Re: [qubes-users] Re: Qubes VM Hardening v0.8.2 Released!

2018-04-17 Thread Andrew David Wong
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA512

On 2018-04-17 11:47, Chris Laprise wrote:
> On 04/17/2018 12:25 AM, none wrote:
>> Is there some official opinion on this from whomever the Qubes
>> developers are ?
> 
> This is the closest to an official opinion I guess:
> 
> https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2748
> 

Just to clarify: The current status of that issue means that the core
devs have not yet reviewed the package. We're at step 4 of the
package contribution procedure:

https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/package-contributions/#contribution-procedure

> [...]
> 
>> Am a bit curious who is officially a dev  on here, I have a few guess,
>> besides Marek, but  maybe its folks with the PGP sigs , shrug.
> 
> Just having a PGP sig doesn't indicate status with the project. The
> Qubes core team is listed here:
> 
> https://www.qubes-os.org/team/
> 

Chris is correct on both counts:

1. "However, anyone on the list can choose to sign their messages, so
   the presence of a PGP signature does not indicate authority."

   https://www.qubes-os.org/support/#staying-safe

2. The core devs are the developers in this list:

   https://www.qubes-os.org/team/#core-team

- -- 
Andrew David Wong (Axon)
Community Manager, Qubes OS
https://www.qubes-os.org

-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
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=0RHt
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"qubes-users" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/bdc66f4d-b6bf-d515-0c96-a77d8742d5b4%40qubes-os.org.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


Re: [qubes-users] Re: Qubes VM Hardening v0.8.2 Released!

2018-04-17 Thread Chris Laprise

On 04/17/2018 12:25 AM, none wrote:
Is there some official opinion on this from whomever the Qubes 
developers are ?


This is the closest to an official opinion I guess:

https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2748

Patrick/adrelanos (also on the Qubes team) has expressed positive 
interest: https://github.com/tasket/Qubes-VM-hardening/issues/2




Looks like it's a bit non trivial, and interacts with dom0 ; hence I'm 
likely to break Q4.0  trying to 'harden' it :)



I was thinking I could clone the Deb-9 Template, and all would be OK, if 
I failed however ...


Its pretty benign to the OS itself. The dom0 commands should be 
identical to the related Qubes doc about enabling sudo prompts:


https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/vm-sudo/#replacing-password-less-root-access-with-dom0-user-prompt

You can skip the sudo prompt configuration and use the alternative for 
restoring internal VM security: Just remove the 
qubes-core-agent-passwordless-root package from the template.


The main risk with the vm-boot-protect-root service is that any settings 
or scripts that are subsequently added to VMs in /rw/config, 
/rw/usrlocal, and /rw/bind-dirs may be deleted (although the first time 
it backs up those dirs and those copies are kept indefinitely).




Am a bit curious who is officially a dev  on here, I have a few guess, 
besides Marek, but  maybe its folks with the PGP sigs , shrug.


Just having a PGP sig doesn't indicate status with the project. The 
Qubes core team is listed here:


https://www.qubes-os.org/team/


--

Chris Laprise, tas...@posteo.net
https://github.com/tasket
https://twitter.com/ttaskett
PGP: BEE2 20C5 356E 764A 73EB  4AB3 1DC4 D106 F07F 1886

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"qubes-users" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/d50aba31-12f8-be7d-075e-443dcc916efc%40posteo.net.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


[qubes-users] Re: Qubes VM Hardening v0.8.2 Released!

2018-04-16 Thread none
Is there some official opinion on this from whomever the Qubes 
developers are ?


Looks like it's a bit non trivial, and interacts with dom0 ; hence I'm 
likely to break Q4.0  trying to 'harden' it :)



I was thinking I could clone the Deb-9 Template, and all would be OK, if 
I failed however ...


Am a bit curious who is officially a dev  on here, I have a few guess, 
besides Marek, but  maybe its folks with the PGP sigs , shrug.


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"qubes-users" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to qubes-users+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to qubes-users@googlegroups.com.
To view this discussion on the web visit 
https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/aabfffab-765a-e97d-1299-010bba746bdd%40riseup.net.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.