Hosanna-Tabor is an easy case once you decide that the person is within the
category of minister and the unanimity is not surprising on those facts.
Contrary to the assertions of some, liberals do not respond in knee-jerk
pavlovian fashion in favor of government regulation of any and all sorts
f
> the First Amendment, that the state may not resolve exclusively
> ecclesiastical questions. See generally Lupu & Tuttle, The Mystery of
> Unanimity in [Hosanna-Tabor], 20 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 1265
> (2017),https://law.lclark.edu/live/files/23330-204lupu-tuttlearticle7pdf
> <
: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
> <mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu>
> [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
> <mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu>] On Behalf Of Steven Jamar
> Sent: Thursday, April 27, 2017 10:13 AM
> To: Law Religion & Law List
&
eligionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
> <mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu>
> [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
> <mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu>] On Behalf Of Steven Jamar
> Sent: Thursday, April 27, 2017 9:49 AM
> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academic
If RFRA applied to the state, or if Virginia had a state RFRA that copied the
federal RFRA, would this state law be legal?
Virginia law provides that a woman can breast feed uncovered anywhere she has a
legal right to be. Can a church then exclude her because breast feeding
uncovered might
I do an informal raise your hand sort of survey of those students in my con law
class who had in-public-school instruction in Christianity in elementary
school. It ranges from a low of 15% to around 50% each year. Once a student
asked me if Catholicism counted as Christian. In that case it was
t;mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu>
> [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
> <mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu>] On Behalf Of Steven Jamar
> Sent: Tuesday, November 22, 2016 3:20 PM
> To: Law Religion & Law List
> Subject: Re: Scalia's views o
I never read Smith that way — it was a straight up carte blanche to the
legislative and executive branches provided the law was neutral and generally
applicable — no weighing of competing interests involved.
Steve
--
Prof. Steven D. Jamar
Assoc. Dir. of International
I supported RFRA for years. I am becoming a supporter of Smith.
--
Prof. Steven D. Jamar
Assoc. Dir. of International Programs
Institute for Intellectual Property and Social Justice
http://iipsj.org
http://sdjlaw.org
"Politics hates a vacuum. If it isn't filled with hope,
Does motive for treating people differently on the basis of sex matter?
Surely. Separate bathrooms, changing rooms, and sports teams, for example.
Those three examples are justified on the basis of other interests such as
cultural norms of privacy and “decency” and on genuine gender-linked,
un...@lists.ucla.edu
> <mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu>
> <religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
> <mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu>> on behalf of Steven Jamar
> <stevenja...@gmail.com <mailto:stevenja...@gmail.com>>
> Sent: Friday, April 22,
Oh oh. Eugene and I agree completely on something! Protesters in a limited
designated public forum are not engaging in protected activity. There is no
constitutional right to disrupt another’s speech in such a setting.
If the school refused to give the protesters a forum at all, that would
http://www.atlasobscura.com/articles/pastafarianism-is-still-not-a-legally-recognized-religion-in-the-united-statesyet?utm_medium=email_source=digg
I assume this is correct under the facts here — but if it were on the seal
continuously from 100+ years ago, I assume it would be ok. But here, with it
being off, then being put back on, it gets the feel religious
motivation/intent/purpose, running afoul of Lemon.
Thoughts?
I think it is wrong to treat enforcement mechanisms as the sine qua non of
whether something is law.
> On Mar 31, 2016, at 11:28 PM, Finkelman, Paul
> wrote:
>
> I think David has it exactly right. If the law says you cannot use the mens
> room with a birth
Have any state RFRA sought to use a non-strict scrutiny balancing approach
under which the weight of the interest of the religious exceptionalist, the
state’s interest, and the employers/public accomodations/etc. interest are
weighed to assess the proper outcome?
--
Prof. Steven D. Jamar
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/03/24/ga-parents-offended-by-the-far-east-religion-of-yoga-get-namaste-banned-from-school/
--
Prof. Steven D. Jamar
Assoc. Dir. of International Programs
Institute for Intellectual Property and Social Justice
Not really wanting to restart this issue, but in re-reading CLS v. Martinez, I
came across this gem:
"The First Amendment shields CLS against state prohibition of the
organization’s expressive activity, however exclusionary that activity may be.
