And Bill Patry e-mailed me the following:
I agree that churches aren't covered by Section 110(5) of the Copyright Act
for the performance of the Superbowl for the reasons you give. There is one
special limitation for churches in Section 110(3) for certain types of musical
works, and then
Really interesting new RFRA decision from the Ninth Circuit:
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/newopinions.nsf/64C37FB597BF2F848825729C0058BFE8/$file/0615371.pdf?openelement
The issue in a nutshell:
The San Francisco Peaks in the Coconino National Forest in northern Arizona
have long-standing
not fear the wrath of an armed people.
-- Original message --
From: Volokh, Eugene [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Maryland high court rules that organist doesn't fall within Title VII
ministerial exception. Archdiocese of Washington v. Moersen, 2007 WL
1703483 (Md. June 14),
Well, to this day, the federal broadcast indecency law 18 U.S.C. § 1464,
provides that [w]hoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by
means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than two years, or both. My understanding is that until
I've barely glanced at the decision, but from what I've quickly read, I don't
think it's fair to call what Colorado has done denominational discrimination,
notwithstanding what the court wrote. It's simply a prohibition on funding
religious education itself, of *any* denomination. Pervasively
OK, I've now read the whole opinion, and I think the court's judgment is
plainly correct under governing doctrine.
The crucial point is that CCU's education necessarily invovles inculcation of
religious truths and spiritual transformation. A substantial portion of the
'secular' instruction
Rick, with all respect, I think you're simply ignoring the rationale of the
Colorado statute and constitution.
Yes, Colorado permits *some* religiously affiliated colleges to participate in
the programs -- it allows, e.g., aid to Regis University and the Univ. of
Denver -- because *some of
Hey, Chris. It's not as if Colorado has it in for pervasively sectarian
schools. It has a constitutional mandate not to provide aid that will go to
religious education -- at any schools, pervasively sectarian or otherwise . . .
or secular, for that matter. For ease of administration of this
OK, one last try -- apologies in advance to all those of you who have read this
many times over, but obviously I'm not doing a very good job making my point.
Let's put it this way: If the Colorado legislature had never enacted a law
mentioning pervasively sectarian schools, the result in this
Agreed that it's important -- indeed, if it reached the Supreme Court, it would
likely be the vehicle for a wholesale 5-4 overturning of almost 40 years of EC
doctrine. A few quick reactions:
1. The court's insistence that this is a case of first impression is
ridiculous. It might be the
Of course I agree with Doug that part of the impulse to protect only mandatory
aspects of religion is a desire to limit exemptions. And part of it is also
based on the misunderstanding he identifies -- the bias in favor of traditional
thou shalt notions of religious commitments and precepts.
The denial of cert. was not unexpected. Somewhat surprisingly, in my view, the
lead argument in the petition
(http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/06-1550_pet.pdf) was not that
the criteria the legislature drew in crafting its religious exemption were
problematic. I don't think
It is, of course, perhaps the central theme of the Memorial and Remonstrance,
especially in the warning that to employ Religion as an engine of civil
policy would be an unhallowed perversion of the means of salvation.
If there's a thorough treatment of the MR out there, perhaps that would be a
Or, just maybe, he actually believed what he was writing.
-- Original message --
From: Volokh, Eugene [EMAIL PROTECTED]
My sense of the Memorial and Remonstrance is that it is
noteworthy chiefly for the absence of any central theme. The MR speaks
of
My apologies, as well; I didn't mean to be snippy. I simply meant to suggest
that Madison might actually have thought that mixing state and church would
threaten each (and every one!) of the problems he identifies; and that the MR
is noteworthy for many things other than an (alleged) lack of
And, of course, unlike in Hustler, the persons at whom the speech was directed
here were not public figures.
On this point, I highly recommend Robert Post's article on Hustler, The
Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic
Deliberation, Hustler Magazine v.
This thread reveals an oddity about modern state-action doctrine -- most of the
cases in which the Court has developed that doctrine have involved questions of
whether the putatively private actors could be *enjoined,* not whether they
could be sued for damages. And it's in that context that
It's not a law -- it's a House resolution, which was passed 372-9 and which
reads as follows:
Whereas Christmas, a holiday of great significance to Americans and many other
cultures and nationalities, is celebrated annually by Christians throughout the
United States and the world;
Whereas
I don't think Eugene's test case helps us see the problem clearly in these
religion
disputes. In deciding the best interests of the child, it is virtually
inevitable that a court will eventually be required to evaluate the
philosophy
to which the child will be exposed -- a philosophy that
Good question. We've been over this before in other contexts. First of all --
is it really the case that there's empirical evidence (as opposed to a judicial
assumption based on anecdote) that a religious upbringing is more likely to
keep a child out of trouble? Religious cultures, after
I haven't read this through yet, but thought I'd bring it to the list's
attention, since it looks to be dealing with an opt-out claim very similar to
that in Mozert -- always a very interesting question:
http://www.ca1.uscourts.gov/pdf.opinions/07-1528-01A.pdf
It's a little off-topic from the Alan/Eugene debate, but I thought it might be
worth noting that a couple of the minor premises here are very much contested:
1. Eugene suggests that if the state gives direct funding to an entity that
discriminates on a basis the state could not itself use,
Chip's post piqued my interest when he wrote that Edwards and Santa Fe were
probably the two toughest Est CL cases in which to side with the government
during [Scalia's] tenure on the Court.
