Re: [qubes-users] Re: looking for quickest way to copy text from dom0-Terminal to another VM
On Sat, Jan 26, 2019 at 09:39:47AM +0100, 799 wrote: > Am Sa., 26. Jan. 2019, 04:33 hat Andrew David Wong > geschrieben: > > > > > Please take a look at this issue: > > > > https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/3571 > > > > Happy to see that this topic (no clipboard from dom0) is at least known. > I don't agree that copying from dom0 is dangerous because "The user could > have secrets in dom0, e.g., keyfiles". > > > My passwords are in a vault VM and if someone messes up handling from dom0 > it is very likely that he/she didn't understand the security concept behind > Qubes and therefore the user is likely the biggest attack surface NOT the > clipboard. > > Please offer a solution where the user can choose (free software!!) to > enable/disable the clipboard (choosing means freedom). > > It seems there is a workaround, can this be bound to a key (maybe also > using xclip in dom0)? > echo -n dom0 > qubes-clipboard.bin.source . > Of course there's a workaround: | tee file qvm-copy-to-vm file You can script this and create a key binding yourself. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/20190127005844.umz6ewf36xnyozwm%40thirdeyesecurity.org. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: [qubes-users] Re: looking for quickest way to copy text from dom0-Terminal to another VM
Am Sa., 26. Jan. 2019, 04:33 hat Andrew David Wong geschrieben: > > Please take a look at this issue: > > https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/3571 Happy to see that this topic (no clipboard from dom0) is at least known. I don't agree that copying from dom0 is dangerous because "The user could have secrets in dom0, e.g., keyfiles". My passwords are in a vault VM and if someone messes up handling from dom0 it is very likely that he/she didn't understand the security concept behind Qubes and therefore the user is likely the biggest attack surface NOT the clipboard. Please offer a solution where the user can choose (free software!!) to enable/disable the clipboard (choosing means freedom). It seems there is a workaround, can this be bound to a key (maybe also using xclip in dom0)? echo -n dom0 > qubes-clipboard.bin.source . - O -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/CAJ3yz2t-o6x7bHazw6kY7uSXd2s7Z3Gn4BTsTih_pKrvPY-Vfw%40mail.gmail.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: [qubes-users] Re: looking for quickest way to copy text from dom0-Terminal to another VM
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 On 25/01/2019 8.02 PM, Eric wrote: > Personally I will not instal anything into dom0 that is not from an > ITL authorised repo. > > Is a real PITA that the inter appVM cut and paste does not work for > dom0 - can there be a switch somewhere that says I am going to be > careful and do it? Feature request? > > Only for package names into dom0 and error text out when things > don't work - like just recently. > > Thanks, Eric > Please take a look at this issue: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/3571 - -- Andrew David Wong (Axon) Community Manager, Qubes OS https://www.qubes-os.org -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEZQ7rCYX0j3henGH1203TvDlQMDAFAlxL1O0ACgkQ203TvDlQ MDCmqhAApZ0H2QZCSVrNVYyhH/Ux8Q0TZW3aVySP+YROwmAvydSg66VC0zsxIkak OxjDKMePe6GV778n3gsuumLuJYiousmFLJD6d5RzTuFRJoqR0V1Y9NhpRVtvS4Fz aypfmxWZI6cR4j6u1oEp5gBXfwv9JlqOh4bznttnBgS/XYmgufGjzRqGqSCVdpCq nET42h4akiAz6Dlf/kUNhohbFVRHXnrye9Q4JoIr50tZNUhXxfOIGIXfKRXTOv6N wSkjLhkqCkkCK7zJvwZtayCh4OL4162XRikFT7lfc5cx9vHVkweeImm4jRD4mbV0 UIasOFq8rxrobpcVdzExdTnGWFKX1kdQ1XdSrrFVl58e6A1VMgw8/mp1G4coN8Cs lRYZB3O9NHv3zGW9rvUVBhHjrvbM22DsVOoJyACyMmDJZwq4RvHj4slRy+i8PZ13 PPeJHcKMoG6H6TuVEz6jKyiv+XXq90Ak2WEbE/P7XwTzJhrPV3WyIoy1oEaujwZh W47+ne/1J0mBqxfviFhDa1yUUdHNAXlB/y6U6iqYRU+msQ30mDQY5wgLhoqZqJSD 0qV9PPF0qa5aCWxmVDlfiF7pqemqEOFToh6GS32NI3v9zIDNQhVdDivgznXrzBJv m8m5SpA60Uo2R4DOwYFjZ4ir3xSLGIH8mTgCufaBf9BHmb3YWs8= =O/Ws -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/2cc475ba-7f30-6520-e46e-e238e5ebc5a5%40qubes-os.org. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
