[qubes-users] Re: Making archlinux template: on make autoreconf not found but it is installed
El martes, 2 de agosto de 2016, 12:25:38 (UTC), Facundo Curti escribió: > Hi there. Someone can help me? > I'm trying to make an archlinux template on qubes 3.2. But i'm having > troubles to compile. > > When I do: > $ make vmm-xen-vm > > I get: > /home/user/qubes-src/vmm-xen/PKGBUILD: line 49: autoreconf: command not found > > But autoreconf is already installed: > $ whereis autoreconf > autoreconf: /usr/bin/autoreconf /usr/share/man/man1/autoreconf.1.gz > > Here is the complete output: > > [user@development qubes-builder]$ make vmm-xen-vm > Currently installed dependencies: > git-2.5.5-1.fc23.x86_64 > rpmdevtools-8.9-1.fc23.noarch > rpm-build-4.13.0-0.rc1.13.fc23.x86_64 > createrepo-0.10.3-3.fc21.noarch > debootstrap-1.0.81-1.fc23.noarch > dpkg-dev-1.17.25-6.fc23.noarch > python-sh-1.11-1.fc23.noarch > dialog-1.3-4.20160424.fc23.x86_64 > --> Archlinux dist-prepare-chroot (makefile): > --> Checking mounting of dev/proc/sys on build chroot... > --> Synchronize resolv.conf, in case it changed since last run... > -> Building vmm-xen (archlinux) for archlinux vm (logfile: > build-logs/vmm-xen-vm-archlinux.log) > --> build failed! > ==> Retrieving sources... > -> Found xen-4.6.1.tar.gz > -> Found series-vm.conf > -> Found apply-patches > ==> WARNING: Skipping all source file integrity checks. > ==> Extracting sources... > -> Extracting xen-4.6.1.tar.gz with bsdtar > bsdtar: Failed to set default locale > ==> Starting build()... > + patch -s -F0 -E -p1 --no-backup-if-mismatch -i > ./patches.misc/qemu-tls-1.patch > + patch -s -F0 -E -p1 --no-backup-if-mismatch -i > ./patches.misc/qemu-tls-2.patch > + patch -s -F0 -E -p1 --no-backup-if-mismatch -i > ./patches.qubes/xen-shared-loop-losetup.patch > + patch -s -F0 -E -p1 --no-backup-if-mismatch -i > ./patches.qubes/xen-no-downloads.patch > + patch -s -F0 -E -p1 --no-backup-if-mismatch -i > ./patches.qubes/xen-hotplug-external-store.patch > + patch -s -F0 -E -p1 --no-backup-if-mismatch -i > ./patches.qubes/xen-tools-qubes-vm.patch > + patch -s -F0 -E -p1 --no-backup-if-mismatch -i > ./patches.qubes/vm-0001-hotplug-do-not-attempt-to-remove-containing-xenstore.patch > + patch -s -F0 -E -p1 --no-backup-if-mismatch -i > ./patches.misc/libxc-fix-xc_gntshr_munmap-semantic.patch > + patch -s -F0 -E -p1 --no-backup-if-mismatch -i > ./patches.misc/libvchan-Fix-cleanup-when-xc_gntshr_open-failed.patch > + patch -s -F0 -E -p1 --no-backup-if-mismatch -i > ./patches.misc/0101-libvchan-create-xenstore-entries-in-one-transaction.patch > + patch -s -F0 -E -p1 --no-backup-if-mismatch -i > ./patches.misc/0001-configure-Fix-when-no-libsystemd-compat-lib-are-avai.patch > + patch -s -F0 -E -p1 --no-backup-if-mismatch -i > ./patches.misc/0001-libxc-prefer-using-privcmd-character-device.patch > + patch -s -F0 -E -p1 --no-backup-if-mismatch -i > ./patches.misc/0001-tools-hotplug-Add-native-systemd-xendriverdomain.ser.patch > + patch -s -F0 -E -p1 --no-backup-if-mismatch -i > ./patches.security/xsa155-xen-0003-libvchan-Read-prod-cons-only-once.patch > + patch -s -F0 -E -p1 --no-backup-if-mismatch -i > ./patches.libxl/0001-libxl-trigger-attach-events-for-devices-attached-bef.patch > + patch -s -F0 -E -p1 --no-backup-if-mismatch -i > ./patches.misc/0001-systemd-use-standard-dependencies-for-xendriverdomai.patch > /home/user/qubes-src/vmm-xen/PKGBUILD: line 49: autoreconf: command not found > ==> ERROR: A failure occurred in build(). > Aborting... > /home/user/qubes-builder/qubes-src/builder-archlinux/Makefile.archlinux:120: > recipe for target 'dist-package' failed > make[2]: *** [dist-package] Error 2 > Makefile.generic:139: recipe for target 'packages' failed > make[1]: *** [packages] Error 1 > Makefile:208: recipe for target 'vmm-xen-vm' failed > make: *** [vmm-xen-vm] Error 1 > > > Some ideas? :P Someone? :S I'm still having the problem. I tried making everything from fresh in a new VM, but i get the same error :P -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/64becca4-2d05-4628-8dcc-6254305a5757%40googlegroups.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: [qubes-users] Re: Is a legacy BIOS preferable to UEFI for a secure system?
On 08/02/2016 06:10 PM, grzegorz.chodzi...@gmail.com wrote: > > Easier troubleshooting/updating/diagnostics. Modern UEFI installed on e.g > gaming motherboards can update itself over Ethernet connection, reinstall > itself from scratch and sometimes contains a built-in mini-linux. If you do > not need such bonuses then legacy BIOS will do just fine. > How do you / how can I identify these malevolent mobos? -- Rudd-O http://rudd-o.com/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/0c85cede-2538-0f56-d011-f38e1eb09181%40rudd-o.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
[qubes-users] Re: Battery Life Qubes 3.2 rc2
That's great to hear Peter. Things are getting better all the time. Great work Qubes team. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/a4ba6fd7-7ca0-44b1-93e8-cb37e56ec777%40googlegroups.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: [qubes-users] Upgrading from Qubes 3.1 to 3.2 fail
On Tuesday, August 2, 2016 at 5:44:45 AM UTC-4, donoban wrote: > -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- > Hash: SHA256 > > > > On 07/31/2016 02:33 PM, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote: > > On Sun, Jul 31, 2016 at 01:53:26PM +0200, donoban wrote: > >> Hi, > > > >> I tried to do the experimental process for upgrading to Qubes > >> 3.2. I followed the steps from > >> https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade-to-r3.2/ > > > > > >> All went fine until I rebooted the system (step 7). After > >> rebooting I had a lot of packages for update on dom0 (more than > >> 1000), and when I tried to update them it failed because some > >> dependency problems (I remember some perl packages but maybe > >> there were more packages with problems). > > > > Those packages should be already handled in step 4. > > Ok, doing same process on my other computer I've noticed I was > confused the first time. When I checked the qubes-core-dom0 I though > it said version 3.2.X installed, but it was AVAILABLE. So there the > dependency problem exists already in this step but I didn't notice. > > Doing the command with --clean doesn't help. How can I provide an > useful log of this? > > Regards. > -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- > Version: GnuPG v2 > > iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJXoGuGAAoJEBQTENjj7QilMCUQAJGIJmdPO9vTvcuYzDynqBkx > eZIDUvC9AtHeZ8g37PeDmE6OpiDCYqF8Gx7njA2WpWwpVVAxGYZPb1b9gUeUUokN > NRlHNtzbdXvaIdYh6JejS2YuR1M5Iijy3tV6DUSqLTaDowpwdZNm5pBFOtsf1/UO > 0n47K5/auLKkNplrgAS3roRFbt6K120hqsIYiWNJw4gNMGebSH9RcFnDlb13j9OD > 83eFbfcPywHf8/WlmuKXmBJj70h/UKoVLakR7k0rHupGSzhwYHwY1azjzpb6ZEmR > 3FoP9e67gIbJJT83H6qTsH14lqvDvf7BrmtMJAzUOmWDa3rAodkxgfk7M88Yv0gd > mhr3lJmLBR2iUlUucmx5eydTCws7sWAUAwe551f3ZnMnNCvr7+Z2JG/Nzrc/Xf/F > msukG+cMuMVd+G6rrGMF+Tj/5b9PW6XQA8WuMbQT90i3Uz6H21O0QI5H+K1MEQs4 > ZYN4bNuoSr9hK+yBmm0m6TD1h39DrQ4RFIn38iIGAVfU52cabsZRPFX89prt8WNv > UVNUqprqbj3XgIA1BIDsxvjrbhkkqTxBoLmQOtZwafIF3s840S5AP1j4Q3RVbSSG > OnITmHqt+ynlXbHfUHBy4V0qI1M2QDmLk8MSlGREFnUi/Ky7VFYU9sn31LCTd4hh > 4Jo1rKCPvspFtIQ65HOj > =EMFl > -END PGP SIGNATURE- same exact thing happened to me. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/a79dcc86-23b6-4df7-9c39-0d9fda0ec038%40googlegroups.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: [qubes-users] Question about Whonix / Tor Browser / exploits