I'm curious whether others agree -- whether we have any sort of consensus on
such matters. After all,
Opinion and all the cert.-stage papers available here:
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/todays-orders-25/#more-6913
-- Original message --
From: Brownstein, Alan [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Do you have the cite for McConnell's dissent handy?
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
SEIU planned a strike to be accompanied by demonstration, rallies and a parade
downtown and in other business areas. Pursuant to those plans, SEIU applied for
sound amplification permits under § 30-8 of the City of Houston Sound
Ordinance, and for parade permits under §§ 45-231 through 45-246
I tend to agree with Alan here. Of course there are occasional conflicts
between gay rights laws and religious beliefs -- principally in the commercial
sector, such as in employment and housing rentals -- but is it really that much
of a problem? Or is it a relatively infrequent phenomenon
will no longer be present.
Eugene
Marty Lederman writes:
I tend to agree with Alan here. Of course there are
occasional conflicts between gay rights laws and religious
beliefs -- principally in the commercial sector, such as in
employment and housing rentals -- but is it really
. Once same-sex
marriages are legally recognized, that argument will no
longer be present.
Eugene
Marty Lederman writes:
I tend to agree with Alan here. Of course there are occasional
conflicts between gay rights laws and religious beliefs --
principally
OLC published yesterday an opinion that it issued last year. It involves
one of those funding statutes that specifically prohibits religious
discrimination in jobs subsidized by a federal grant. OLC concludes --
similar to a mental-health funding regulation that it approved back in
2002/2003 --
Complaint:
http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/files/satanfiling.pdf
DOJ Brief:
http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/files/beast.pdf
On Fri, Nov 14, 2008 at 11:34 AM, Jean Dudley [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/11/bush-administra.html
From the Wired article:
Has anyone, either in such a wrongful-death suit, or perhaps in some other
context, ever argued in court that the exemptions violate the Establishment
Clause? If not, why not? If the third-party burdens were enough to render
the law invalid in *Thornton v. Caldor*, these are easy cases.
On Fri,
If I may offer a brief response to Eugene's initial question, which was not
about whether the state can *prohibit *such conduct, but instead whether a
public employer can discharge a public employee for conspicuously engaging
in such public conduct . . . . (Of course, if the conduct can be
If the city allows commercial ads but no political or religious ads, I
think the policy is constitutionally OK.
Maybe. To be sure, that forum (limited to commercial speech) would be
distinguishable from the broader forum in Rosenberger . . . but such a
favoring of commercial over noncommercial
The most troubling (or at least undefended) part of the majority opinion is
why the particular signs specifically about Snyder and arguably not on a
matter of public concern – namely, “You’re Going to Hell” and “God Hates
You” – should be immunized merely because the “overall thrust” of the
--
*From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Ira Lupu [
icl...@law.gwu.edu]
*Sent:* Thursday, March 03, 2011 5:13 PM
*To:* Law Religion issues for Law Academics
*Cc:* conlawp...@lists.ucla.edu
*Subject:* Re: Harassment
It sounds like Marty
Note JPS's examples -- a museum and an art gallery. His objection might be
styled as an EC concern, but I think what's doing most of the work is
actually the speech and assembly clauses of the First Amendment. He's
suggesting what is implied in, e.g., Heffron and the opinions in Texas
Monthly --
So why don't we try to ascertain the facts? Took me about 20 seconds to
find the complaint online:
http://www.aclj.org/media/pdf/Graning-DCT-FILED-Doc-1-Complaint-20100714.pdf
I dont know whether there were further pleadings, or what the bus service's
defense might have been, but from the looks
Well, Marci, if his claim is not simply that he does not believe women
should wear bathing suits, but is more broadly that if he drives women to
Macy's it will create a religious hardship, then his religious request for
an exemption must be honored under title VII unless doing so would create an
From what I can tell, this is what ended up in the bill; please holler if
this is not correct:
S 10-B. APPLICATION. 1. NOTWITHSTANDING ANY OTHER PROVISION OF LAW,
PURSUANT TO SUBDIVISION NINE OF SECTION TWO HUNDRED NINETY-TWO OF THE
EXECUTIVE LAW, A CORPORATION INCORPORATED UNDER THE
at 6:23 AM, Marty Lederman lederman.ma...@gmail.comwrote:
From what I can tell, this is what ended up in the bill; please holler if
this is not correct:
S 10-B. APPLICATION. 1. NOTWITHSTANDING ANY OTHER PROVISION OF LAW,
PURSUANT TO SUBDIVISION NINE OF SECTION TWO HUNDRED NINETY-TWO
Chair in Public Law
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law
Yeshiva University
Sent from my Verizon Wireless BlackBerry
-Original Message-
From: Marty Lederman lederman.ma...@gmail.com
Sender: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
Date: Sat, 25 Jun 2011 16:24:50
To: Law Religion issues
there is no religious tenet component to the title Vii
exemption? It is just on religious identity? And if a tenet component? How
does it apply to this question?
