I would think that, if Hobby Lobby wins the case, this will
just mean that future Congresses who are worried about such things should add a
RFRA will not apply to this statute provision to statutes when they don't
want any religious exemptions from those statutes. That's one
I appreciate Alan's point, but I wonder how far it goes.
First, I might not have been clear enough on this in my post,
but I was speaking of what should be a matter of constitutional entitlement, or
entitlement under a generally applicable exemption scheme. And
significant as to be tantamount to coercion -- as in
the 4980D tax for failing to comply with coverage requirements.
On Dec 17, 2013, at 9:10 PM, Volokh, Eugene wrote:
The heart of Marty's argument (I focus for now on item 1 below) is, I think, an
empirical claim: Large employers such as Hobby
I'm not sure that Marty's two-step approach works. To be sure,
a legislature can always require everyone to pay taxes. But if the legislature
requires people who do X to pay a tax, while people who don't do X don't pay
the tax, and X turns out to be something that people feel
The heart of Marty's argument (I focus for now on item 1 below) is, I think, an
empirical claim: Large employers such as Hobby Lobby would be better off just
dropping coverage, paying the $2000/employee/year tax, us[ing] some of [the]
enormous cost savings to compensate employees for the lost
I much appreciate Marty's kind words about my posts, and I'm
very interested in his posts. The argument that there's actually no employer
mandate for RFRA purposes (the Part III post) strikes me as especially
interesting, though I'm somewhat skeptical about it. Marty, could
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Sent: Monday, December 09, 2013
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Sent: Monday, December 09, 2013 9:17 AM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: unsubscribe
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by the regulations in question, even if
Abood could be distinguished on other grounds (which may have been true in
Glickman, though not in Keller).
On Dec 5, 2013, at 1:52 AM, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
Well, the most recent case, Knox, does label Abood
to
compelled support for B's speech (under RFRA). Maybe that is Congress's
judgment, but I think we can still ask whether it makes any sense.
Micah
On Dec 5, 2013, at 3:03 AM, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
I would assume that what justifies
My sense is that I (as someone who is irreligious) would get
relatively little solace or even wise counsel from speaking to an average
Catholic priest about my troubles and misdeeds, at least unless I was at least
contemplating converting to Catholicism. Unsurprisingly, the
...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Thursday, December 05, 2013 4:17 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: The clergy-penitent privilege and burdens on third parties
My sense is that I (as someone who is irreligious) would get
relatively little
I agree with Alan, Marc, and Chris at some level of generality. But it seems
to me that religious exemption claims are rightly treated differently than
other claims, such as free speech claims.
Consider, for instance, the emotional distress tort. Larry Flynt says nasty
things about Jerry
restrictive means.
Again, I realize that my question is one of analogy, but the Abood line seems
to set the bar rather low.
Micah
On Dec 4, 2013, at 5:06 PM, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
Maybe I'm missing something, but the Court (1) found
significant third
party harms (in this case, to employees).
On Mon, Dec 2, 2013 at 11:43 PM, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
I appreciate Jim's argument, and also the arguments that the
problem with the exemption isn't discrimination in favor
:
I'm happy to let others answer the question of why Eugene's FRA would be crazy
(and profoundly contrary to the statute Congress enacted in 1993). If Eugene
is not persuaded, so be it.
On Tue, Dec 3, 2013 at 10:57 AM, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote
are entitled, and in avoiding serious EC
concerns.
On Tue, Dec 3, 2013 at 11:22 AM, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
So I take it the EEOC and the great majority of courts that
have considered the meaning of religion in Title VII are wrong, too
I read the Gedicks Van Tassell article, which I found
interesting but ultimately not quite persuasive as to the draft.
According to
http://www.swarthmore.edu/library/peace/conscientiousobjection/co%20website/pages/HistoryNew.htm,
there were 170,000
3, 2013 at 6:30 PM, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
I sympathize with the argument that there is a compelling
government interest in preventing costs on third parties, and that this may
justify rejecting the RFRA claim. I think the doctrine
Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Tuesday, November 26, 2013 9:43 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Contraception Mandate
I do indeed think so. The government doesn’t have to extend a
government-mandated benefit to everyone; Title VII protections, for instance
of treating any and all members of the clergy
differently from
one's
best friends, fellow family members, or even, in most courts, reporters.
sandy
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Tuesday, December 03, 2013 7
one's
best friends, fellow family members, or even, in most courts, reporters.
sandy
From:
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[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edumailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu]
On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent
I appreciate Jim's argument, and also the arguments that the
problem with the exemption isn't discrimination in favor of religion, but
rather the burden on third parties, regardless of whether the exemption is only
for the religious. (I hope to respond to those arguments soon.)