neilhard...@gmail.com: > I have a question about Whonix/Tor Browser exploits. > > I have played around a bit with Metasploit to see how browser exploits work. > > They basically rig a web page with exploits, and then it does what's known as > "arbitrary code execution", to open up a "remote shell". > > As far as I can tell.. the remote shell is running in the browser's RAM. They > are essentially hi-jacking the browser's RAM, and using it to run their own > remote shell. > > The hacker then usually loads a file from the remote shell, onto the > computer's hard drive, in order to obtain persistence... As soon as the > browser tab closes, the remote shell is gone, hence why they need persistence. > > So my question is about persistence. > > Is it possible to simply remove the hard drive altogether from Whonix, to > prevent them achieving persistence...? > > I know that TAILS simply doesn't have a hard drive at all. > > Would this be useful to have in Whonix..? To remove the hard drive > altogether, perhaps in VM Settings in QUBES...? > > Or is it possible to run a Xen exploit purely in the browser's RAM anyway...? > Thus, they don't even need a hard drive because they can just run the exploit > in RAM anyway...? > > So the main question is really whether they can run the Xen exploit in RAM > anyway or not If not, then surely removing the hard drive itself > would be useful...? > > Hopefully you understand my question. It's possible to use Whonix as a DisposableVM (although it's not the default configuration of a fresh Qubes installation), so in theory any exploit placed in the VM will disappear when the VM is closed. This would, presumably, mitigate persistent malware placed via Firefox exploits, but won't help against malware that combines a Firefox exploit with a Xen exploit. It still seems like an improvement against the default configuration. Cheers, -Jeremy Rand -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/49652994-14ed-c71c-3f0a-9c595d304940%40airmail.cc. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature
Re: [qubes-users] MicroSD assigned to dom0 and not to sys-usb
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki: > On Mon, Aug 01, 2016 at 07:35:26PM +, 468ezc+5r0fnwy87qeag via > qubes-users wrote: >> Hi, > >> My MicroSD while attached is assigned to dom0 and not sys-usb as is >> supposed. Notwithstanding, USB devices are still assigned to sys-usb. > >> Is this the intended behavior? Doesn't this increases, in the same manner as >> usb devices does, the surface attack in dom0? > > Your (micro)SD card reader is probably not a USB device, but PCI device. > Yes, it's better to assign it to some VM - sys-usb is ok. You can do > this in VM settings - "Devices" tab. Seems to me that assigning the SD controller to a different VM than sys-usb would eliminate some attack vectors, since if they're assigned to the same VM, IOMMU won't prevent software accessing the SD card from attacking software accessing the USB devices (and vice versa). A doomsday scenario that comes to mind is when the USB controller is being used to connect to the Internet via a phone tether, and the SD card is storing some high-value data. (My doomsday imagination is limited; perhaps there are better doomsday scenarios.) Is my intuition on this corect? Of course, using a separate VM means increased RAM usage, which may or may not be worth it. Cheers, -Jeremy Rand -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/33219161-b369-6ddc-b4b2-f9e75310881d%40airmail.cc. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature
[qubes-users] Re: What do you think about the idea of a FileVM?
I'm seriously taking this thread on a tangent, but are there any FOSS GUIs that have been specifically built for Xen? Heck, any free proprietary GUIs? I see paid options, abandoned projects, and cross-hypervisor solutions (those don't tend to be great), but one reason I never delved into Xen is that I couldn't figure out a good, free, standard GUI for management. I figured that's one reason Qubes built one from scratch, but something pre-existing would likely have OVA import functions. Alright, now I'm starting to ramble... On Tue, Aug 2, 2016, 9:01 PM Drew White wrote: > On Tuesday, 2 August 2016 08:43:43 UTC+10, fmu...@gmail.com wrote: > > I don't know about OVAs, but I imported a Virtualbox VM. If you search > for virtualbox you'll find the post with the procedure. Maybe this link > will work: https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/qubes-users/YQyRSoRQWCU > > I've been working on getting the OVAs decoded and imported for a while > now. The primary issue us the fact that they can be OVA versions 1,2,3, > etc.. And this causes issues within Qubes when it's decoded and put in. > > OVA1 is easy and just works. OVA2 is a little more tricky though. > > Qubes itself can't accomplish this because it can't do the later versions > of the OVAs, however in my manager I have been adding in the software and > configurations to allow for importing many different machines, including > P2V support, but that is currently only for linux clients. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/CAP0YRgb8MpgQHRp5hL6bzFLcEDbfzwZ9n%3D%2B6UZ8Jr5XD3hNOOw%40mail.gmail.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: [qubes-users] How to encrypt Qubes OS?
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 On 2016-08-02 17:00, jamiesmithdat...@gmail.com wrote: > HI! > > I have tried to figure stuff out on my own, but as a very non-techy person, > I find it hard! > > What's the best way to secure my install of Qubes OS? I want to boot from > a USB device on my PC when I want to use Qubes - is it possible to encrypt > this USB and then boot from it? > > Or... is there a way to create encrypted volumnes inside Qubes itself? > Sorry to sound so newb-like, Im getting there just need some help as I want > to move away from Tails and use something more secure! > > Cheers , > > Jamie > Qubes OS uses full disk encryption (FDE) by default: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/user-faq/#does-qubes-use-full-disk-encryption-fde You can also manually configure your encryption settings, if you like: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/encryption-config/ - -- Andrew David Wong (Axon) Community Manager, Qubes OS https://www.qubes-os.org -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJXoVV+AAoJENtN07w5UDAwPMwP/irWB17ia1PdFTVLaIvPmSKP ELbFTv/bcgYkpSltvqLa19s7mpBmdgYHw4QP22kfgIS+ZoeRopo3AdXwbgqCu+sJ 3DBQZ3KpApqSb8fjEOvmwpcw+yjDi/ZXb9SLGmtyA/UcvBxtjspaLWeLFGfBKVqY 6+9aZ9kqi3Idf9Gi7gtcus9dCB6i/Js7lGYZRo8/p8KJteKThgQq/txkwPOG7CdP CUGiWHH2bzCGQgzfNhgOzXdImj/3OLjvvX25Xz8lEoEmVJWe8sEydrQMnBSOArgo U4pxdkigTR9FRP+wLE6zN/fmwSXf4tyMm1ALNGKr5hLRlYA5EG/CitjOG0NWqmGR LuFC15AAHQyQ12aZesxGva9s1HALHZ7xhabKf7LC/WNdnaRcQg7GvUr6G0jPDcxg 03Nvs7QeVj5/wXrBcMQiEDzHcCQ3bYCkQkFgf8BraBeFru6nMX9DarvTIu3jiOLZ +tFEYVlkgos/t375edOhhz/OB2lou7/aV72HLUdrp7adjzcsKYuBTDcwXnwwe9EU lkXOgCJe7uFnsoOn9+XCy+k6b7S+HX4eeB4jGG+DOT08Bv7VNkPR4k9JXnJA1DEW z8/V6m4xVEAYkP+RtU5OpJViqFqpWBa5o5KNPWxWSK9lmZOfXpPxunKjqohuOQoH /zun5EvdrCOISHK49tCS =VHKW -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/c0d4f024-b2a3-c009-3930-af96dc2e4b16%40qubes-os.org. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: [qubes-users] Attaching a webcam from sys-usb to other appvm
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 On 2016-08-02 17:07, Franz wrote: > On Tue, Aug 2, 2016 at 8:19 PM, Andrew David Wong > wrote: > > On 2016-08-02 09:29, 46co2u+d7n6f69py4nlk via qubes-users wrote: Hi, Is this possible and how can it be done? Unfortunately I didn't find any how to explaining this. Thank you > > Sorry, that's not supported: > > "Other devices, such as USB webcams, will also work, but they will be > accessible only from the USB qube itself, as explained above." > > https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/usb/#tocAnchor-1-1-3 > > > >> but isn't the last paragraph of your link actually mentioning that a USB >> webcam can be "attached" to a "conferences qube", even if only under >> 3.2? > >> Well I do not have yet 3.2, but this seems interesting. May you please >> elaborate a little bit about the use cases of this last paragraph? > >> It seems something totally different from the old USB controller >> assignment. So what is that? Or even more interesting; for what purpose >> may we use it? > >> Best Fran > Ah, yes, you're right. I overlooked this new feature introduced in 3.2 because I haven't had a chance to try it yet. (Also, I don't know whether the OP is on 3.1 or 3.2-rcX, and of course 3.2-rcX is still an RC.) So, yes, beginning in 3.2, it should be possible to do this. The use case, as far as I can tell, would be as described in that paragraph: something like attaching a webcam to a "conference" VM for the purpose of the teleconferencing. You should be able to use it for that and similar purposes. - -- Andrew David Wong (Axon) Community Manager, Qubes OS https://www.qubes-os.org -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJXoVUIAAoJENtN07w5UDAwG2IP/AlnpuvqRqdWGPPKTLkExKdM 3K/7/jXLSbGuBwnS1b9w922JEO4nnttvO8aDNNd6V3Kf4ktZfGUK4owWsCr4OMUJ YFiT5xdOoK/2STUcbaikfePP97oXvQsfQgHdsxMCwFyoxGxSUgWtNwhZ5h+eOvfu lf3ZX+xKuVHD1OGWQPRYZ/ZSz+J1z46YU8+qU2VXw8yTO+KtFzlvZw9AwUAd5HDv S+rJrDMDdV5loTuDkD/U2aT8kpyKxZVHMCeWFmNcNlKIWaXdC7BuAJjaacdKubSd zDeaSnc2GRURkL1wwKwgTEPzNvq+ra4g5BLD+p198yaIIQIMLihjz9juidmYzLKG bc1cNJonfVHKf4tqBp6ISCHMo9EfJ1GjhPMv29wXeOV2k6ajDbMBi+vmGnbbgn6B yMx+8rzS1MKE77KaSuwTbedcyuzHj8yvhfDniILKM9gKfyemgKfOBYidRKm4K6q0 b9BpzmbXUBtZsMxMmDHG3w8NPc+PhUMhXdHlagiGnMkpy8zSYTKTYFPXnBC3U/aA 0/oBQEgtzSc/7ajB7w6SQc9hYPaEZ4zPXRF8c1t7XzqkbKlwm35TN9J5k1+Cwp1t DCpifqwJW4ZWdI2ITVUDTzMEAynsPLYe3Rv0KvRgrK1l0pijriQN/JvHzCc3ywer B6TiEAhcfOanf/ZD0Pfc =P4/m -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/45a556d2-49c2-cd58-63cf-093f9cd314e2%40qubes-os.org. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: [qubes-users] Re: Battery Life Qubes 3.2 rc2