But CLS enjoys no constitutional right to state
; doctrine or longstanding tradition allowing legislative accommodation of
>> religion? See Cutter ("Religious accommodations ... need not 'come packaged
>> with benefits to secular entities'").
>>
>>
>>
>> - Jim
>>
>>
>>
>>
> ___
t; <http://www.nrla.com/>
>
> Championing Religious Freedom and Human Rights
>
> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
> <mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu>
> [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
> <mailto:religionlaw-boun..
law?"
>
> Interesting question, but like the computer said in War Games, perhaps "the
> only way to win is not to play."
>
> Ed Darrell
> Dallas
>
>
> From: Steven Jamar <stevenja...@gmail.com>
> To: Law Religion & Law List <religionlaw@l
How might Congress draft a federal law that requires states to accommodate
religious beliefs so that state employees are free to refuse to perform tasks
that are contrary to their religious beliefs? We have the Boerne problems of
making a record and RFRA being held to be too much of a
Seems to me there is an establishment problem here. Cheerleaders are sponsored
by the school and are displaying religious messages to a captive audience who
could choose to forego attending the game or else putting up with the religious
banners.
Has the free speech approach become so dominant
decisions.
>
> Sandy
>
> Sent from my iPhone
>
> On Jan 17, 2016, at 7:45 AM, Steven Jamar <stevenja...@gmail.com
> <mailto:stevenja...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>
>> It seems to me that the play-in-the-joints theory and providing
>> accommodations bet
It seems to me that the play-in-the-joints theory and providing accommodations
between exercise and establishment shoiuld win out in this instance thereby
upholding the Missouri Constitutional ban on direct and indirect financial
support for religious organizations.
A ruling that pushes the
I didn’t think we had respect within our discipline or influence within our
discipline through law reviews generally! :)
> On Dec 29, 2015, at 11:33 AM, Conkle, Daniel O. wrote:
>
> A colleague of mine, who is working on an interdisciplinary book, has asked
> me for ideas
I think too much is made about the difficulty of deciding who is or who is not
a member of a religion. First, self-identification would handle most cases.
Second, a simple questionaire of just a few key points would be sufficient to
identify a Muslim — unless the person was lying, but pretty
cross posted con law profs and law and religion listserves
1. Does assistant coach Kennedy have the right to lead prayers after
football games?
2. Does assistant coach Kennedy have the right to personally publicly pray
at midfield after football games?
3. Do the Satanists and
The underlying theory is exactly the same — complicity with evil. Once the
naked assertion is made, it is, after Hobby Lobby, uncontestable by the
government or courts.
Analogizing and distinguishing are tricky, manipulable rhetorical devices. But
you can’t dodge the similarities just
I didn’t think the complicity argument was plausible until Hobby Lobby said
otherwise.
> On Sep 16, 2015, at 2:00 PM, Michael Masinter
> wrote:
>
> What plausible reading of religious freedom empowers Ms. Davis to prohibit
> her deputies from issuing marriage
I think Eugene’s careful dissecting out the EP aspect is misguided, especially
after Olbergefell’s careful consideration of both EP and SDP in this sort of
same-sex marriage context.
I agree that the denial of the right to marry is sufficient to support the
injunction — Davis is denying that
gt; philosophical judgment, Muslims are free to do based on their religious
> judgment.
>
>Eugene
>
> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
> <mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu>
> [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
> <mailto:religion
ilto:slevin...@law.utexas.edu>]
> Sent: Sunday, September 06, 2015 3:36 PM
> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> Subject: Re: What's happening in KY? -- my differences with Eugene
>
> I think Steve gets it exactly right.
>
>
>
> Sent from my iPhone
gt;> http://amzn.to/15f7bLH <http://amzn.to/15f7bLH>
>>>
>>> You can view my papers on the Social Science Research Network (SSRN) at
>>> the following
>>> URL: http://ssrn.com/author=345249 <http://ssrn.com/author=345249>
>>>
>>
Thank you for posting the extended exerpt, Eugene.
