARY with an empty thesaurus file will crasch the backend. To reproduce: $ echo $(pg_config --sharedir)/tsearch_data/thesaurus_empty.ths Then use this thesaurus to create a text search dictionary:

[HACKERS] 答复: [HACKERS] is isolation level 'Serializa ble' in pg not same as 'serializable' in S QL-92?

2009-12-01 Thread 张中
Thank you very much! -邮件原件- 发件人: Robert Haas [mailto:robertmh...@gmail.com] 发送时间: 2009年12月1日 1:37 收件人: 张中 抄送: pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org 主题: Re: [HACKERS] is isolation level 'Serializable' in pg not same as 'serializable' in SQL-92? 2009/11/30 张茂森 maosen.zh...@alibaba-inc.com:

Re: [CORE] [HACKERS] EOL for 7.4?

2009-12-01 Thread Marc G. Fournier
On Tue, 1 Dec 2009, Tom Lane wrote: Greg Sabino Mullane g...@turnstep.com writes: This thread never got resolved. I think we can all agree that EOL for 7.4 is a when, not an if? Can we get -core to take a stance here and pick a date? I like the clean smooth lines of January 2011, and thus

Re: [GENERAL] [HACKERS] Fwd: psql+krb5

2009-12-01 Thread Robert Haas
On Tue, Dec 1, 2009 at 11:26 AM, Scott Marlowe scott.marl...@gmail.com wrote: Except that he posted a month ago and got no answers... Gee, I wonder why. ...Robert -- Sent via pgsql-hackers mailing list (pgsql-hackers@postgresql.org) To make changes to your subscription:

Re: [HACKERS] Block-level CRC checks

2009-12-01 Thread Joshua D. Drake
On Tue, 2009-12-01 at 07:05 -0500, Bruce Momjian wrote: All useful detection mechanisms have non-zero false positives because we would rather sometimes ring the bell for no reason than to let bad things through silently, as we do now. OK, but what happens if someone gets the failure

Re: [HACKERS] Block-level CRC checks

2009-12-01 Thread Simon Riggs
On Tue, 2009-12-01 at 10:55 -0500, Tom Lane wrote: Simon Riggs si...@2ndquadrant.com writes: On Tue, 2009-12-01 at 16:40 +0200, Heikki Linnakangas wrote: It's not hard to imagine that when a hardware glitch happens causing corruption, it also causes the system to crash. Recalculating the

Re: [HACKERS] Empty dictionary file when creating text search dictionary

2009-12-01 Thread Bruce Momjian
This is a duplicate report and has been fixed by Tom already. --- Robert Gravsj? wrote: Found this a couple of weeks back and just re-tested against head: CREATE TEXT SEARCH DICTIONARY with an empty thesaurus file will

Re: [HACKERS] Block-level CRC checks

2009-12-01 Thread Joshua D. Drake
On Tue, 2009-12-01 at 10:55 -0500, Tom Lane wrote: Simon Riggs si...@2ndquadrant.com writes: On Tue, 2009-12-01 at 16:40 +0200, Heikki Linnakangas wrote: It's not hard to imagine that when a hardware glitch happens causing corruption, it also causes the system to crash. Recalculating the

Re: [HACKERS] Block-level CRC checks

2009-12-01 Thread Bruce Momjian
Simon Riggs wrote: Also, we might * Put all hint bits in the block header to allow them to be excluded more easily from CRC checking. If we used 3 more bits from ItemIdData.lp_len (limiting tuple length to 4096) then we could store some hints in the item pointer. HEAP_XMIN_INVALID can be

Re: [HACKERS] Deleted WAL files held open by backends in Linux

2009-12-01 Thread Kevin Grittner
Tom Lane t...@sss.pgh.pa.us wrote: Determining whether it's still the current append target is not so cheap though; it would require examining shared-memory status which means taking a lock on that status (and it's a high-traffic lock already). I haven't reviewed the internal locking

Re: [HACKERS] Re: [COMMITTERS] pgsql: Rewrite GEQO`s gimme_tree function so that it always finds a

2009-12-01 Thread Robert Haas
On Tue, Dec 1, 2009 at 11:39 AM, Greg Sabino Mullane g...@turnstep.com wrote: Playing around with this a bit, I was easily able to get 2-second planing times on 15 table join, 6-second planning times on a 16 table join and 30-second planning times on a 17 table join.  This makes it hard to

Re: [HACKERS] Block-level CRC checks

2009-12-01 Thread Robert Haas
On Tue, Dec 1, 2009 at 1:02 PM, Joshua D. Drake j...@commandprompt.com wrote: The hard core reality is this. *IF* it is one of the goals of this project to insure that the software can be safely, effectively, and responsibly operated in a manner that is acceptable to C* level people in a