I've been thinking some more about the argument that the
Establishment Clause forbids any RFRA-based religious exemptions from the
employer mandate, on the grounds that such exemptions would impose an
unacceptable burden on employees who would thus have to (say) pay for
Though I think the ACA regulations should be seen as
substantially burden the plaintiffs' exercise of religion, I think the strict
scrutiny argument is much harder to analyze, and perhaps the government should
indeed win under strict scrutiny. And I can see the appeal of the
Jim Oleske writes:
My sense is that the language from the Piggie Park Court was reflective of an
accepted notion at the time that for-profit businesses did not have a
presumptive right to religious exemptions, even if non-profit religious
institutions might have such a right
Why would that
I'm not Brad, but I thought I'd put my two cents' worth in:
Brad-Is it your view that for-profit companies over 50 employees (those
affected here), who are subject to Title VII, and may not discriminate on the
basis of religion or gender,
can tailor their salary and benefit plans
/
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From: Volokh, Eugene vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
I don’t see that at all. Say the government requires employers
to buy lunch for their employees, and a religiously vegetarian employer orders
only vegetarian food. I don’t think that somehow constitutes the employer
discriminating based on religion against people who don’t
That seems to me to be precisely the issue that the Court faced
in United States v. Lee, and that lower courts have faced with regard to
similar objectors -- granting such exemptions, especially given that they are
sure to proliferate, would indeed substantially undermine the
I've long thought that corporate rights make sense only to the extent
that they are useful for stand-ins for the rights of people. (I support
Citizens United precisely because of that.)
And when it comes to closely held corporations, whose owners claim an
objection to
I appreciate the point, but when the Court confronted the issue
more squarely, in Bob Jones, it didn't treat the university's claim as patently
frivolous, but did apply strict scrutiny (though upholding the law, of course).
Likewise, the 1990s lower court cases involving
by for-profit businesses.
On Tue, Nov 26, 2013 at 4:59 PM, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
I appreciate the point, but when the Court confronted the issue
more squarely, in Bob Jones, it didn't treat the university's claim as patently
frivolous
be right.
On Tue, Nov 26, 2013 at 5:42 PM, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
The less restrictive means would be to have the government
offer such a plan, which employees could buy from the government (or from some
other entity), without
Law School
Yeshiva University
@Marci_Hamilton
On Nov 26, 2013, at 5:52 PM, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
I don't see that at all. Say the government requires employers
to buy lunch for their employees, and a religiously vegetarian employer
...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Tuesday, November 26, 2013 3:31 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Rights of corporations and RFRAs
I've long thought that corporate rights make sense only to the extent
too far.
Alan Brownstein
From:
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edumailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Tuesday, November 26, 2013 2:52 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Contraception Mandate
Let me ask a different question about the contraceptive
mandate, and one that I should stress is not relevant under RFRA; it's more a
question of how exemptions should be crafted.
I often here variants of the following argument for Hobby Lobby
and similar
I thought this might be interesting to list members (though
maybe all of you are reading Howard Friedman’s Religion Clause blog already).
Feed: Religion Clause
Posted on: Wednesday, November 06, 2013 4:48 AM
Author: Howard Friedman
Subject: Paper Reports On Jews In State Prisons
I've seen articles talking about a 1764 Rhode Island incest law
exemption for uncle-niece marriages among Jews, but now that I'm trying to find
the actual statute, I'm having a hard time. Does anyone happen to have a good
citation for it? Thanks,
Eugene
Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
434-243-8546
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Tuesday, October 15, 2013 5:18 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
(religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu)
Subject
So holds the Minnesota Court of Appeals, applying the Minnesota Constitution,
in today's In the Matter of the Welfare of J.J.M. A.,
http://www.mncourts.gov/opinions/coa/current/OPa130295-092313.pdf --
surprisingly, a nonprecedential opinion.