On Monday, August 1, 2016 at 7:50:24 PM UTC-6, Andrew David Wong wrote: > -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- > Hash: SHA512 > > On 2016-08-01 18:36, Peter M wrote: > > On Sunday, July 31, 2016 at 6:29:27 PM UTC-6, Peter M wrote: > >> Is anyone else noticing very significant increases in battery life with > >> 3.2 as opposed to 3.1? > >> > >> On 3.1 I was lucky to get 1h 30 min while with 3.2 I am easily getting 3 > >> hours. I have an Nvidia Quadro graphics card so I am guessing some > >> improvement in the nouveau driver is helping. > >> > >> Anyone else want to share their battery life experiences? > > > > > > Ok I can confirm a very significant improvement in power usage. > > > > In 3.1 with minimal activity (nothing but basic VM open) the usage is > > about 24W. Opening a few VM's (personal, work, etc) brings that up to about > > 28.5W. > > > > IN 3.2 with minimal activity (nothing but basic VM open) the usage is > > about 13.1W. Opening a few VM's (personal, work, etc) brings that up to > > about 16.3W. > > > > There is also an improvement in temperature. My laptop ran pretty warm in > > 3.1 while in 3.2 it runs cool. Going to dig into it more. > > > > My setup is Nvidia Quadro M2000M Intel Xeon M1505 16Gb Ram > > > > Given this is new hardware my guess is significant driver updates is the > > cause. > > > > Very nice! :) > > - -- > Andrew David Wong (Axon) > Community Manager, Qubes OS > https://www.qubes-os.org I am also noting increases in graphics performance, less artifacts. One point to note for those running Windows 7 HVM is that Qubes Windows Tools 3.2.0.2 seems to be more stable than 3.0.4.1 I had issues with the older windows tools in 3.1 but the problems got worse in 3.2. The VM would randomly crash. Since updating windows tools it has not crashed yet. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/aabf8326-25a0-43f8-b96a-7f12bccdb140%40googlegroups.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
[qubes-users] Re: What do you think about the idea of a FileVM?
On Tuesday, 2 August 2016 08:43:43 UTC+10, fmu...@gmail.com wrote: > I don't know about OVAs, but I imported a Virtualbox VM. If you search for > virtualbox you'll find the post with the procedure. Maybe this link will > work: https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/qubes-users/YQyRSoRQWCU I've been working on getting the OVAs decoded and imported for a while now. The primary issue us the fact that they can be OVA versions 1,2,3, etc.. And this causes issues within Qubes when it's decoded and put in. OVA1 is easy and just works. OVA2 is a little more tricky though. Qubes itself can't accomplish this because it can't do the later versions of the OVAs, however in my manager I have been adding in the software and configurations to allow for importing many different machines, including P2V support, but that is currently only for linux clients. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/29f9d841-5684-4809-abce-ce3c6044c0c2%40googlegroups.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: [qubes-users] Re: installer 3.2 bugs
On Sunday, 31 July 2016 08:50:25 UTC+10, Andrew David Wong wrote: > -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- > Hash: SHA512 > > On 2016-07-30 11:55, Peter M wrote: > > On Thursday, July 14, 2016 at 4:56:32 PM UTC-6, Drew White wrote: > >> installer bug.. picture > > > > I am having a similar issue but in this case I check to configure sys-net, > > sys-firewall and default application qubes but I get the same error you > > observed. > > > > Then when I go to the system it has nothing except dom0 and the VM > > templates. no sys-net, sys-firewall and default application qubes. > > > > This issue is being tracked here: > > https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2213 > > - -- > Andrew David Wong (Axon) > Community Manager, Qubes OS > https://www.qubes-os.org > -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- > > iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJXnS8pAAoJENtN07w5UDAwrhcP/3vym+GdifMH3dhJuhmIzSCC > 2F1QbgUYlvkNeBPNc/P+QhodaV+agvfWnPn04G6JX5gBnfFCCF1ALRlAt2fB1Wel > iQijVuEqakmFD/+iOvQQNOXQs2+U21DHrSE9vPyyuZfNd8T/0wv1mPyxiwepqpg7 > O5qejJDjil+ir2DTAHWUYaQNgbs0XbFLg9kRoVQepQQcoHIdkj+ir5GEGLl8q+1o > Et1MxNcl8oaAzDOd9TPbDPkXIV76x8Mu5GGAR9BuZX0ByXNmUe+1FY2ucvMEg33A > 49aTMZKX3AKQZCoXQUfZKN3Idt31KshxNc0ZNjS1FoCCn5uOloPBUpeiuqat9Dnb > W7OwdXXO6iewZt3KGOfr7wI3kALrgwGrBb4JY9T6NeZtjJHhEcsNbsY6lsqHtMu4 > tjCzjVMAuTE9+9L/OpHO1S/9WQrrxpyBPWZAjVo1yVklh80+SkjTHrZFO3A3Q8lA > fBWo62TiBJ92KCagcr3b3Xu9ae7LgNHTt7yMVkr81FFAPvxuCjBz2sVl0wFdZ+kB > IVPlY5RQ2ikdWb1AIY1/Ah3rr186x02V2eJf/9WiP7/W9a2vV3Zx+gYdDcwlRyTI > HXw+64IYUO1VVUEKKFGDqa+nhA3eRHgnuG3ROxW6wERVBLs5XHjBS+wIMPoxpot8 > Z5h0oslwlVR2/0MAfzB4 > =Kn5f > -END PGP SIGNATURE- I see so much in that issue tracking that it makes no sense. It's only a couple of lines of code that need to be fixed in the installer as far as I can tell. So I guess maybe I just don't understand it. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/6a3b5072-7f48-49c4-9ac3-93d87ba2e578%40googlegroups.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: [qubes-users] Window border coloring
On Wednesday, 13 July 2016 11:36:00 UTC+10, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote: > -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- > Hash: SHA256 > > On Tue, Jul 12, 2016 at 06:02:11PM -0700, Drew White wrote: > > Hi folks, > > > > I'm trying to get this to work but it's not letting me make it work... > > > > Trying to change the window border colour, if I change it, it changes to > > white, instead of the colour I set it to instead of using a label. > > > > What is it that causes this? > > Is it a bug? > > > > /usr/bin/qubes-guid -d 8 -N guest027 -c 0xedd400 -i > > /usr/share/icons/hicolor/128x128/devices/windows-yellow.png -l 3 -q > > > > -c {HEX Colour Code}<-- this should set the colour, but it doesn't. > > This can be removed, and it will still have the correct colour. > > Only very few places use this value currently. Most of them (including > standard window decoration) use "label index" value (-l 3 here), which > refers to hardcoded table in KDE/Xfce/i3/... > This is going to be better in upcoming versions, but it isn't done yet. > > - -- > Best Regards, > Marek Marczykowski-Górecki > Invisible Things Lab > A: Because it messes up the order in which people normally read text. > Q: Why is top-posting such a bad thing? > -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- > Version: GnuPG v2 > > iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJXhZr6AAoJENuP0xzK19cswo8H/i0NINEMQhc5qMnuOy0XBvRf > 8kB9mw3VuK9nhcbR/E9wyHcTMornYYLo5xEdsn3R3T/DIb+FNrgKCk0+WMacdi6y > ndwWFsNoVlkVydfnr1BqxatmNEJlLEuSPsk4uXn+bLouwOZz+Ae0FUmnqX4ALLrJ > DYH9+Gw299ClYmNQOSVtbbnrXUo8OXXFKoISp4jkhKd3K/yuVQYbyyxZwzZXaD/S > dHHl+CbXNwnXvHhlyB47IRa/6ZAhnszcd6l9NmzhmPTHxpPKhMVLlaDcO71n5EQC > o771dLFKVfDcAWAgRx8iTi4VnRxUjMp/GMyFaotx967n944jM38bY+alPktYvko= > =z361 > -END PGP SIGNATURE- Okay, so I take it you don't know. Thanks anyway. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/fa810175-7d04-4c9a-9305-c53d46b34fe3%40googlegroups.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: [qubes-users] How to encrypt Qubes OS?
