[qubes-users] Fedora 31 approaching EOL

2020-10-27 Thread Andrew David Wong

Dear Qubes Community,

Fedora 33 was released today [1], 2020-10-27. According to the Fedora
Release Life Cycle [2], this means that Fedora 31 is scheduled to reach
EOL (end-of-life [3]) in approximately four weeks, around 2020-11-24 [4].

We strongly recommend that all Qubes users upgrade their Fedora 31
TemplateVMs and StandaloneVMs to Fedora 32 or higher before Fedora 31
reaches EOL. We provide step-by-step upgrade instructions for upgrading
Fedora TemplateVMs [5]. For a complete list of TemplateVM versions
supported for your specific version of Qubes, see Supported TemplateVM
Versions [6].

We also provide a fresh Fedora 32 TemplateVM package through the
official Qubes repositories, which you can install in dom0 by following
the standard installation instructions [7].

After upgrading your TemplateVMs, please remember to switch all qubes
that were using the old template to use the new one [8].

Please note that no user action is required regarding the OS version in
dom0. For details, please see our note on dom0 and EOL [9].


[1] https://fedoramagazine.org/announcing-fedora-33/
[2] https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_Release_Life_Cycle
[3] https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/End_of_life
[4] 
https://www.timeanddate.com/date/dateadded.html?m1=10=27=2020=add===4==

[5] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/template/fedora/upgrade/
[6] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-versions/#templatevms
[7] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/fedora/#installing
[8] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/templates/#switching
[9] https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/supported-versions/#note-on-dom0-and-eol

This announcement is also available on the Qubes website:
https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2020/10/27/fedora-31-approaching-eol/

--
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org

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Re: [qubes-users] Potential Accidental Install of Unsigned Package

2020-10-27 Thread 'awokd' via qubes-users
'Yiyi50' via qubes-users:
> I'm running qubes 4.0 on a Purism Librem 13 v4. I've installed updates for my 
> templates without necessarily reading everything in the terminal before 
> clicking "y". How concerned should I be of having inadvertently installed an 
> unsigned package? Is there a command i can run to check the signatures on all 
> my installed packages? I should mention that I'm relatively new to linux and 
> qubes. How common is the installation of unsigned packages in Fedora or 
> Debian? Does the qubes team audit/review all template updates?
> 
If you haven't gone out of your way to add repos to your templates, you
would be using the default repos, which require signed packages. Your
chances are basically nil. No-one from Qubes audits updates that are not
from Qubes (with the possible exception here or there for security
critical ones like Xen); that is up to the maintainers of packages in
each distribution (Fedora/Debian).

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Re: [qubes-users] I broke qubes.UpdateProxy. Does anyone have a default version of it I can reference to fix it in dom0?

2020-10-27 Thread 'awokd' via qubes-users
setemera...@posteo.net:
> I was halfway through setting my updateProxy file to go off of a sys-vpn
> instead of sys-whonix. However I can't remember how it was supposed to
> be initially. Could someone show me a default one or otherwise tell me
> how to adjust this one? Thank you

Think this is default if you chose sys-whonix for updates:

$type:TemplateVM $default allow,target=sys-whonix
## Note that policy parsing stops at the first match,
## so adding anything below "$anyvm $anyvm action" line will have no effect

## Please use a single # to start your custom comments

# Upgrade all TemplateVMs through sys-whonix.
#$type:TemplateVM $default allow,target=sys-whonix

# Upgrade Whonix TemplateVMs through sys-whonix.
$tag:whonix-updatevm $default allow,target=sys-whonix

# Deny Whonix TemplateVMs using UpdatesProxy of any other VM.
$tag:whonix-updatevm $anyvm deny

# Default rule for all TemplateVMs - direct the connection to sys-net
$type:TemplateVM $default allow,target=sys-net

$anyvm $anyvm deny

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Re: [qubes-users] Orphan menu entries after deleting VM's

2020-10-27 Thread Ludovic Bellier

Le 27/10/2020 à 07:44, Dave a écrit :

Hi guys,

After deleting the work and personal VM's in the qubes VM manager, the 
vm settings shortcuts from both vm's were not deleted from the menu.
So i still have two menu entrys for personal and work in my startmenu, 
with both only the vm settings entry listed.
I have checked ~/.local/share/applications/ 
and /usr/local/share/applications/ for these orphan shortcut but they 
arent there..
Where else can i look for these orphan shortcuts? or how can i get rid 
of these broken shortcuts..?



