[qubes-devel] Congrats, you made it...

2017-07-05 Thread David Hobach
... into the most popular printed edition of a German magazine for IT professionals [2]. Apparently the story was written by 2 external authors who introduced Qubes into their small-size company and are talking about their positive experience with that. In another teaser [1] they also

[qubes-devel] awesome wm: Focus steal hardened rc.lua

2017-05-01 Thread David Hobach
Dear users, I was annoyed by some unwanted focus changes whilst using awesome and thus created the attached config that should prevent most of them. Maybe it'll be useful to some of you (I noticed some threads on this mailing list about focus steal stuff after all). The code should be

Re: [qubes-devel] handling encrypted external drives

2018-08-05 Thread David Hobach
On 07/31/2018 09:38 PM, Rusty Bird wrote: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 David Hobach: On 07/29/2018 07:30 AM, 'awokd' via qubes-devel wrote: Check out https://github.com/rustybird/qubes-split-dm-crypt, it addresses some of that. The Readme also mentions the currently

[qubes-devel] Re: [qubes-users] nftables vs iptables

2018-10-10 Thread David Hobach
On 10/10/18 3:33 PM, unman wrote: On Wed, Oct 10, 2018 at 03:17:47PM +0200, Illidan Pornrage wrote: On 10/10/18 3:14 PM, unman wrote: On Tue, Oct 09, 2018 at 09:18:22PM +0300, Ivan Mitev wrote: On 10/9/18 7:44 PM, mfreemon wrote: On 10/8/18 10:56 AM, mfreemon wrote: On 10/2/18 2:25 AM,

Re: [qubes-devel] Re: Password encryption for individual vm's

2019-01-20 Thread David Hobach
On 1/20/19 12:33 AM, Andrew David Wong wrote: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 On 18/01/2019 11.43 PM, thorsten.schie...@gmail.com wrote: I am also interested in having encrypted vms (preferably having one password for each VM-group). Let's assume I have one or more VMs for

Re: [qubes-devel] Re: Password encryption for individual vm's

2019-01-20 Thread David Hobach
On 1/20/19 9:01 PM, thorsten.schie...@gmail.com wrote: Or just encrypt all your customer A data inside a container or partition in dom0 and attach that to the right VM on demand whilst memorizing the respective password. Something like this could work if you are using the container as a simple

Re: [qubes-devel] Request: Deferred autostart

2018-12-15 Thread David Hobach
On 12/14/18 8:51 PM, Achim Patzner wrote: Hi! After reorganizing my working environment (e. g. putting certain security-related services in separate machines) I would like to start them at system startup but the current autostart feature is waiting or all machines to come up. Would it be

[qubes-devel] Potential IOMMU bypass from peripherals

2019-02-27 Thread David Hobach
Dear devs, [1] claims full IOMMU bypass from malicious peripherals using any of a) racing conditions during boot. b) enabled ATS (apparently the default with Linux < 4.21; I'm not sure about Xen). What's the Qubes OS view on that? Is ATS enabled/disabled? Were you included in the

[qubes-devel] socat dependency of qubes-core-dom0

2019-10-21 Thread David Hobach
Dear devs, the latest dom0 update apparently introduced a socat dependency for qubes-core-dom0 4.0.47-1. Where does this come from? I was rather suprised and intrigued. Best Regards David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-devel" group. To

Re: [qubes-devel] "Qubes Architecture Next Steps: The GUI Domain" by Marek Marczykowski-Górecki & Marta Marczykowska-Górecka

2020-04-04 Thread David Hobach
On 3/18/20 7:07 PM, David Hobach wrote: On 3/18/20 5:47 PM, Andrew David Wong wrote: Dear Qubes Community, A new article has just been published on the Qubes website: "Qubes Architecture Next Steps: The GUI Domain" by Marek Marczykowski-Górecki & Marta Marczykowska-Górecka htt

Re: [qubes-devel] Rowhammer

2020-04-05 Thread David Hobach
On 4/5/20 6:10 AM, Demi Obenour wrote: Are either of the Qubes-certified laptops vulnerable to Rowhammer or to TRRespass? I believe that immunity to both should be required. Also, are Lenovo P51s vulnerable? It is a matter of thetype of RAM the manufacturer uses which I guess may change

Re: [qubes-devel] "Qubes Architecture Next Steps: The GUI Domain" by Marek Marczykowski-Górecki & Marta Marczykowska-Górecka

2020-03-18 Thread David Hobach
On 3/18/20 5:47 PM, Andrew David Wong wrote: Dear Qubes Community, A new article has just been published on the Qubes website: "Qubes Architecture Next Steps: The GUI Domain" by Marek Marczykowski-Górecki & Marta Marczykowska-Górecka https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2020/03/18/gui-domain/

Re: [qubes-devel] Is it more secure to update dom0 and templates via Salt?