On Tue, Aug 2, 2016 at 9:00 PM, wrote: > HI! > > I have tried to figure stuff out on my own, but as a very non-techy > person, I find it hard! > > What's the best way to secure my install of Qubes OS? I want to boot from > a USB device on my PC when I want to use Qubes - is it possible to encrypt > this USB and then boot from it? > Just following standard Qubes installation you are being asked to encrypt your disk giving two times a proper password. So i do not understand you question; isn't that enough for you? > > Or... is there a way to create encrypted volumnes inside Qubes itself? That is usually done in a Vault VM which is not connected to network and is dedicated to just that. You can organize yourself there in the same way you would do in any normal linux distribution. > Sorry to sound so newb-like, Im getting there just need some help as I > want to move away from Tails and use something more secure! > > Cheers , > > Jamie > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "qubes-users" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/895bcc21-5fe0-403b-a4b2-0f81a2755695%40googlegroups.com > . > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/CAPzH-qDsA79v%2B3sR8odMkNT5098rXPBggpBCnarNjhNQOF1Agg%40mail.gmail.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: [qubes-users] Attaching a webcam from sys-usb to other appvm
On Tue, Aug 2, 2016 at 8:19 PM, Andrew David Wong wrote: > -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- > Hash: SHA512 > > On 2016-08-02 09:29, 46co2u+d7n6f69py4nlk via qubes-users wrote: > > Hi, > > > > Is this possible and how can it be done? Unfortunately I didn't find any > > how to explaining this. > > > > > > Thank you > > > > Sorry, that's not supported: > > "Other devices, such as USB webcams, will also work, but they will be > accessible only from the USB qube itself, as explained above." > > https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/usb/#tocAnchor-1-1-3 > > > but isn't the last paragraph of your link actually mentioning that a USB webcam can be "attached" to a "conferences qube", even if only under 3.2? Well I do not have yet 3.2, but this seems interesting. May you please elaborate a little bit about the use cases of this last paragraph? It seems something totally different from the old USB controller assignment. So what is that? Or even more interesting; for what purpose may we use it? Best Fran Andrew David Wong (Axon) > Community Manager, Qubes OS > https://www.qubes-os.org > -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- > > iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJXoSqaAAoJENtN07w5UDAwIlgQAMVyrVZVlQZFfL5BYFar/5Z2 > sSNuJFHZDDKKS62njgi8bIn0ud1AUhk8tWdttBnccGxi1Tftsl1Z/Dr50s9UbEXP > O/wXSgzeM3STzXqrjxskqsPhVHlqxs28sdPBz6dVnn12af1ripSG4AOR9DffQpmG > xCwcl8M86wpmSOmb6xNTGS0ZE/q7b0c+DVUvHKxHLw4+nh5PIW0vOemkvaccK4cp > BHRpFcKDigOA+JpXLVGWDt+89FWlyNcLa50o7mlI8g1D8IBSvn64gsdxxlf6lzwa > a6LrnYCRiciA41kLgQGvg+nM4iNxs8XxSnxygwuyT1j91yRLWorY7CqFNjmih44x > cS7i9V9ZuAXbuWxzSbJy5jmBDM2izmRiN5mEUr5d7jNdSgN/hachQlTBQgy4Q0E4 > E/9uOuvhJROtED2NxW2kJuZl2RGf4QGx7Hs15bwWk3qD07IE2Wf+WuFszSmIHhS1 > M+zScVxLzEMPtFk6bsyBNFCSa4+22MtdfhWMgdIPeRdcJuLB9uZFtf359p36DVCF > yQD4LBuDKWjiQcoKQKvFfNmfz9COB2luWWhy+yezrmp0yAGm7LDRiYW+mdihSI6h > p1P9jDIXdm91iIwvIl5onkiPTC0F0xWDqAoMg2FjgdDiiM2OxRST9Au/pkOdZP/0 > ea2BoQsfWNi7CtqjXcQy > =aJfc > -END PGP SIGNATURE- > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "qubes-users" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/401a6c9e-efb5-9b75-36a0-124a0b7fb405%40qubes-os.org > . > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/CAPzH-qDBY9F%3DnLde__cBC2ifob-rrr2w4nykJgay5iU_EVmCtw%40mail.gmail.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
[qubes-users] How to encrypt Qubes OS?
HI! I have tried to figure stuff out on my own, but as a very non-techy person, I find it hard! What's the best way to secure my install of Qubes OS? I want to boot from a USB device on my PC when I want to use Qubes - is it possible to encrypt this USB and then boot from it? Or... is there a way to create encrypted volumnes inside Qubes itself? Sorry to sound so newb-like, Im getting there just need some help as I want to move away from Tails and use something more secure! Cheers , Jamie -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/895bcc21-5fe0-403b-a4b2-0f81a2755695%40googlegroups.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: [qubes-users] Attaching a webcam from sys-usb to other appvm
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 On 2016-08-02 09:29, 46co2u+d7n6f69py4nlk via qubes-users wrote: > Hi, > > Is this possible and how can it be done? Unfortunately I didn't find any > how to explaining this. > > > Thank you > Sorry, that's not supported: "Other devices, such as USB webcams, will also work, but they will be accessible only from the USB qube itself, as explained above." https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/usb/#tocAnchor-1-1-3 - -- Andrew David Wong (Axon) Community Manager, Qubes OS https://www.qubes-os.org -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJXoSqaAAoJENtN07w5UDAwIlgQAMVyrVZVlQZFfL5BYFar/5Z2 sSNuJFHZDDKKS62njgi8bIn0ud1AUhk8tWdttBnccGxi1Tftsl1Z/Dr50s9UbEXP O/wXSgzeM3STzXqrjxskqsPhVHlqxs28sdPBz6dVnn12af1ripSG4AOR9DffQpmG xCwcl8M86wpmSOmb6xNTGS0ZE/q7b0c+DVUvHKxHLw4+nh5PIW0vOemkvaccK4cp BHRpFcKDigOA+JpXLVGWDt+89FWlyNcLa50o7mlI8g1D8IBSvn64gsdxxlf6lzwa a6LrnYCRiciA41kLgQGvg+nM4iNxs8XxSnxygwuyT1j91yRLWorY7CqFNjmih44x cS7i9V9ZuAXbuWxzSbJy5jmBDM2izmRiN5mEUr5d7jNdSgN/hachQlTBQgy4Q0E4 E/9uOuvhJROtED2NxW2kJuZl2RGf4QGx7Hs15bwWk3qD07IE2Wf+WuFszSmIHhS1 M+zScVxLzEMPtFk6bsyBNFCSa4+22MtdfhWMgdIPeRdcJuLB9uZFtf359p36DVCF yQD4LBuDKWjiQcoKQKvFfNmfz9COB2luWWhy+yezrmp0yAGm7LDRiYW+mdihSI6h p1P9jDIXdm91iIwvIl5onkiPTC0F0xWDqAoMg2FjgdDiiM2OxRST9Au/pkOdZP/0 ea2BoQsfWNi7CtqjXcQy =aJfc -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/401a6c9e-efb5-9b75-36a0-124a0b7fb405%40qubes-os.org. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: [qubes-users] R3.0 - R3.1: Upgrade of Debian TemplateVMs crashes