I disagree with you on one point in particular — if the state has chosen to use
counties, then it has chosen to use counties, not regional offices. It could
choose to use another method — regional offices — and the district court did
not
Mark and I disagree about the nature of animus and bias in the violation of
constitutional rights. I think the source of her bias is not relevant to the
14th Amendment analysis; he thinks it is. She is treating all couples the same
only because she thinks that insulates her from liability
Mark, are you claiming that her religious-based bias against same sex couples
is ok under the 14th Amendment? This sort of bias has been repeatedly declared
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court as inherently unreasonable. Again, see
Cleburne.
If her original position had been as nuanced as
Even if she is acting in accordance with her understanding of state law, she
cannot violate the federal constitution in doing so, and any state law that is
violation of the federal constitution is not, well, constitutional.
State RFRA cannot override the United States Constitution. Period.
I still dislike Smith. I think the ability of the court to allow play in the
joints under Sherbert/Yoder was superior to both Smith and RFRA especially
given how the court applied RFRA in Hobby Lobby. If the choice is between
Hobby Lobby and any claim of complicity being treated as cognizable
I don’t know that anyone can really know the extent of their biases influencing
their thinking. Deep things like being a trained historian vs. an engineer can
infect how we view the law. Life experiences — poor or rich, elite or
marginal, black, white or other, etc. surely impact how we view
She is motivated by prejudice against same sex couples. Her motivation for that
is not relevant under what I thought to be well settled and noncontroversial
equal protection jurisprudence. She has no rational reason to treat same sex
couples differently from opposite sex couples under the law.
And so back to attenuation, proximate cause (remember Palsgraf?), and
complicity with evil and metaphysical triggers like telling someone that you
want to opt out being equated to being forced to physically distribute
contraceptives.
No sale.
Steve
On Jul 10, 2015, at 5:07 PM, Michael
Everyone knows that God’s domicile for jurisdictional purpose is Minnesota,
aka, God’s country.
Steve
On May 6, 2015, at 9:25 AM, Jeremy Mallory jeremy.mall...@gmail.com wrote:
Hmm. I wonder if this means that God is now subject to personal jurisdiction
in Nebraska. Ernest Chambers will
There is a serious asymmetry here, it seems to me. Many expressions of concern
about the religious being persecuted by the new norm of respect for those with
same-sex orientation with little recognition of the decades/centuries of those
self same religious adherents persecuting those with a
Is there an IRS provision that would require the loss of tax exempt status as
in Bob Jones?
On Apr 29, 2015, at 9:39 PM, Brad Pardee bp51...@windstream.net wrote:
In an article from the Weekly Standard, the question was raised about the
implications for religious organizations losing their
If I understand the question correctly, the question is whether standards will
change and whether new demands will be made at some time in the future? The
answer is “of course.” Of course people will agitate for more. And others
will ask will ask for more. Witness the religious claims of
If the state requires you to bake a cake, bake two.
Matthew 5:41
It is verses like this that make it hard for me to credit the complicity with
evil argument underlying all of these religious objections. But I know the
first amendment does not protect actual Christianity because there is no
The benefits of clarity in regulation are that it obviates the need for
litigation and it allows for compromise among disparate and often competing
interests as well as allowing for compromise of competing values. If a law
specifically exempts a well-defined business or entity, then the very
Interesting articles in the Washington Post on the Indiana brouhaha.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/gov-pence-defends-religious-freedom-bill-amid-continued-criticism/2015/03/29/c8174cbe-d63a-11e4-ba28-f2a685dc7f89_story.html
Gov. Pence points out that there are many misunderstandings and
I know there are those who think the Indiana RFRA only protects religious
adherents through an exemption or exception-based regime.
But that is not how everyone will understand it. Some will think of it as a
license to discriminate:
If the Hobby Lobby decision that complicity with evil simpliciter, no matter
how attenuated, is a substantial burden is followed, then the fears about state
RFRAs will be realized. If however, the (in my judgment vain) attempt by
Justice Alito to tie the substantiality of the burden to the
“No one”? Well, maybe not its more sensible advocates.