Re: [HACKERS] Block-level CRC checks

2009-12-01 Thread Simon Riggs
On Tue, 2009-12-01 at 13:05 -0500, Bruce Momjian wrote: Simon Riggs wrote: Also, we might * Put all hint bits in the block header to allow them to be excluded more easily from CRC checking. If we used 3 more bits from ItemIdData.lp_len (limiting tuple length to 4096) then we could

Re: [HACKERS] Application name patch - v4

2009-12-01 Thread Tom Lane
Marko Kreen mark...@gmail.com writes: If the pooler gets new connection with same username:database as some existing connection, but with different appname, what it is supposed to do? Whatever it wants to. People seem to be imagining that the appname isn't under the control of the pooler.

Re: [HACKERS] Hot Standby remaining issues

2009-12-01 Thread Heikki Linnakangas
Simon Riggs wrote: commit 02c3eadb766201db084b668daa271db4a900adc9 Author: Simon Riggs sri...@ebony.(none) Date: Sat Nov 28 06:23:33 2009 + Added wal_standby_info GUC to turn RM_STANDBY_ID messages on/off. Various comments added also. This patch makes it unsafe to start hot

Re: [HACKERS] Block-level CRC checks

2009-12-01 Thread Joshua D. Drake
On Tue, 2009-12-01 at 13:20 -0500, Robert Haas wrote: On Tue, Dec 1, 2009 at 1:02 PM, Joshua D. Drake j...@commandprompt.com wrote: The hard core reality is this. *IF* it is one of the goals of this project to insure that the software can be safely, effectively, and responsibly operated

Re: [CORE] [HACKERS] EOL for 7.4?

2009-12-01 Thread Tom Lane
Marc G. Fournier scra...@hub.org writes: What are RedHats EOL dates for the various releases? Dave already mentioned a public page for that: http://www.redhat.com/security/updates/errata/ Based on track record so far, Red Hat isn't going to care about anything but high-priority security issues

Re: [HACKERS] Block-level CRC checks

2009-12-01 Thread Tom Lane
Bruce Momjian br...@momjian.us writes: OK, here is another idea, maybe crazy: When we read in a page that has an invalid CRC, we check the page to see which hint bits are _not_ set, and we try setting them to see if can get a matching CRC. If there no missing hint bits and the CRC doesn't

Re: [HACKERS] Block-level CRC checks

2009-12-01 Thread Tom Lane
Simon Riggs si...@2ndquadrant.com writes: On Tue, 2009-12-01 at 13:05 -0500, Bruce Momjian wrote: When we read in a page that has an invalid CRC, we check the page to see which hint bits are _not_ set, and we try setting them to see if can get a matching CRC. Perhaps we could store a

Re: [HACKERS] Deleted WAL files held open by backends in Linux

2009-12-01 Thread Tom Lane
Kevin Grittner kevin.gritt...@wicourts.gov writes: Tom Lane t...@sss.pgh.pa.us wrote: Determining whether it's still the current append target is not so cheap though; it would require examining shared-memory status which means taking a lock on that status (and it's a high-traffic lock

Re: [HACKERS] Block-level CRC checks

2009-12-01 Thread Aidan Van Dyk
* Tom Lane t...@sss.pgh.pa.us [091201 13:58]: Actually, the killer problem with *any* scheme involving guessing is that each bit you guess translates directly to removing one bit of confidence from the CRC value. If you try to guess at as many as 32 bits, it is practically guaranteed that

Re: [HACKERS] Re: [COMMITTERS] pgsql: Rewrite GEQO`s gimme_tree function so that it always finds a

2009-12-01 Thread Tom Lane
Robert Haas robertmh...@gmail.com writes: On Tue, Dec 1, 2009 at 11:39 AM, Greg Sabino Mullane g...@turnstep.com wrote: What about 14? Could we at least raise it to 14? 1/2 :) I doubt we can raise it at all without lying to ourselves about the likely results of so doing. The GEQO planning

Re: [HACKERS] Block-level CRC checks

2009-12-01 Thread Greg Stark
On Tue, Dec 1, 2009 at 6:41 PM, Tom Lane t...@sss.pgh.pa.us wrote: Bruce Momjian br...@momjian.us writes: OK, here is another idea, maybe crazy: When we read in a page that has an invalid CRC, we check the page to see which hint bits are _not_ set, and we try setting them to see if can get a

Re: [HACKERS] Deleted WAL files held open by backends in Linux

2009-12-01 Thread Kevin Grittner
Tom Lane t...@sss.pgh.pa.us wrote: Perhaps, if you didn't mind sometimes getting a wrong answer. Well, it would be a heuristic which would close the deleted file *almost* all the time. When it didn't, the next check would probably catch it. Assuming that you would never get an indication

Re: [HACKERS] Block-level CRC checks

2009-12-01 Thread Tom Lane
Greg Stark gsst...@mit.edu writes: Another thought is that would could use the MSSQL-style torn page detection of including a counter (or even a bit?) in every 512-byte chunk which gets incremented every time the page is written. I think we can dismiss that idea, or any idea involving a

Re: [CORE] [HACKERS] EOL for 7.4?