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 On 2016-08-02 04:19, hed...@tutanota.com wrote: > Summary of Problem: During a fresh installation of Qubes R3.1, all > restored Debian TemplateVMs crash during the apt-get dist-upgrade and can > no longer be restarted. > > Details: My preferred Qubes upgrade method is to do a fresh install to a > new disk and backup/restore AppVMs and TemplateVMs from the previous > version. This has highlighted two problems (the minor one first): > > 1. The documentation at > https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/releases/3.1/release-notes/#upgrading details > two upgrade methods: [quote]The easiest and safest way to upgrade to Qubes > R3.1 is to install it fromscratch and use qubes backup and restore tools > formigrating of all of the user VMs. Users of Qubes R3.0 can upgrade using > experimentalprocedure.[/quote] > > > > I can find no reference in the fresh-installation instructions for > upgrading the TemplateVMs, which only seems to be mentioned in the > "experimental method" section. Perhaps the term "experimental" is no longer > appropriate and, if so, should ideally be dropped. > > 2. After a fresh installation of R3.1, I restored all AppVMs, HVMs and > TemplateVMs (from R3.0) to the new system, I upgraded the Fedora > TemplateVMs without problem using the "experimental" procedure but ALL 3 of > my Debian-based TemplateVMs crash during the apt-get dist-upgrade step, > leaving the VMs in an unusable state (cannot be restarted). > > Since this is consistent across all three of my Debian-based TemplateVMs > (debian-8, debian-8-nonfree and debian-8-sandbox) it seems likely to be a > bug. Right now, I've restored all three from backup and they are still > usable in R3.0 form but some things (eg VM Manager Update) no longer work. > > Is this a known problem? Is there a solution or workaround? > Thanks for the report. Tracking your issue here: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2224 - -- Andrew David Wong (Axon) Community Manager, Qubes OS https://www.qubes-os.org -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- iQIcBAEBCgAGBQJXoSoZAAoJENtN07w5UDAwcPcQAMmSDvW1HFhjR8MJ8xauOC6w nhoZdT0rn/d4rxx95ev8cjdMqHmKgreoz2fBhWGM+Euhh+9/Tv3CuZ8ks1tZIz12 TMQ5umjXztPcAhoYD0u6YFv5utaVVBCGRIpUm5prWln+FqwuMm70RHYYHRtjfx7P cV7VhyHVfDRdkGakUYXI3suAFD1nzOyS6QXyFO3FQq/j6ZzBSgaKE1sC12RmHWGM Q3TPmPUrzdOkjQJ1W6D0nKBxU+3Byn4KlFSR275/MUt9oEzgmcgNnxd1vXteNmqF vkVQjOMV7h3V2ixoikWHZENp+zChZp+TvzGzqfWz1Q3Kkosvulgs583nGbTqbS6p fiKdKMnpcZkOwEneRzCb3eAmauCYHREVDix4zUdV0+2/bpQfi/rcQMt6xBD2eXmh rlqUIqL6fdP7X7y8wnG0LemozJGOYs4Tg3Cosd78RrY8R2s8VsNXDMgT1j63t2Ez 459EUwA8tE+RXVn0Jzv+fJQtWSgLCxbYWTd//V614He7ajbOO6yTrtodvOvdHWZV 3mHYwOXb0AYtMWQO/cOBgL8k7u9FseYazX5HYX5Q9U9NKLwT3D8FZ/khqb1QFXBH rjs/QSORFzOwp+f6vQPytSd/neFOUjL5SDi9CAevO/J/ErOGTXIne+Evd6UBvBHt eWtiDxORLzyg8Rb9eGfZ =KUwY -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/f85003a4-7590-12de-cca8-83eb4aa7082c%40qubes-os.org. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
[qubes-users] Question about Whonix / Tor Browser / exploits
I have a question about Whonix/Tor Browser exploits. I have played around a bit with Metasploit to see how browser exploits work. They basically rig a web page with exploits, and then it does what's known as "arbitrary code execution", to open up a "remote shell". As far as I can tell.. the remote shell is running in the browser's RAM. They are essentially hi-jacking the browser's RAM, and using it to run their own remote shell. The hacker then usually loads a file from the remote shell, onto the computer's hard drive, in order to obtain persistence... As soon as the browser tab closes, the remote shell is gone, hence why they need persistence. So my question is about persistence. Is it possible to simply remove the hard drive altogether from Whonix, to prevent them achieving persistence...? I know that TAILS simply doesn't have a hard drive at all. Would this be useful to have in Whonix..? To remove the hard drive altogether, perhaps in VM Settings in QUBES...? Or is it possible to run a Xen exploit purely in the browser's RAM anyway...? Thus, they don't even need a hard drive because they can just run the exploit in RAM anyway...? So the main question is really whether they can run the Xen exploit in RAM anyway or not If not, then surely removing the hard drive itself would be useful...? Hopefully you understand my question. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/6738a699-2afb-4a73-ade2-203608f142a8%40googlegroups.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: [qubes-users] Configuring OpenDNS in Qubes
m...@lamarciana.com: >> If I understand correctly, permanently changing /etc/resolv.conf in the >> ProxyVM to show: >> >> nameserver 208.67.222.222 >> nameserver 208.67.220.220 >> >> should achieve that in a standalone ProxyVM. > > Thanks for your answer. I thought that changing /etc/resolv.conf by hand was > not recommended because some other programs can overwrite it. Anyway, I tried > it and changes in /etc/resolv.conf in my standalone ProxyVM are lost once I > reboot... > Are you using NetworkManager in that ProxyVM? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/46da2e66-4687-886f-2250-43067e021d91%40riseup.net. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: [qubes-users] Upgrading from Qubes 3.1 to 3.2 fail
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On Tue, Aug 02, 2016 at 02:18:20PM +0200, donoban wrote: > > > On 08/02/2016 11:44 AM, donoban wrote: > > > > > > On 07/31/2016 02:33 PM, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote: > >> On Sun, Jul 31, 2016 at 01:53:26PM +0200, donoban wrote: > >>> Hi, > > > >>> I tried to do the experimental process for upgrading to Qubes > >>> 3.2. I followed the steps from > >>> https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade-to-r3.2/ > > > > > >>> All went fine until I rebooted the system (step 7). After > >>> rebooting I had a lot of packages for update on dom0 (more > >>> than 1000), and when I tried to update them it failed because > >>> some dependency problems (I remember some perl packages but > >>> maybe there were more packages with problems). > > > >> Those packages should be already handled in step 4. > > > > Ok, doing same process on my other computer I've noticed I was > > confused the first time. When I checked the qubes-core-dom0 I > > though it said version 3.2.X installed, but it was AVAILABLE. So > > there the dependency problem exists already in this step but I > > didn't notice. > > > > Doing the command with --clean doesn't help. How can I provide an > > useful log of this? > > > > Regards. > > > > I've pasted the update log: > > https://paste.debian.net/786543 Could you paste also list of packages in dom0 (rpm -qa)? This should allow me to reproduce the problem. - -- Best Regards, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki Invisible Things Lab A: Because it messes up the order in which people normally read text. Q: Why is top-posting such a bad thing? -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2 iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJXoQlIAAoJENuP0xzK19csAckH/2va8JQ20uY72MLwzymj8qPg PyE1rf2riymZOCJ16DPPgBEzY+n5nhSMeI1Gwm330s5MZwVx5OjufPLwiE3JvqVZ X1UNoE0WK7s0MtLKGEVwWZ6dPh1M0XLExQoMMglrdGvHOFTWFuIphWX4aYhw14LG 9m7ZL3lw5HhFesO3O80empoZMSf29HQu60o7+Lc7C/N4Tne7gC4g9V1yQvEI+5vS wXuGAw5J1U8EyT52QISWcrId9Vhev2YMsauHOR5lW5VuyvHkqBpONm16cCRdT/f7 dT2Z3O/BF+hSAp1T36bqSm334scPYgNJ4+1HB0p4DBrDly529fDMk/9FyyGC8Y8= =NQmN -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/20160802205743.GH32095%40mail-itl. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: [qubes-users] Is a legacy BIOS preferable to UEFI for a secure system?