Eugene
One more item: Please include your full name and affiliation in the posts,
unless it’s obvious from your e-mail address. Thanks,
The list custodian
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To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or
Folks: This list is designed for technical legal discussions
about the law of government and religion, and is aimed generally at law
professors who specialize in the field. Please keep list discussions focused
on that, rather than on general discussions about other areas of
).
On Aug 22, 2013, at 11:23 PM, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
My sense is that many freelance writers are indeed pretty
unselective. But, in any event, why should the writer's or photographer's
selectivity or unselectivity affect the First Amendment
-- Most freelancers are subject to work for hire agreements that
divest copyright and make the purchaser the owner of the speech for all
purposes.
Marci A. Hamilton
Verkuil Chair in Public Law
Benjamin N. Cardozo Law School
Yeshiva University
@Marci_Hamilton
On Aug 24, 2013, at 12:37 PM, Volokh
A quick question, focusing on the compelled speech side of the
issue rather than just the RFRA side. The court’s logic isn’t limited to
sexual orientation discrimination (as opposed to other kinds of discrimination)
or to photographers (as opposed to other creators of protected
underlying the court's decision. She did not contest her
status as a public accommodation, after all.
On Aug 22, 2013, at 10:43 PM, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
A quick question, focusing on the compelled speech side of the
issue rather than just
or state administrative programs.
Marci A. Hamilton
Verkuil Chair in Public Law
Benjamin N. Cardozo Law School
Yeshiva University
@Marci_Hamilton
On Aug 16, 2013, at 4:21 PM, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
I agree with Ellis that the Free
Clark Law School
SSRN Page: http://ssrn.com/author=357864
Faculty Page: http://law.lclark.edu/faculty/james_oleske/
On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 8:35 PM, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
But wait: How can you read ACA as setting a baseline
Pepperdine Univ. School of Law
From:
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edumailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Friday, August 16, 2013 8:36 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: New Twist On Challenge
-
FROM: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] on behalf of Volokh, Eugene
[vol...@law.ucla.edu]
SENT: Thursday, August 15, 2013 11:33 PM
TO: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
(religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu)
SUBJECT: RE: New Twist On Challenge
qualify as a
burden on the reproductive freedom of those who must bear the resulting cost of
pregnancy prevention services?
On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 1:17 PM, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
I'm still not sure I understand. This is plaintiff's insurance
I appreciate Sandy’s point, and as one of the few people who
thinks the unanimous Abood decision was unanimously mistaken, I would take it
quite a distance.
Nonetheless, Abood illustrates, I think, that even in the Free
Speech Clause context the law
I agree with Ellis that the Free Exercise Clause shouldn't
generally be read as mandating religious exemptions. But the debate these days
(at least on this blog) is usually not about the Free Exercise Clause but about
RFRAs, which do involve legislatively created exemptions
Well, the Court wouldn’t have thought there was a compelled
speech claim, if the money were used to pay for old-age homes rather than for
political advocacy. But that’s just because the compelled speech doctrine
applies only to compelled exactions of money for speech purposes
I still don't understand the rhetoric of imposing on his
daughters here. Plaintiff is entitled, as a benefit for himself because of
his employment, to coverage for his 18-year-old daughters as well as for
himself. But it's his choice; he is entirely free to say Sorry, gals,
to obtain contraceptives, let
alone use them.
Jon
On 2013-08-16 17:38, Volokh, Eugene wrote:
I still don't understand the rhetoric of imposing on his daughters
here. Plaintiff is entitled, as a benefit for himself because of his
employment
than anyone
else.)
On Fri, Aug 16, 2013 at 8:49 PM, Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
I agree; as I wrote near the start of the thread, I'm not sympathetic
to the legislator's claim, and I'm not sure that the provision of only a
general insurance policy
I’m not sympathetic to the legislator’s claim, and I’m not sure
that the provision of only a general insurance policy and not the one with the
exceptions substantially burdens the legislator’s belief. Indeed, the
legislator’s ability to send a disclaimer to the insurance
I agree there may well be a compelling interest in the
government’s providing for life-saving procedures, even ones that an insured
refused to buy insurance for. But -- assuming that offering an employee a
policy covering such procedures, with no other options, is a substantial
434-243-8546tel:434-243-8546
From:
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[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edumailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu]
On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Tuesday, August 06, 2013 12:40 AM
To: Law Religion issues
Indeed, Marci didn’t say Doug was “lying,” but when one says of
a first-hand witness that the “history, as I knew it, was distinctive from his
account,” and “Not sure how to square [Doug’s past reassurances] w Doug's
current statements,” the implicit accusation seems to me to be
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-Original Message-
From: Volokh, Eugene vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
religionlaw@lists.ucla.edumailto:religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
Sent: Thu, Aug 1, 2013
So holds Monday's district court decision in In re Archdiocese of Milwaukee,
http://thinkprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/church-bankruptcy-opinion.pdf
.