2020-10-17 Thread David Hobach
On 10/17/20 6:22 AM, 'icequbes1' via qubes-devel wrote: While the docs are very nice, sometimes I think there is too much documentation in Qubes that it might scare new users away. While some users may be unaware of the ability to update TemplateVMs with qubesctl, is a _typical_ user really

Re: [qubes-devel] Pool interface questions

2020-06-20 Thread David Hobach
On 6/14/20 3:54 PM, Rusty Bird wrote: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 David Hobach: For example, you usually wouldn't want to decrypt a pool until the user requests some data from it. Or do I have to implement "lazy initialization" myself? I.e. I guess I'd then h

Re: [qubes-devel] Discuss Offline docs app

2020-06-09 Thread David Hobach
On 6/9/20 2:54 PM, Sarvottam Kumar wrote: Hey, I discussed the offline documentation earlier and I'm working on it. Now after exploring the markdown application for viewing offline docs, I found out that HTML is the best format to display documentation. So, I think we should stick to 'mdbook'

[qubes-devel] Pool interface questions

2020-06-14 Thread David Hobach
Dear devs, I'm trying to understand the qubes.storage.Pool interface and its requirements for implementations. In particular I wonder: Are implementations required to be fully initialized right after the constructor is called? I'm asking because I prefer "lazy initialization"; I don't want

[qubes-devel] Distributing OS-specific Changes

2021-06-19 Thread David Hobach
Dear all, How do you distribute modifications specific to certain template operating systems? I considered sending the seemingly trivial 2-line PR for [5988], but then noticed that modifying upstream systemd configuration can be done in many ways with each having Pros and Cons and none

Re: [qubes-devel] Distributing OS-specific Changes

2021-06-20 Thread David Hobach
On 6/19/21 1:20 PM, Rusty Bird wrote: Hi David, How do you distribute modifications specific to certain template operating systems? I considered sending the seemingly trivial 2-line PR for [5988], but then noticed that modifying upstream systemd configuration can be done in many ways with

Re: [qubes-devel] Storage driver implementation questions

2021-04-06 Thread David Hobach
On 4/6/21 7:30 AM, Artificial Amateur wrote: Hello, I was reading through the source code (qubes-core-admin and qubes-core-admin-client) in an effort to help Issue #1293. The goal I had in mind was to encrypt the private and volatile volumes of every new AppVM and private, volatile, and root for

Re: [qubes-devel] Storage driver implementation questions

2021-04-15 Thread David Hobach
On 4/14/21 8:30 PM, Joe wrote: On 4/6/21 7:30 AM, Artificial Amateur wrote: Would encryption best be under its own storage driver or incorporated into an existing one? On this subject: I ran into the problems with my encrypted storage pool driver where the volatile changes to the

[qubes-devel] Scripts at /etc/qubes-rpc/ inside VMs

2021-07-24 Thread David Hobach
Dear devs, do I understand it correctly that all those scripts may have a totally untrusted stdin coming from a different VM? If so, I wonder why they are doing so little input sanitization? Is there some default sanitization by qrexec in place? In particular those scripts don't look like

Re: [qubes-devel] Why code review is hard

2022-02-13 Thread David Hobach
On 2/13/22 10:05, Holger Levsen wrote: On Sat, Feb 12, 2022 at 01:03:35PM +0100, David Hobach wrote: just stumbled across it and was wondering what a reviewer would expect from this code to do: [...] At least on my amchine it executes "badCode" in both domU and dom0. I might miss

[qubes-devel] Why code review is hard

2022-02-12 Thread David Hobach
Dear all, just stumbled across it and was wondering what a reviewer would expect from this code to do: ``` #!/bin/bash function badCode { echo "bad code executed" } function testCode { #pick some existing file, nonexisting works too though echo "/etc/passwd" } function tfunc { local foo=

Re: [qubes-devel] Why code review is hard

2022-02-12 Thread David Hobach
On 2/12/22 17:52, Brendan Hoar wrote: On Sat, Feb 12, 2022 at 11:31 AM HW42 wrote: So this is probably not even a bug. Thanks for the nice example David (apropos shell: set -e semantics are also "fun"). Simon I’m going to guess (again, away from Linux terminal right now) that the