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On Mon, Aug 01, 2016 at 12:41:06AM +0200, Stephen Moreno wrote: > Hi, > > I'm looking to build a new desktop system for Qubes. In an ideal world I would > use a motherboard with a Libreboot open source BIOS, however this is currently > not practical. > > I am therefore intending to use a motherboard with an AMD AM3 chipset, to at > least avoid the AMD PSP and Intel ME technologies. This would either contain a > proprietary legacy BIOS or a newer UEFI BIOS. My question is, what would be > most preferable for a secure Qubes system? > > It is my current understanding that once a legacy BIOS has finished > initializing the hardware, it hands off to the OS and no longer executes. In > contrast, a UEFI BIOS has runtime services that continue to execute while the > OS is running. No, it isn't true - legacy BIOS can also be executed while the OS is running, as part of SMM: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/System_Management_Mode So there is no difference here. > I was therefore coming to the conclusion that if the BIOS was compromised (and > it could potentially be compromised before I received it), then a system that > could only run a legacy BIOS would be preferable, as it could theoretically do > less damage. > > The Wikipedia page on UEFI also states, “UEFI can support remote diagnostics > and repair of computers, even with no operating system installed”. (https:// > en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface) > This has me further concerned about UEFI in a proprietary form. > > Are there any benefits of a UEFI BIOS that would outweigh my concerns? > > Any input on this topic would be much appreciated. I think it doesn't really matter from security point of view. Either legacy or UEFI BIOS can contain bugs fatal to the system security. On the other hand, many UEFI BIOSes contains bugs affecting Qubes OS. Legacy BIOSes also have bugs, but those are much older and already have workarounds in Xen/Linux. In addition, Anti Evil Maid (which can detect some firmware modifications) isn't compatible with UEFI. In short: choose legacy BIOS (or at least a BIOS with legacy boot mode), for better Qubes OS support. - -- Best Regards, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki Invisible Things Lab A: Because it messes up the order in which people normally read text. Q: Why is top-posting such a bad thing? -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2 iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJXoQiqAAoJENuP0xzK19cs+7kIAIsFxRsVyQEFkFKFBvSjVSDF 5626k5Q1U/Jq6dyfAVXeRbqYTdaFg8cS0P+QtbIZKDAoXitQr7Xrs0LxQx5HNRey cO3Ywx2u8Y3oc3ATRSysueqtZvFFWQVKn3FCOvoe4vts2bPpY+Odh5HdmzkLanPG OF38lfX6OTiS9NScj/119yJ9mWQCI9QIyYQBhj3NFndzx5OPCrjQNOUqj1YYCkpd ygJiCD31CCAKzKxIqYualJY0nU1vS8jh3DYiJMVujo8qMn7/E8a3LSZRaGwr0Rmw qUQFjhliaJUhSa4f0jXmFOZZKqxaHOxbaynE5uXfFF3GBzFiziAMb9VjI3bOwKw= =ds13 -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/20160802205505.GG32095%40mail-itl. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: [qubes-users] Moving old (customized) templates or start with fresh templates?Hi
>If you have few customizations you should use the new. There is some >thread with some problems related to don't use the rpm installed >templates... Yeah, sometimes the updater can't talk to the repos fo some reason. Cloning the template and using the clone instead fixes it. Cheers BillW -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/06413d61-3e31-4a0f-92a0-a676d7cf210d%40googlegroups.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
[qubes-users] Re: Is a legacy BIOS preferable to UEFI for a secure system?
>Easier troubleshooting/updating/diagnostics. Modern UEFI installed on e.g >gaming >motherboards can update itself over Ethernet connection, reinstall itself from >scratch and >sometimes contains a built-in mini-linux. If you do not need such bonuses then >legacy BIOS >will do just fine. Oh, joy, yet another threat vector. AMI mobos for yours truly. Cheers BillW -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/3693c285-68fa-4bac-a1bb-ac7eb403de0d%40googlegroups.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
[qubes-users] x201t not compatible
Try disabling VT-d in the BIOS. It's a common Lenovo problem. Cheers BillW -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/b692f2f5-a6ca-4ac8-880d-1c47904f0026%40googlegroups.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
[qubes-users] Re: Is a legacy BIOS preferable to UEFI for a secure system?
W dniu poniedziałek, 1 sierpnia 2016 00:41:08 UTC+2 użytkownik Stephen Moreno napisał: > Hi, > > > > I'm looking to build a new desktop system for Qubes. In an ideal world I > would use a motherboard with a Libreboot open source BIOS, however this is > currently not practical. > > > > I am therefore intending to use a motherboard with an AMD AM3 chipset, to at > least avoid the AMD PSP and Intel ME technologies. This would either contain > a proprietary legacy BIOS or a newer UEFI BIOS. My question is, what would be > most preferable for a secure Qubes system? > > > > It is my current understanding that once a legacy BIOS has finished > initializing the hardware, it hands off to the OS and no longer executes. In > contrast, a UEFI BIOS has runtime services that continue to execute while the > OS is running. > > > > I was therefore coming to the conclusion that if the BIOS was compromised > (and it could potentially be compromised before I received it), then a system > that could only run a legacy BIOS would be preferable, as it could > theoretically do less damage. > > > > The Wikipedia page on UEFI also states, “UEFI can support remote diagnostics > and repair of computers, even with no operating system installed”. > (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_Interface) > > This has me further concerned about UEFI in a proprietary form. > > > > Are there any benefits of a UEFI BIOS that would outweigh my concerns? > > > > Any input on this topic would be much appreciated. Easier troubleshooting/updating/diagnostics. Modern UEFI installed on e.g gaming motherboards can update itself over Ethernet connection, reinstall itself from scratch and sometimes contains a built-in mini-linux. If you do not need such bonuses then legacy BIOS will do just fine. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/c36d44aa-90ca-43a2-baff-1b0f0b6603c6%40googlegroups.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
[qubes-users] Attaching a webcam from sys-usb to other appvm
Hi, Is this possible and how can it be done? Unfortunately I didn't find any how to explaining this. Thank you Sent using GuerrillaMail.com Block or report abuse: https://www.guerrillamail.com/abuse/?a=UFR2AB5NVqcQmh2U93EQdRjCStifx8dDiadNcQ%3D%3D -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/806b4c9282497dc66e7c0d4a8bc9757eb058%40guerrillamail.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: [qubes-users] Is it possible to attach usb devices to HVMs?
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On Tue, Aug 02, 2016 at 03:39:42PM +, 46cikr+6jqihtc138d2g via qubes-users wrote: > Hi, > > I have a windows HVM running, is it possible to do USB passthrough and attach > a USB device to it? > How can this be done? Unfortunately no, currently USB passthrough work only on Linux. - -- Best Regards, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki Invisible Things Lab A: Because it messes up the order in which people normally read text. Q: Why is top-posting such a bad thing? -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2 iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJXoMS5AAoJENuP0xzK19csmw4H/2VYTUHi5T23zDWt2hLrMdWh rgPHWC7o36pmGSmilCxfGHqSPO+zGcYU9HIvudbC7CTPRVFW67vZvh0iO4KQjsvf usPy1V2SpD0a3s8erD5pcxpTPCYKoyg3kY66AnREcsosBWwdEAuWsrW8LSeByQrq vevnwhuCNiScl4LDaL9etAgBnCGTSD5N2TqWEgQmbvZ4SxOlseXfTa95NR3k245K JRZ9UTU6xyt880yIy9ZyzCYhv03w/mPnnmZelCCqx0bnlYijyFhRGVb7QTjBho4b zN2c5T17l9zoow80+glKzmNbfJb8axOJRiTnOdBAnbsG+VhUvU68su++tcgbeIw= =cxcB -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/20160802160512.GD32095%40mail-itl. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
[qubes-users] Is it possible to attach usb devices to HVMs?