Hi Dave,

    I think you can find it with the find command (here an example for 
the 'personal VM'):


[adm@dom0 ~]$ find -iname "*personal*"

    ./.config/menus/applications-merged/ and 
./.local/share/qubes-appmenus/personal/apps/ seems to be good 
candidates. Reading the Freedesktop menu spec could help you. Backup the 
files before any (delete) actions.


Ludovic

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Re: [qubes-users] finally got working broadcom bcm4360 on a macbook air 7,2 with qubes os

2020-10-27 Thread 'awokd' via qubes-users
OH MY PLUG:
> 
> i only installed the package broadcom-sta-dkms on debian 10 template, then 
> i changed the sys-net template from fedora 30 to debian 10
> 
Glad it was an easy fix!

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Re: [qubes-users] Usability of Qubes Tools for Windows 10

2020-10-27 Thread 'awokd' via qubes-users
Knut von Walter:
> Hi,
> well I have read the documentation of installing Qubes Windows Tools
> ,link: https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/windows-tools/ Especially the known
> limitations of that software on, link:
> https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/3585 . Also I discovered
> this video tutorial on you-tube:
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1mGop1B-kqU . The author, Mr. Chris
> Titus, of this video, which is from October 27th in 2019. Came to the
> conclusion that it is at that moment not advisable to install Qubes
> Tools for Windows.
> Therefore I have this question: Do you think this issue changed in the
> meantime? Or is it better to wait for some time until the team of Qubes
> OS have programmed the necessary software. So that everything is running
> smoothly.

Check out https://github.com/elliotkillick/qvm-create-windows-qube for a
bit more updated info.

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Re: [qubes-users] Monitor all processes

2020-10-27 Thread 'awokd' via qubes-users
preill...@gmail.com:
> On 10/14/20 3:11 AM, mj.jos...@gmail.com wrote:

>>
>> I want to creat a 'Monitor' VM with absolutely no internet capability
>> using debian (i started learning Linux with Ubuntu, then moved onto
>> Kali and Arch, now im experimenting with Raspbian, so im much more
>> familiar with debian than Fedora). I want to have all my supervisory
>> programs on this VM, but simply peering thru the looking glass as it
>> were.  I found xentop on the qubes terminal helpful, but that only
>> tells me if a particular qube is peaking CPU or memory usage, not what
>> process is killing my performance.

There might be some way to develop something like that if you really had
to, but finding the problem VM with xl top/xentop then drilling into it
to see process details is the "standard" way...

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Re: [qubes-users] wifi does not work after update on nitropad X230

2020-10-27 Thread 'awokd' via qubes-users
tms7:
> Hi all, 
> 
> I faced a wifi-related issue on Nitropad X230. Wifi used to work properly 
> at the beginning, but after update it stopped functioning. 
> 
> After entering the following commands (according to the documentation here: 
> https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/wireless-troubleshooting/)
> 
> `sudo rmmod iwldvm`
> `sudo modprobe iwldvm`
> 
> The wifi was on again, but unable to connect to any wifi with the message 
> “device not ready”. 
> 
> After [sys-net] reboot,  the first issue persisted. Neither the key binding 
> `fn+F5` nor the hardware (physical switch) seems to be working.
> 
> This might be related to drivers, but any help or hint on this issue would 
> be welcome. It is possible to post logs, if I knew where to look.
> 
> Thanks. 
> 
It's possible a kernel update broke your wifi driver. Try going into
Qube Settings on the sys-net (or wherever your wifi device is attached)
qube, and manually selecting a lower versioned kernel.

