Am Sa., 26. Jan. 2019, 04:33 hat Andrew David Wong <a...@qubes-os.org>
geschrieben:

>
> Please take a look at this issue:
>
> https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/3571



Happy to see that this topic (no clipboard from dom0) is at least known.
I don't agree that copying from dom0 is dangerous because "The user could
have secrets in dom0, e.g., keyfiles".


My passwords are in a vault VM and if someone messes up handling from dom0
it is very likely that he/she didn't understand the security concept behind
Qubes and therefore the user is likely the biggest attack surface NOT the
clipboard.

Please offer a solution where the user can choose (free software!!) to
enable/disable the clipboard (choosing means freedom).

It seems there is a workaround, can this be bound to a key (maybe also
using xclip in dom0)?
echo -n dom0 > qubes-clipboard.bin.source .

- O

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