On Mar 27, 2015, at 3:22 PM, Ryan T. Anderson ryantimothyander...@gmail.com
wrote:
What you call discriminate I call freedom to operate in public square in
accordance with well-founded beliefs about marriage. As Doug pointed out, no
Interesting that you think that people who want to use this legislationl to
discrimiate will wait until July to do so.
On Mar 27, 2015, at 1:57 PM, Kniffin, Eric N. eknif...@lrrlaw.com wrote:
I would caution against reading too much into a reactionary statement from
the NCAA’s Director of
Paul’s point is supported by those Christians who interpret “shall not be
unevenly yoked” broadly as requiring separation — including discrimination
against others of other beliefs. I have relatives who (formerly) were of
exactly this belief and know some Christians who still adhere to them.
There is a big difference between a regime where the law says you cannot or
should not and a law that says its ok in the way people respond.
Most people do not sue most of the time every time their rights are infringed,
so the “show me the cases” standard seems a bit off to me.
Nonetheless, I
I thought Smith was wrong at the time. I now think it is mostly right albeit
with an unworkable, even naive standard of “neutral and generally applicable” —
which was and is meaningless in a regime of accommodations (how are such laws
neutral or generally applicable?). But the idea that
Not all bases of discrimination are the same and not all businesses are the
same. Discrimination based on the target’s immutable characteristics (race,
national origin, gender, sexual orientation, etc.) is not the same as one based
on a difference in beliefs — political, religious, moral.
A
I think one will see all sorts of errors — like those going the other way in
Alabama right now. And like those teachers and administrators who wrongly
prohibit kids from private prayer before lunch or from reading the Bible in
free reading time.
And ironically some of the mistakes will be
Penn Teller illustrate the value of vaccinations.
http://www.kevinmd.com/blog/2015/01/watch-2-magicians-destroy-anti-vaccine-movement-90-seconds.html
--
Prof. Steven D. Jamar
Howard University School of Law
vox: 202-806-8017
fax: 202-806-8567
http://sdjlaw.org
Sorry to cloud the issue with facts, but since the first posting, I've learned
that there are a number of snowplow blades with various messages on them — not
all Christian evangelism.
http://siouxfalls.org/active-projects/special-projects/paint-the-plows/Gallery/havey-dunn.aspx
So, does
The seems to be a pretty clear case of violating the establishment clause AND
the trademark rights of Coca Cola.
http://godsnotdeadthemovie.com/blog/gods-dead-sioux-falls/
--
Prof. Steven D. Jamar vox: 202-806-8017
Director of International Programs, Institute for
The best way to get a bad law repealed is to enforce it strictly.” Abraham
Lincoln
On Oct 19, 2014, at 5:20 PM, Ira Lupu icl...@law.gwu.edu wrote:
I appreciate the comments of others to the effect of I would not have
enacted . . = stupid or silly. Note that the Supreme Court must take
Don’t some public accomodations laws reach vendors — even though employment
discrimination laws don’t? I don’t know that the federal law does, but surely
some states’ laws do.
On Oct 9, 2014, at 6:01 PM, Michael Peabody peabody...@gmail.com wrote:
Greetings,
Please forgive me if this has
On Oct 8, 2014, at 9:08 AM, Douglas Laycock dlayc...@virginia.edu wrote:
And of course a fair number of questions about how to reconcile deference
with compelling interest and least restrictive means. That is a genuine
puzzle.
sarcasm I’m shocked that anyone could have trouble with this
How would it not be constitutional? What possible theory?
On Sep 28, 2014, at 5:24 PM, Marc Stern ste...@ajc.org wrote:
Today's NY Times Review section has an article by a professor of evolutionary
biology at a public university describing a lecture he gives annually
explaining how that
Surely this is an easy case?
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/atheist_who_wouldnt_take_so_help_me_god_oath_isnt_allowed_to_reenlist_group/?utm_source=maestroutm_medium=emailutm_campaign=weekly_email
--
Prof. Steven D. Jamar vox: 202-806-8017
Director of International
The justices are woeful historians — but this is understandable given that our
discipline is rhetorical, not truth-based. We are trained to find support for
our positions and to push that support and the inferences from it as far as we
can to support our conclusions. The justices, in their
Yes. We are not only deep into an accommodationist regime, but the complicity
theory immunizes religious claims from examination except for sincerity.