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Re: [qubes-users] Suddenly I can't get internet access from within one of my Win 10 HVM's but I can from another one

2020-10-27 Thread 'awokd' via qubes-users
'M' via qubes-users:
> 
> Suddenly I can't get internet access from within one of my Win 10 HVM's, 
> but I can from another one.
> 
> I have compared the internet settings under "Qube Settings". And it says 
> sys-whonix in both HVM's.
> 
> What can be the reason for not being able to get internet access from 
> within one of my Win 10 HVM's... ?
> 
> I have installed Win 10 by using this method: 
> https://groups.google.com/g/qubes-users/c/78DgmWxZf80/m/L8cJA2BUAwAJ
> 
Wouldn't have anything to do with your router since other connections
work. Double check your problem HVM is getting an IP address?

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Re: [qubes-users] select vm to restore from a qvm-backup

2020-10-27 Thread Rusty Bird
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Hash: SHA512

lik...@gmx.de:
> I'm looking for a possibility to restore only 1 AppVM from a system
> backup. I could find this by studying the parameters of
> qvm-backup-restore. Seems that it performs a whole system restore
> (only to choose between with or without dom0).

You can specify the intended VM(s) after the backup file argument:

$ qvm-backup-restore /foo/qubes-2020-10-27T123456 vm1 vm2

For some reason the manpage doesn't mention this syntax, but it's
shown in 'qvm-backup-restore -h'.

Rusty
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Re: [qubes-users] Securety: Auto shutdown pc after wakeup if no password.

2020-10-27 Thread evado...@gmail.com
I wrote python program with timer to shutdown qubes after some time if it 
will not be canceled. It's GUI program. 

I tried to start it with systemd service (wakeup / sleep.target). It report 
that $DISPLAY not found.

When I add
Environment=DISPLAY=:0 
to my service than it report that DISPLAY not found. 

So, the problem is that I don't know how to run program that request X 
session on Qubes if it run from service... 
Any help?

вторник, 27 октября 2020 г. в 12:58:11 UTC, evado...@gmail.com: 

>
> Look like I found the solution and know how to make it. Only need to 
> develop interface & test. When I will have time and if I will not have any 
> problems with the code it will be released. 
> вторник, 27 октября 2020 г. в 08:32:29 UTC, haa...@web.de: 
>
>> > Any ideas how to start shutdown process after wake up from sleep if 
>> user 
>> > will not unlock pc in expected time period (e.g. 30-60 seconds). 
>> > 
>> > Maybe run some script before PC goes to sleep with timer and after it 
>> > wake up timer will continue and only user will have access to click 
>> > "cancel" when he will unlock the screen? 
>> > 
>> > Where can I add this script on dom0? Can Qubes trigger(run) my script 
>> > before sleep action or wakeup action? 
>> > 
>> > Or any other suggestions or ideas? 
>> > 
>>
>> I have a similar question/idea, which would be auto-shutdown after 3 (or 
>> any other number) false password attempts. The idea is to add a second 
>> (luks) password layer if any stupid attempts are made. 
>>
>> My idea is to hook in the screensaver mechanism. In my install that 
>> would be /etc/pam.d/xscreeensaver were system-auth is mentioned, so I 
>> guess, I have to include a line in /etc/pam.d/system-auth to count 
>> wrong pwd attempts and do some action if necessary. I guess something 
>> like 
>>
>> account required pam_exec.so debug /path/to/wrongpasswordscript.sh 
>>
>> in the system-auth could do the job, but I am not sure. Manipulating 
>> unwisely these files may end with a lock-out of my system, so I'd like 
>> some advice if this sounds correct to you, the qubes-community. 
>>
>>
>> Cheers, Bernhard 
>>
>

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Re: [qubes-users] screenlock keycombinations

2020-10-27 Thread David Hobach

On 10/27/20 2:37 PM, evado...@gmail.com wrote:

Qubes by default protected from this key combinations?