2009-12-01 Thread Scrappy
is there a reason why we can't follow a similar 4+3 life cycle? packagers r produced for the first 4y after .0 release and only source updates for year 5 thru 7? if we could advertise such on the web, there would be no question as to when bug reports are accepted (n+4y) and when only

Re: [HACKERS] Block-level CRC checks

2009-12-01 Thread Josh Berkus
All, I feel strongly that we should be verifying pages on write, or at least providing the option to do so, because hardware is simply not reliable. And a lot of our biggest users are having issues; it seems pretty much guarenteed that if you have more than 20 postgres servers, at least one of

Re: [HACKERS] enable-thread-safety defaults?

2009-12-01 Thread Magnus Hagander
2009/12/1 Bruce Momjian br...@momjian.us: Peter Eisentraut wrote: On m?n, 2009-11-30 at 12:21 -0500, Bruce Momjian wrote: ! for thread safety;  use --disable-thread-safety to disable threading.]) --disable-thread-safety does not disable threading, it disables thread safety. Good point!  

Re: [HACKERS] SE-PgSQL patch review

2009-12-01 Thread Josh Berkus
This is totally separate from the really important question of whether SE-Linux has a future, and another about whether, if SE-Linux has a future, PostgreSQL needs to go there. If the hooks are generic enough that the could potentially be adapted to other security frameworks, yes. The need

Re: [CORE] [HACKERS] EOL for 7.4?

2009-12-01 Thread Andrew Dunstan
Scrappy wrote: is there a reason why we can't follow a similar 4+3 life cycle? packagers r produced for the first 4y after .0 release and only source updates for year 5 thru 7? if we could advertise such on the web, there would be no question as to when bug reports are accepted (n+4y)

Re: [HACKERS] SE-PgSQL patch review

2009-12-01 Thread Joshua D. Drake
On Mon, 2009-11-30 at 20:28 -0800, David Fetter wrote: This is totally separate from the really important question of whether SE-Linux has a future, and another about whether, if SE-Linux has a future, PostgreSQL needs to go there. Why would we think that it doesn't? Maybe I haven't been

Re: [HACKERS] enable-thread-safety defaults?

2009-12-01 Thread Tom Lane
Magnus Hagander mag...@hagander.net writes: 2009/12/1 Bruce Momjian br...@momjian.us: What are we going to do for build farm members who don't support threading?  Is someone going to manually update their configure flags? Yeah, I think so. Unless there's a whole lot of them, in which case

Re: [CORE] [HACKERS] EOL for 7.4?

2009-12-01 Thread Tom Lane
Andrew Dunstan and...@dunslane.net writes: The time between these periodic debates seems to be getting shorter and shorter. No, this is just a continuation of the unresolved thread from a month or so ago. regards, tom lane -- Sent via pgsql-hackers mailing list

Re: [HACKERS] Block-level CRC checks

2009-12-01 Thread Kevin Grittner
Josh Berkus j...@agliodbs.com wrote: And a lot of our biggest users are having issues; it seems pretty much guarenteed that if you have more than 20 postgres servers, at least one of them will have bad memory, bad RAID and/or a bad driver. Huh?!? We have about 200 clusters running on

Re: [HACKERS] Block-level CRC checks

2009-12-01 Thread Greg Stark
On Tue, Dec 1, 2009 at 7:19 PM, Josh Berkus j...@agliodbs.com wrote: However, that solution would not detect subtle corruption, like single-bit-flipping issues caused by quantum errors. Well there is a solution for this, ECC RAM. There's *no* software solution for it. The corruption can just as

Re: [HACKERS] SE-PgSQL patch review

2009-12-01 Thread Tom Lane
Joshua D. Drake j...@commandprompt.com writes: On Mon, 2009-11-30 at 20:28 -0800, David Fetter wrote: This is totally separate from the really important question of whether SE-Linux has a future, and another about whether, if SE-Linux has a future, PostgreSQL needs to go there. Why would we

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