I wonder, though, whether this is right (assuming that bankruptcy law would
give creditors access to other trusts administered by
to it.
Bob Ritter
On July 10, 2013 at 11:42 PM Volokh, Eugene
vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote:
Again, if the question is whether there is a rational basis for
the requirement – the question that we began with, since the presence or
absence of a rational
Folks: Please make sure the discussion is focused on legal analysis, not
general matters of right and wrong or good or bad policy, except insofar as
they are tied to the legal analysis. The recent discussion of marriage
restrictions has departed in some measure from the list’s focus on the
I’m skeptical of claims that the U.S. is overpopulated; indeed,
I’m tentatively inclined to say that we ought to have a considerably larger
population. But surely if this is just a matter of the rational basis test,
the government would have a rational basis for policies aimed
the why don't you
exclude those couples argument.
MARK SCARBERRY
Sent from my Verizon Wireless 4G LTE Smartphone
Original message
From: Volokh, Eugene vol...@law.ucla.edumailto:vol...@law.ucla.edu
Date: 07/03/2013 5:20 PM (GMT-10:00)
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
I think that marriages of people who are past childbearing age
are a great example in favor of the policy argument for allowing same-sex
marriage. When we see those of that age marrying, I assume that most of us
don't say, Grrr, free riders, too bad that they get all the
I would think that if a state were to say that it doesn’t want
to give the various benefits of marriage to couples who marry past some age,
but to reserve those benefits to couples who are below that age, that would
pass the rational basis test. (Whether it passes the
That may be a perfectly sensible policy position; but I don’t
think that modern constitutional law demands that the government take such a
view. To be sure, the government is constrained in its power to restrict
childbearing or to mandate it, but the government can certainly
...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Jean Dudley
Sent: Monday, July 01, 2013 10:56 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Re: Nonreligious rational bases for opposite-sex-only marriage rules
On Jul 1, 2013, at Mon, Jul 1, 9:21 PM, Volokh, Eugene
vol
all are now. Mirabile dictu.
My best,
Toni
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu]
on behalf of Volokh, Eugene [vol...@law.ucla.edu]
Sent: Monday, July 01, 2013 9:21
Most laws aren't based on provable
Most laws aren't based on provable scientific fact, and the
rational basis test generally doesn't require scientific proof. That's
especially so in areas that can't be easily subjected to scientific experiment,
and in which indirect consequences might not be felt for
Well, many people find others expressly suggesting that they
change their political terminology to be demeaning and dismissive. Indeed,
publicly asking people to change how they speak - and calling people bigots -
is often felt to be insulting. One might well suggest that
My guess is that the great bulk of people who condemn same-sex
marriage are also quite troubled by out-of-wedlock births and by divorce. One
common argument, indeed, is that (1) we tinkered with traditional sexual and
marital mores, and the result - much greater out-of-wedlock
I've offered two arguments against recognition of same-sex marriage that aren't
religious in nature. But beyond this, a vast range of laws is based on claims
that haven't been proven. That's true of intellectual property law, drug
laws, gun control laws, rent controls, price controls, labor
Doesn’t this assume the conclusion? A RFRA claim isn’t an
attempt to “nullify otherwise valid laws that clearly apply to them”; rather,
it’s a claim that one law in fact doesn’t apply to them, because another law
(RFRA) precludes it from applying. That’s no more a
On Jun 15, 2013, at 8:41 PM, Marc DeGirolami
marc.degirol...@stjohns.edumailto:marc.degirol...@stjohns.edu wrote:
I hope you will indulge a brief note about the recent publication of my book,
The Tragedy of Religious
Freedomhttp://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674072664content=book.