Backdoor #1: Ctrl-Alt-Backspace.

 This keystroke kills the X server, and on some systems, leaves you at a
text console. If the user launched X11 manually, that text console will
still be logged in. To disable this keystroke globally and permanently, you
need to set the DontZap flag in your xorg.conf or XF86Config or
XF86Config-4 file (whichever name is in use on your system). See the manual
for XF86Config (or variant) for more details.


Didn't work with physlock, but I don't have xscreenlock.
I wonder where #2 went. ;-)


Backdoor #3: Alt-SysRq-F.

 This is the Linux kernel "OOM-killer" keystroke. It shoots down random
long-running programs of its choosing, and so might might target and kill
xscreensaver, and there's no way for xscreensaver to protect itself from
that. You can disable it globally with: sudo 'echo 176 >
/proc/sys/kernel/sysrq'


I got "This sysrq operation is disabled" for that one.


 (As of version 5.41, if xscreensaver is setuid, and you are running
Linux 2.6.37 or newer, xscreensaver attempts to request that the kernel's
out-of-memory assassin not randomly unlock the screen on you, but it's only
a request.)
Backdoor #4: Ctrl-Alt-KP_Multiply.

 This keystroke kills any X11 app that holds a lock, so typing this will
kill xscreensaver and unlock the screen. This "feature" showed up in the X
server in 2008, and as of 2011, some vendors are shipping it turned on by
default. How nice. You can disable it by turning off AllowClosedownGrabs in
xorg.conf.


No keypad to test...

You might be interested in [1] and [2].

[1] 
https://github.com/Qubes-Community/Contents/blob/master/docs/customization/screenlockers.md
[2] https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/1917

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[qubes-users] screenlock keycombinations

2020-10-27 Thread evado...@gmail.com
Qubes by default protected from this key combinations?


Backdoor #1: Ctrl-Alt-Backspace.

This keystroke kills the X server, and on some systems, leaves you at a 
text console. If the user launched X11 manually, that text console will 
still be logged in. To disable this keystroke globally and permanently, you 
need to set the DontZap flag in your xorg.conf or XF86Config or 
XF86Config-4 file (whichever name is in use on your system). See the manual 
for XF86Config (or variant) for more details.

Backdoor #3: Alt-SysRq-F.

This is the Linux kernel "OOM-killer" keystroke. It shoots down random 
long-running programs of its choosing, and so might might target and kill 
xscreensaver, and there's no way for xscreensaver to protect itself from 
that. You can disable it globally with: sudo 'echo 176 > 
/proc/sys/kernel/sysrq'

(As of version 5.41, if xscreensaver is setuid, and you are running 
Linux 2.6.37 or newer, xscreensaver attempts to request that the kernel's 
out-of-memory assassin not randomly unlock the screen on you, but it's only 
a request.) 
Backdoor #4: Ctrl-Alt-KP_Multiply.

This keystroke kills any X11 app that holds a lock, so typing this will 
kill xscreensaver and unlock the screen. This "feature" showed up in the X 
server in 2008, and as of 2011, some vendors are shipping it turned on by 
default. How nice. You can disable it by turning off AllowClosedownGrabs in 
xorg.conf. 

There's little that I can do to make the screen locker secure so long as 
the kernel and X11 developers are actively working against security. The 
strength of the lock on your front door doesn't matter much so long as 
someone else in the house insists on leaving a key under the welcome mat.

In an ideal world, there would be a single X11 request named something like 
XGrabMagicKeys() that would, analagously to XGrabKeyboard(), disable all of 
these magic keystrokes until the grab was released or the program exited. 
It should be an X11 call, not an ioctl(), and especially not a root-only 
ioctl(). Needless to say, no such interface exists. 