Attenuation could be adopted in a later case, but if it is not attenuated in
HL, then it is hard to see where it would be. And as we all
I was using accommodation as distinguished from separation or coercion or
neutrality as guiding principles. I think that is somewhat different from
Sandy’s point.
I think Sandy’s point about the decline of the understanding of government and
civil society as being (largely) based on reason,
not
represent the views of my employer.
Warning: this message is subject to monitoring by the NSA.
On Tue, Jul 1, 2014 at 12:46 AM, Steven Jamar stevenja...@gmail.com wrote:
The court accepts without inquiry the assertion that the complicity with evil
theory is the problem that leads
that question,
as an empirical matter, in this case.
Art Spitzer
Warning: this message is subject to monitoring by the NSA.
On Mon, Jun 30, 2014 at 11:17 PM, Steven Jamar stevenja...@gmail.com wrote:
Brown eliminated the constitutional doctrine of separate but equal
Religion-in-employment cases should not be one-sided or even two sided — there
are at least three parties with serious interests that come into play–the
employer’s religious exercise; the employees’ interest in employment, in the
benefits required by law, in the employee’s (singularly or
“nones”?
Huh. I knew that was a thing, but didn’t really expect to see it here.
Steve
On Jun 9, 2014, at 4:49 PM, mallamud malla...@camden.rutgers.edu wrote:
I agree with Alan's statement below, stated better than I did. I would add
that we now do/should include the nones within the
by treating it seriously.
Steven Jamar
--
Prof. Steven D. Jamar vox: 202-806-8017
Director of International Programs, Institute for Intellectual Property and
Social Justice http://iipsj.org
Howard University School of Law fax: 202-806-8567
http://sdjlaw.org
Isn’t this an easy case of free exercise violation? Assuming that states do
not need to recognize same sex marriages as a matter of federal equal
protection law, and do not need recognize church-recognized same sex marriages
as vaild for state purposes (though the state would still recognize
I think Mary is dead-on on this point and would love to see the court interpret
RFRA as inherently and unavoidably including some sort of balancing test that
takes into account not just whether the burden is substantial, but just how
substantial or intrusive it is, as well as recognizing that
Where is the complicity burden? The financial burden can’t be a burden. If
the alternative removes the complicity, and that alternative is available to
them, then where is the substantial burden on religion? It was plaintiff’s
complicity theory that was the driving force. They had the
An employer's duty to accommodate is notoriously anemic. Here the Buddhist is
likely claiming the requirement forces the employee
Sent from Steve's iPhone
On Mar 25, 2014, at 9:34 PM, Volokh, Eugene vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
An interesting lawsuit that Howard Friedman
The employer's duty to accommodate is notoriously anemic. Forcing an employee
to violate his beliefs concerning right speech seems wrong as a matter of
morality and policy, but not law. If someone else can put the offensive words
on the communications, then there might be an accommodation case,
as a value, and right practically because, as many have noted,
bureaucrats, judges and legislators all have done a remarkably bad job of it.
-KC
On Tue, Mar 11, 2014 at 10:21 PM, Steven Jamar stevenja...@gmail.com wrote:
Cryptic. Equal right to be wrong is a good start at what
I do not find it all disturbing that academics engage in advocacy and do not
present their positions in an objective, neutral way — or in a way that some
others might think objectivity and neutrality require. Nor do I object to
their being advocates, tailoring arguments to the particular
I appreciate Kevin Chen’s clarification that he does not consider equality
foreign to U.S. consitutional jurisprudence. I agree with him that equality is
not easy to corral and that equality is context dependent, like every other
aspect of law.
There are procedural aspects of equality and
I think it is difficult only because of the impossibly long, subjective,
untestable stretch of the religious (not legal) complicity theory. If there is
.1% chance of something happening, does that make one complicit in it? Does my
paying taxes make me complicit in the 30,000 annual deaths on
I can get behind liberty. Can you (and others) get behind equality? Often
they work together, but sometimes they are in serious conflict. State
sanctioned liberty to exclude and discriminate against denies equality to some.