Hi, I have a windows HVM running, is it possible to do USB passthrough and attach a USB device to it? How can this be done? Thanks. Sent using GuerrillaMail.com Block or report abuse: https://www.guerrillamail.com/abuse/?a=UFR2AB5NVqcQmh2U93EQdRjCStifx8dDiadNcQ%3D%3D -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/32528b736fec8b6ab6c95e7adc45a6a7a222%40guerrillamail.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: [qubes-users] Updated requirements for Qubes-certified hardware
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On Tue, Aug 02, 2016 at 03:16:46AM -0700, pixel fairy wrote: > Any laptops on the market meet these requirements yet? According to this post[1], Thinkpad x320 (with coreboot installed) should be ok. But we haven't tested it, and it isn't certified yet. [1] https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-devel/20160724174753.GY16348%40chishio.swcp.com - -- Best Regards, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki Invisible Things Lab A: Because it messes up the order in which people normally read text. Q: Why is top-posting such a bad thing? -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2 iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJXoKipAAoJENuP0xzK19cskZQIAJQfcqKhuj4RSUA9GoQyaqg3 kVwzTtYcdzY3WsW1yDoCgWEemeW1AX5mh6WRVhKWGWjhkVr/sGlE8SPmaDIEZCEC Mfpw5iavk8/Ms6MuImfqWplkJzXq9lE7+WoNIlwnbnywF8cQr3L8T2BfUGOpV3aB FmBY8EN1AeYx4mu0CX0+C1mZIT1eVJsVhQe0DNANkImZ3BrKLIjF0k8X+OKM3Ofb D7AZYrIWB5hr4oXSKKGf9ITm4H3scIlpJwP4AFHsd9VL1cfOiMJu91LcZ9q5yOET 6obo1HaQndNAuNoc1TAfaNJ5lZ8hanz6K0SfZ7JcZPtRovRfos7cvCTQCi0X2qY= =J9TT -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/20160802140528.GC32095%40mail-itl. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: [qubes-users] PS2 Mouse with adaptor
On Fri, Jul 29, 2016 at 8:01 AM, Herbies wrote: > Hi, > > Qubes advice to use ps2 mouse and keyboard but is impossible to find one > in local shop. > > I have bought some usb/ps2 adapter to connet usb keyboard and mouse to > my ps2 port. My keyboard is working well, but I have tried several model > of mouse unsuccessfully. > > Do you know the reason because my usb mouses fail to function while > connected to the adapter? > > Any other suggestion? > Something like this does not work for you? https://www.amazon.com/Logitech-PS-Optical-Wheel-Mouse/dp/B000HGMMH6 > > Thanks you > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "qubes-users" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/58ff77d6-a4c3-d57d-406a-ecc3477b1790%40openmailbox.org > . > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/CAPzH-qBv6a3Khfk69-26N6Z%3Da2bBoqE%2B0hozyEs8hsgVMfmwKA%40mail.gmail.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
[qubes-users] PS2 Mouse with adaptor
Hi, Qubes advice to use ps2 mouse and keyboard but is impossible to find one in local shop. I have bought some usb/ps2 adapter to connet usb keyboard and mouse to my ps2 port. My keyboard is working well, but I have tried several model of mouse unsuccessfully. Do you know the reason because my usb mouses fail to function while connected to the adapter? Any other suggestion? Thanks you -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/58ff77d6-a4c3-d57d-406a-ecc3477b1790%40openmailbox.org. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
[qubes-users] Making archlinux template: on make autoreconf not found but it is installed
Hi there. Someone can help me? I'm trying to make an archlinux template on qubes 3.2. But i'm having troubles to compile. When I do: $ make vmm-xen-vm I get: /home/user/qubes-src/vmm-xen/PKGBUILD: line 49: autoreconf: command not found But autoreconf is already installed: $ whereis autoreconf autoreconf: /usr/bin/autoreconf /usr/share/man/man1/autoreconf.1.gz Here is the complete output: [user@development qubes-builder]$ make vmm-xen-vm Currently installed dependencies: git-2.5.5-1.fc23.x86_64 rpmdevtools-8.9-1.fc23.noarch rpm-build-4.13.0-0.rc1.13.fc23.x86_64 createrepo-0.10.3-3.fc21.noarch debootstrap-1.0.81-1.fc23.noarch dpkg-dev-1.17.25-6.fc23.noarch python-sh-1.11-1.fc23.noarch dialog-1.3-4.20160424.fc23.x86_64 --> Archlinux dist-prepare-chroot (makefile): --> Checking mounting of dev/proc/sys on build chroot... --> Synchronize resolv.conf, in case it changed since last run... -> Building vmm-xen (archlinux) for archlinux vm (logfile: build-logs/vmm-xen-vm-archlinux.log) --> build failed! ==> Retrieving sources... -> Found xen-4.6.1.tar.gz -> Found series-vm.conf -> Found apply-patches ==> WARNING: Skipping all source file integrity checks. ==> Extracting sources... -> Extracting xen-4.6.1.tar.gz with bsdtar bsdtar: Failed to set default locale ==> Starting build()... + patch -s -F0 -E -p1 --no-backup-if-mismatch -i ./patches.misc/qemu-tls-1.patch + patch -s -F0 -E -p1 --no-backup-if-mismatch -i ./patches.misc/qemu-tls-2.patch + patch -s -F0 -E -p1 --no-backup-if-mismatch -i ./patches.qubes/xen-shared-loop-losetup.patch + patch -s -F0 -E -p1 --no-backup-if-mismatch -i ./patches.qubes/xen-no-downloads.patch + patch -s -F0 -E -p1 --no-backup-if-mismatch -i ./patches.qubes/xen-hotplug-external-store.patch + patch -s -F0 -E -p1 --no-backup-if-mismatch -i ./patches.qubes/xen-tools-qubes-vm.patch + patch -s -F0 -E -p1 --no-backup-if-mismatch -i ./patches.qubes/vm-0001-hotplug-do-not-attempt-to-remove-containing-xenstore.patch + patch -s -F0 -E -p1 --no-backup-if-mismatch -i ./patches.misc/libxc-fix-xc_gntshr_munmap-semantic.patch + patch -s -F0 -E -p1 --no-backup-if-mismatch -i ./patches.misc/libvchan-Fix-cleanup-when-xc_gntshr_open-failed.patch + patch -s -F0 -E -p1 --no-backup-if-mismatch -i ./patches.misc/0101-libvchan-create-xenstore-entries-in-one-transaction.patch + patch -s -F0 -E -p1 --no-backup-if-mismatch -i ./patches.misc/0001-configure-Fix-when-no-libsystemd-compat-lib-are-avai.patch + patch -s -F0 -E -p1 --no-backup-if-mismatch -i ./patches.misc/0001-libxc-prefer-using-privcmd-character-device.patch + patch -s -F0 -E -p1 --no-backup-if-mismatch -i ./patches.misc/0001-tools-hotplug-Add-native-systemd-xendriverdomain.ser.patch + patch -s -F0 -E -p1 --no-backup-if-mismatch -i ./patches.security/xsa155-xen-0003-libvchan-Read-prod-cons-only-once.patch + patch -s -F0 -E -p1 --no-backup-if-mismatch -i ./patches.libxl/0001-libxl-trigger-attach-events-for-devices-attached-bef.patch + patch -s -F0 -E -p1 --no-backup-if-mismatch -i ./patches.misc/0001-systemd-use-standard-dependencies-for-xendriverdomai.patch /home/user/qubes-src/vmm-xen/PKGBUILD: line 49: autoreconf: command not found ==> ERROR: A failure occurred in build(). Aborting... /home/user/qubes-builder/qubes-src/builder-archlinux/Makefile.archlinux:120: recipe for target 'dist-package' failed make[2]: *** [dist-package] Error 2 Makefile.generic:139: recipe for target 'packages' failed make[1]: *** [packages] Error 1 Makefile:208: recipe for target 'vmm-xen-vm' failed make: *** [vmm-xen-vm] Error 1 Some ideas? :P -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/CABxff58hc4_u_8mYc2Z8TFUifFiZ%2BX_KDRRG-Mom%2BSDbt1C0Xg%40mail.gmail.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: [qubes-users] Upgrading from Qubes 3.1 to 3.2 fail
