Am Sa., 26. Jan. 2019, 04:33 hat Andrew David Wong <a...@qubes-os.org> geschrieben:
> > Please take a look at this issue: > > https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/3571 Happy to see that this topic (no clipboard from dom0) is at least known. I don't agree that copying from dom0 is dangerous because "The user could have secrets in dom0, e.g., keyfiles". My passwords are in a vault VM and if someone messes up handling from dom0 it is very likely that he/she didn't understand the security concept behind Qubes and therefore the user is likely the biggest attack surface NOT the clipboard. Please offer a solution where the user can choose (free software!!) to enable/disable the clipboard (choosing means freedom). It seems there is a workaround, can this be bound to a key (maybe also using xclip in dom0)? echo -n dom0 > qubes-clipboard.bin.source . - O -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-users" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/CAJ3yz2t-o6x7bHazw6kY7uSXd2s7Z3Gn4BTsTih_pKrvPY-Vfw%40mail.gmail.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