Colleagues: I might have mentioned this case (which I'm litigating) before on
the list, but now that the briefing is done I thought I'd pass along all the
information about it, in case some might find it interesting. The case is
Scott v. Saint John's Church in the Wilderness, in which the
to the messages and will be emotionally upset.
Any thoughts, Eugene.
Alan
From:
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edumailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Tuesday, May 14, 2013 2:54 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law
Dear colleagues: This Fall, I'll be teaching a First Amendment Amicus Brief
Clinic here at UCLA School of Law (http://amicusclinic.org). The clinic will
represent nonprofits, as well as academics or groups of academics, who want to
file friend-of-the-court briefs in free speech and religious
I was under the impression that the New Jersey Constitution has been
interpreted to follow Smith rather than Sherbert/Yoder when it comes to
religious exemptions, but now I can't find the case that I thought so held.
Does anyone know what the straight dope on this is? Thanks,
Eugene
Here is a link to the 2012 AALS Law and Religion Section newsletter:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/121563670/AALS-Law-and-Religion-Section-Newsletter
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From S.T. v. Napolitano, 2012 WL 6048222 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 5):
S.T. is a citizen of India. He is currently eleven years old. Bakula and Ashok
Trivedi are both natives of India. Ashok became a United States citizen in
1997; Bakula became a citizen in 1995.
Bakula and Ashok Trivedi practice the
...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Friday, December 07, 2012 10:03 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RFRA challenge to DNA testing requirement for child's
citizenshipapplication (derivative of parental citizenship)
From S.T. v
.
From:
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edumailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu]
On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene [vol...@law.ucla.edu]
Sent: Sunday, November 25, 2012 6:15 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject
I appreciate Sandy's point, but I wonder whether the matter might be
more complex than that. We don't want docile citizens, but we do want
citizens who comply with legally enacted rules; and we certainly want minor
students who so comply. We expect citizens to display their lack of
Though I agree with much that Sandy says (and especially join in his
Happy Thanksgiving wishes), I wonder whether the item below involves the
tailing wagging the dog a bit. Many virtues that we inculcate in schools are
only presumptive virtues, that sometimes must be set aside in favor
...@virginia.edu]
Sent: Thursday, November 22, 2012 12:02 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics; Volokh, Eugene
Subject: Re: High School Student's Religious Objection to Wearing RFID Chip
Badge for Student Locator Program
It seems to me that Eugene is talking about ends
I continue to think that, when someone claims that a law
substantially burdens their religious beliefs by requiring them to do something
that they view as religiously wrong because it is complicit with evil, the
question should be whether the claimant sincerely believes that
Of course when criminal law or tort law makes someone liability
for complicity, it must set forth an objective definition of what counts as
complicity. My point (and Doug's) is that, when someone claims a religious
duty to avoid complicity with conduct he views as sinful (under
Isn't that like saying, if it's OK for you to 'produc[e] the
raw product necessary for the production of any kind of tank,' why is working
on tank turrets any different?? Why isn't the answer much like that given in
Thomas: But Thomas' statements reveal no more than that he
Law School
580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
434-243-8546
From:
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edumailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Sunday, September 30, 2012 10:37 PM
To: Law Religion issues
Let me add that American law has very different views of when
people are responsible for the acts of others, or when they can demand that
they not assist in the acts of others. For instance,
1. Zelman sets forth one rule when it comes to taxpayers'
right to
As one of the few people on this list who both supports Smith and
supports jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction RFRAs, let me put in a plug for my
theory. The worry (expressed, for instance, by Sandy) that religious
objections, both sincere and insincere, can undermine an important law is a
Doug Laycock writes:
No law prohibits political discrimination by private employers, except in DC
and maybe a few other places I don't know about. But I think not very many,.
It turns out that bans on some forms of political
discrimination by private employers are present
This might be a great opportunity for some of our former students, so I thought
I'd pass it along:
Stanford Law School
Religious Liberty Clinic
Staff Attorney
The Mills Legal Clinic of Stanford Law School invites applicants for the staff
attorney position with its Religious Liberty Clinic
Sorry for the delay responding -- I was working on a cert petition all
week, and just handed it off to my cite-checker.
As list readers might recall, my position was not that circumcision
restriction would be justified. Rather, I wrote, From what I understand,
think the health
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