State sanctioned and enforced equality limits the liberty of some
To shift Sandy’s tort analogy — if you walk the streets of NYC at rush hour you
have to expect to get jostled by the crowd and not every touching is therefore
an actionable battery. When Hobby Lobby and Notre Dame choose to walk the
streets, they assume the risk of some jostling.
Steve
--
Still complicit--the employer knows the wages will sometimes be spent on things
the employer dislikes just as much as the employer knows some employees will
use insurance for things the employer dislikes. If the theory is complicity,
that line is a pretty lame one.
Sent from Steve's iPhone
citizens have an equal right to be wrong seems
like a good start.
-KC
On Tue, Mar 11, 2014 at 8:15 PM, Steven Jamar stevenja...@gmail.com wrote:
I can get behind liberty. Can you (and others) get behind equality? Often
they work together, but sometimes they are in serious conflict. State
I hope Greg is right about the first category, but many anti-gay advocates want
a blanket exclusion based on their animus toward gays that would cover any
person engaged in business, even Hobby Lobby.
As to the second category — I don’t see those two parts as one category. The
first
Let’s think about how this law would operate. A gay person walks into the
store and is denied service. Now, this gay person needs to sue to prove the
store improperly refused him service because he is gay. So he needs to hire a
lawyer, pay the lawyer, and spend a lot of time and effort to
Maybe I’ve been wrong about the complicity theory after all. Those who are
condemning homosexuality know that at least some people are prone to act in a
violent way against gays and so by condemning homosexuality they are complicit
in incidents (and far, far worse) of violence against gays.
...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Steven Jamar
Sent: Thursday, February 27, 2014 10:49 AM
To: Law Religion Law List
Subject: Re: Protecting Religious Conscience from Private Suits -- How far
do we go under the Const and under RFRAs?
I don’t think state action is as settled as Chris’s post implies
I get that religious people do not want to be discriminated against. Indeed,
they have lots of protections in the laws already protecting them from
discrimination in employment, public accomodations, and so on. And they have
lots of special treatment in the form of exemptions from laws that
:
I really have a hard time listening to a claim that RFRA supporters think
that being required to not abuse children [is] an invasion of religious
liberty.
Mark
Mark S. Scarberry
Pepperdine University School of Law
Sent from my iPad
On Feb 21, 2014, at 2:46 PM, Steven Jamar stevenja
I was, early on, generally a support of RFRA and thought the Smith rule went
too far. I thought that the substantial burden would work out much as it has —
courts have been reluctant to find a substantial burden very easily.
But in the last decade, and in particular with the response of some
They are not forced into that choice except by their choice of beliefs. They
can do other things. They have no right to run a business in opposition to
established public policy. If they can win the political battle and get
specific exemption in the legislation — ok. But what if the
Judge Posner gives 1L lesson on oral advocacy to Notre Dame's lawyer on oral in
freedom of religion case. Pretty basic 1L stuff. Embarrassing for the
attorney — and his firm and school.
University of Virginia Law School
580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
434-243-8546
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Steven Jamar
Sent: Friday, February 14, 2014 7:47 AM
To: CONLAWPROFS professors; Law Religion Law
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/pr-georges-trial-in-fatal-police-chase-tossed-because-of-jurors-religious-beliefs/2014/01/09/3e834ef4-7956-11e3-af7f-13bf0e9965f6_print.html
--
Prof. Steven D. Jamar vox: 202-806-8017
Director of International Programs, Institute for
We are a common law country where courts have always made law.
We are a country where courts have always interpreted the statutory and
regulatory law and unavoidably in the process “made” law.
We are a country where legislatures (including Congress) have the power to
write the law contrary to
http://talkingpointsmemo.com/livewire/athiest-group-s-flying-spaghetti-monster-displayed-in-wisconsin-capitol
Pastafarians don’t generally evangelize quite this much.
--
Prof. Steven D. Jamar vox: 202-806-8017
Director of International Programs, Institute for Intellectual
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