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On 08/02/2016 11:44 AM, donoban wrote: > > > On 07/31/2016 02:33 PM, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote: >> On Sun, Jul 31, 2016 at 01:53:26PM +0200, donoban wrote: >>> Hi, > >>> I tried to do the experimental process for upgrading to Qubes >>> 3.2. I followed the steps from >>> https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade-to-r3.2/ > > >>> All went fine until I rebooted the system (step 7). After >>> rebooting I had a lot of packages for update on dom0 (more >>> than 1000), and when I tried to update them it failed because >>> some dependency problems (I remember some perl packages but >>> maybe there were more packages with problems). > >> Those packages should be already handled in step 4. > > Ok, doing same process on my other computer I've noticed I was > confused the first time. When I checked the qubes-core-dom0 I > though it said version 3.2.X installed, but it was AVAILABLE. So > there the dependency problem exists already in this step but I > didn't notice. > > Doing the command with --clean doesn't help. How can I provide an > useful log of this? > > Regards. > I've pasted the update log: https://paste.debian.net/786543 -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2 iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJXoI+MAAoJEBQTENjj7QilMNwP/AhUHFQBJYe4jRJeeML9iBFb 2Hfrk68Ak5wPoiZMvDCQl/mgLSo2/3UQHtrjNQOVWanDjcJ0H6XQ0DxrEogiytLj f12g95EmmDK5/Od1sSbfKQkxIup/Ibh4whsHPX26lEA6loUivJIGGkq5FI0jer5E iPYtiLndRUcMi1OnHuXFUp3eE0bZDeFaZ8NVV1LtporFo6G/cLk/DXyvlinaSffl iIVudT++hUNrlKPVBEvyo1QMB8KmlbWU3a2jy8MBnedc9u/wTCStRHjgEN5Lit6S x2/xwrOT/N0JpojRujWnVXduDF1f40/6kfkGGcBuFgNqmWNEoz2dxHDTCV91+UVN +H7yiUDjaPLxMSPMz3og3H5Pdlyr4SfTYPJ2ZAOBoQLuRRRjE3NlNUzlw9yTEodl HHBy5XdywFdvDkz69eRbr6socRofvzkhEzD0l/YYA7pKndgo8PvqAqi9hfFMZqOz JWDKevIhJoeGrZUFCpbtBt63uDP4N86Qq1FHTHzEKj2pKAM54Q9vF33Ni2YVu6MI t5nOUUSp1+64GtLOJmm1jJN4dxoPeZGDlex5M36OVQW9SQovhc6i25QOeblNd/ux x9I8gkVKbSgyn6ILN7aN/9g4RujvyTdFxC+SGuMOy2GLsXZdeNVYyeDT4+U/dbLv jn385ZmZ8DcTv/MonZqm =QX4D -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/523409af-5c1b-a44d-ad1e-f0d6d0d8c32d%40riseup.net. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
[qubes-users] R3.0 - R3.1: Upgrade of Debian TemplateVMs crashes
Summary of Problem: During a fresh installation of Qubes R3.1, all restored Debian TemplateVMs crash during the apt-get dist-upgrade and can no longer be restarted. Details: My preferred Qubes upgrade method is to do a fresh install to a new disk and backup/restore AppVMs and TemplateVMs from the previous version. This has highlighted two problems (the minor one first): 1. The documentation at https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/releases/3.1/release-notes/#upgrading details two upgrade methods: [quote]The easiest and safest way to upgrade to Qubes R3.1 is to install it fromscratch and use qubes backup and restore tools formigrating of all of the user VMs. Users of Qubes R3.0 can upgrade using experimentalprocedure.[/quote] I can find no reference in the fresh-installation instructions for upgrading the TemplateVMs, which only seems to be mentioned in the "experimental method" section. Perhaps the term "experimental" is no longer appropriate and, if so, should ideally be dropped. 2. After a fresh installation of R3.1, I restored all AppVMs, HVMs and TemplateVMs (from R3.0) to the new system, I upgraded the Fedora TemplateVMs without problem using the "experimental" procedure but ALL 3 of my Debian-based TemplateVMs crash during the apt-get dist-upgrade step, leaving the VMs in an unusable state (cannot be restarted). Since this is consistent across all three of my Debian-based TemplateVMs (debian-8, debian-8-nonfree and debian-8-sandbox) it seems likely to be a bug. Right now, I've restored all three from backup and they are still usable in R3.0 form but some things (eg VM Manager Update) no longer work. Is this a known problem? Is there a solution or workaround? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/KO6kF0M--3-0%40tutanota.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
[qubes-users] Updated requirements for Qubes-certified hardware
Any laptops on the market meet these requirements yet? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/b8715f91-5382-497a-9e7f-ef448a3c0411%40googlegroups.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
[qubes-users] x201t not compatible
thought it should work. pretty standard i7 with intel graphics. no problems in linux. but ive tried 3 releases now and always get that Q in rainbow static trying to install it. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/82787c2a-4721-4bcf-86ae-5eab7fcc0e20%40googlegroups.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: [qubes-users] Upgrading from Qubes 3.1 to 3.2 fail
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On 07/31/2016 02:33 PM, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote: > On Sun, Jul 31, 2016 at 01:53:26PM +0200, donoban wrote: >> Hi, > >> I tried to do the experimental process for upgrading to Qubes >> 3.2. I followed the steps from >> https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/upgrade-to-r3.2/ > > >> All went fine until I rebooted the system (step 7). After >> rebooting I had a lot of packages for update on dom0 (more than >> 1000), and when I tried to update them it failed because some >> dependency problems (I remember some perl packages but maybe >> there were more packages with problems). > > Those packages should be already handled in step 4. Ok, doing same process on my other computer I've noticed I was confused the first time. When I checked the qubes-core-dom0 I though it said version 3.2.X installed, but it was AVAILABLE. So there the dependency problem exists already in this step but I didn't notice. Doing the command with --clean doesn't help. How can I provide an useful log of this? Regards. -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2 iQIcBAEBCAAGBQJXoGuGAAoJEBQTENjj7QilMCUQAJGIJmdPO9vTvcuYzDynqBkx eZIDUvC9AtHeZ8g37PeDmE6OpiDCYqF8Gx7njA2WpWwpVVAxGYZPb1b9gUeUUokN NRlHNtzbdXvaIdYh6JejS2YuR1M5Iijy3tV6DUSqLTaDowpwdZNm5pBFOtsf1/UO 0n47K5/auLKkNplrgAS3roRFbt6K120hqsIYiWNJw4gNMGebSH9RcFnDlb13j9OD 83eFbfcPywHf8/WlmuKXmBJj70h/UKoVLakR7k0rHupGSzhwYHwY1azjzpb6ZEmR 3FoP9e67gIbJJT83H6qTsH14lqvDvf7BrmtMJAzUOmWDa3rAodkxgfk7M88Yv0gd mhr3lJmLBR2iUlUucmx5eydTCws7sWAUAwe551f3ZnMnNCvr7+Z2JG/Nzrc/Xf/F msukG+cMuMVd+G6rrGMF+Tj/5b9PW6XQA8WuMbQT90i3Uz6H21O0QI5H+K1MEQs4 ZYN4bNuoSr9hK+yBmm0m6TD1h39DrQ4RFIn38iIGAVfU52cabsZRPFX89prt8WNv UVNUqprqbj3XgIA1BIDsxvjrbhkkqTxBoLmQOtZwafIF3s840S5AP1j4Q3RVbSSG OnITmHqt+ynlXbHfUHBy4V0qI1M2QDmLk8MSlGREFnUi/Ky7VFYU9sn31LCTd4hh 4Jo1rKCPvspFtIQ65HOj =EMFl -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/87a6d4dc-ddfe-c843-109d-624f2c84c6c0%40riseup.net. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: [qubes-users] Different version usr/src and kernel - Installink module aziokdb
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On Sun, Jul 31, 2016 at 05:35:31PM -0700, Facundo Curti wrote: > Hi there. I'm trying to install a kernel module for my keyboard. But I'm > having troubles when I have to install it... > > I have a diferent version on /usr/src that the kernel. > > ls /usr/src/kernels: > 4.4.14-11.pvops.qubes.x86_64 > > ls /boot: > xen-4.6.1.gz > symvers-4.4.12-9.pvops.qubes.x86_64.gz > initramfs-4.4.12-9.pvops.qubes.x86_64.img > vmlinuz-4.4.14-9.pvops.qubes.x86_64 > > ls -l /lib/modules/4.4.12-9.pvops.qubes.x86_64/ > build -> /usr/src/kernels/4.4.12-9.pvops.qubes.x86_64 > > When I try to compile aziokdb module: > > make: > error /lib/modules/4.4.12-9.pvops.qubes.x86_64/build does not exist > > > I didn't put the entire output because it is from dom0 and I cant copy-paste > as easy than with another vm. I made it manually. > > Some idea how can I fix this? :/ I'ts possible to reinstall kernel without > compiling it manually? It would solve it? :P Kernel headers are in kernel-devel package. You either need to downgrade kernel-devel package, or upgrade kernel. Useful commands: Downgrade kernel-devel: sudo qubes-dom0-update --action=downgrade kernel-devel-4.4.12* Upgrade kernel: sudo qubes-dom0-update kernel - -- Best Regards, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki Invisible Things Lab A: Because it messes up the order in which people normally read text. Q: Why is top-posting such a bad thing? -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v2 iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJXoGYNAAoJENuP0xzK19csLFsH/RvQq8zNj86Nw5F3cwed6yrB TNpFw1O8U6ByimUHwr3Or2y9QUrHmLptOZTL99atpT/+mAEpjN6TlcVnd8e+MddD INfCjhiQ/i77NuCObDdZ9RIBlTbjNlqnXQAoq8gxx0PwUHd0IkLu92g0Y1Zm/oFx QeA9uUH27V6hLJ0a6uxUbVr9igDITiJcw+1NLUprZeeJCBHdUIwVrtFGpD7R021w 56t1ABpkHqallzXy4roogLmFTtDs2VAUGGnNQWV6fc33VOfB8WJFNroya0HfMZgk 3v1S4jUC8zry8+TeQCb9upoR38gF/tLGV+gpce8RK4L24N/wY/QF5OXrhRBuWE0= =UzOH -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/20160802092116.GA32095%40mail-itl. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.