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Re: [qubes-users] Securety: Auto shutdown pc after wakeup if no password.

2020-10-27 Thread evado...@gmail.com

Look like I found the solution and know how to make it. Only need to 
develop interface & test. When I will have time and if I will not have any 
problems with the code it will be released. 
вторник, 27 октября 2020 г. в 08:32:29 UTC, haa...@web.de: 

> > Any ideas how to start shutdown process after wake up from sleep if user
> > will not unlock pc in expected time period (e.g. 30-60 seconds).
> >
> > Maybe run some script before PC goes to sleep with timer and after it
> > wake up timer will continue and only user will have access to click
> > "cancel" when he will unlock the screen?
> >
> > Where can I add this script on dom0? Can Qubes trigger(run) my script
> > before sleep action or wakeup action?
> >
> > Or any other suggestions or ideas?
> >
>
> I have a similar question/idea, which would be auto-shutdown after 3 (or
> any other number) false password attempts. The idea is to add a second
> (luks) password layer if any stupid attempts are made.
>
> My idea is to hook in the screensaver mechanism. In my install that
> would be /etc/pam.d/xscreeensaver were system-auth is mentioned, so I
> guess, I have to include a line in /etc/pam.d/system-auth to count
> wrong pwd attempts and do some action if necessary. I guess something like
>
> account required pam_exec.so debug /path/to/wrongpasswordscript.sh
>
> in the system-auth could do the job, but I am not sure. Manipulating
> unwisely these files may end with a lock-out of my system, so I'd like
> some advice if this sounds correct to you, the qubes-community.
>
>
> Cheers, Bernhard
>

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[qubes-users] select vm to restore from a qvm-backup

2020-10-27 Thread liked2

Hi!

I'm looking for a possibility to restore only 1 AppVM from a system backup. I 
could find this by studying the parameters of qvm-backup-restore. Seems that it 
performs a whole system restore (only to choose between with or without dom0).

Any ideas or suggestions?

Best, P.

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Re: [qubes-users] Securety: Auto shutdown pc after wakeup if no password.

2020-10-27 Thread haaber

Any ideas how to start shutdown process after wake up from sleep if user
will not unlock pc in expected time period (e.g. 30-60 seconds).

Maybe run some script before PC goes to sleep with timer and after it
wake up timer will continue and only user will have access to click
"cancel" when he will unlock the screen?

Where can I add this script on dom0? Can Qubes trigger(run) my script
before sleep action or wakeup action?

Or any other suggestions or ideas?



I have a similar question/idea, which would be auto-shutdown after 3 (or
any other number) false password attempts. The idea is to add a second
(luks) password layer if any stupid attempts are made.

My idea is to hook in the screensaver mechanism. In my install that
would be   /etc/pam.d/xscreeensaver were system-auth is mentioned, so I
guess, I have to include a line in /etc/pam.d/system-auth  to count
wrong pwd attempts and do some action if necessary. I guess something like

accountrequired pam_exec.so debug  /path/to/wrongpasswordscript.sh

in the system-auth could do the job, but I am not sure. Manipulating
unwisely these files may end with a lock-out of my system, so I'd like
some advice if this sounds correct to you, the qubes-community.


Cheers, Bernhard

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[qubes-users] Orphan menu entries after deleting VM's

2020-10-27 Thread Dave
Hi guys,

After deleting the work and personal VM's in the qubes VM manager, the vm 
settings shortcuts from both vm's were not deleted from the menu. 
So i still have two menu entrys for personal and work in my startmenu, with 
both only the vm settings entry listed. 
I have checked ~/.local/share/applications/ 
and /usr/local/share/applications/ for these orphan shortcut but they arent 
there..
Where else can i look for these orphan shortcuts? or how can i get rid of 
these broken shortcuts..?

Thanks in advance

Dave

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