David
Sent from my iPhone
On Jun 26, 2011, at 2:24 PM, Marty Lederman lederman.ma...@gmail.com
wrote:
A very small
of a particular
religion.
On Sun, Jun 26, 2011 at 4:44 PM, Marty Lederman lederman.ma...@gmail.comwrote:
David: Good question. Let's stick to title VII, because (i) it's the
statute with which we're most familiar; (ii) it has been the subject of the
most litigation; and (iii) other state, local
, 26 Jun 2011 16:44:29 -0400
From: Marty Lederman lederman.ma...@gmail.com
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
Subject: Re: The religious exemptions in the new NY same-sex marriage
law
Message-ID: BANLkTinE=jbw9bayb+vj
very interesting, thanks
On Tue, Jun 28, 2011 at 5:31 PM, Luke Goodrich lgoodr...@becketfund.orgwrote:
Marty,
** **
Thanks for your response. I wish you were right that “virtually all states
will, as would ENDA for federal law, simply carve out a separate ‘religious
organizations’
I can imagine at least two grounds on which the use of the park for the
baptism could be prohibited without raising serious legal question:
1. I suspect that the river or stream or pond in the park is not generally
open to the public for immersion or swimming -- and if so, prohibiting the
Not sure how you can disagree with me, Marci, when I haven't yet articulated
my views! (I've only predicted that the current Court would rule against
the State -- which I assume most here would agree is not a very
controversial prognostication.)
On the merits, two questions: Is it an EC
Now that all the briefs are in except Doug's reply -- see
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/preview_home/10-553.html -- I was
wondering if anyone has any reactions, in particular whether anyone's views
have changed by virtue of the briefs. I haven't seen much discussion online
lately.
in a traditional public forum?
** **
Eugene
** **
On Mon, Aug 15, 2011 at 8:07 AM, Marty Lederman lederman.ma...@gmail.com
wrote:
I can imagine at least two grounds on which the use of the park for the
baptism could be prohibited without raising serious legal
Paul's Prawfsblawg post is, I think, fairly described as trying to suggest
that the Corbin/Griffin amicus brief (which he praises) does not fairly
reflect the view of most professors who teach Law and Religion, and that,
instead, there is a very different and *nearly unanimous consensus* about
think the Hosanna-Tabor case has been superbly briefed on both sides. I
expect the case will prove quite difficult for the Supreme Court, and will
defy any easy prediction about the outcome or the line-up of Justices.
On Mon, Aug 15, 2011 at 11:15 AM, Marty Lederman lederman.ma...@gmail.com
And how would the school explain to six-year-old students why the school is
open to such uses only on Sundays; and why, just coincidently, the
overwhelmingly predominant uses of the school are for Christian religious
services?
Don't get me wrong -- this doesn't mean that I necessary think there
What if, as is likely the case, New York's purpose in opening its schools
for private uses on Sundays is not to encourage a diversity of views from
private speakers, but instead simply to generate income, whether the uses
are for speech or otherwise?
On Mon, Aug 15, 2011 at 12:43 PM, Volokh,
household is that schools can be rented whenever not in
use. They are less frequently in use on sundays, but lots of schools can be
rented on Saturday or Friday nights.
Marc
*From*: Marty Lederman [mailto:lederman.ma...@gmail.com]
*Sent*: Monday, August 15, 2011 12:54 PM
*To*: Law Religion
.
** **
Eugene
** **
*From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *Marty Lederman
*Sent:* Monday, August 15, 2011 9:53 AM
*To:* Law Religion issues for Law Academics
*Subject:* Re: Establishment Clause, equal access
Rick: I'm not exactly sure whether you mean to suggest that Hosanna-Tabor
itself is an example of your second sort of case, i.e., as involving
something the state lacks the power to regulate.
I think we would all agree with you that, at least without more, the state
lacks the power to tell a
School
P.O. Box 780
Notre Dame, IN 46556-0780
574-631-6981 (office)
574-631-4197 (fax)
--
*From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Marty Lederman [
lederman.ma...@gmail.com]
*Sent:* Tuesday, August 16, 2011 5
*Hosanna-Tabor* is not a run-of-the-mill ministerial exception case; and
because of that, it raises a question that I was hoping others on the list
could address.
The much more common type of ME case, with which we're all familiar,
involves a dispute about *whether* the church or organization in
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/
Mirror of Justice http://www.mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/
Law, Religion, and Ethics http://lawreligionethics.net/
** **
*From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *Marty Lederman
*Sent
to the core of religious freedom and identity, as the most narrow
understanding of the ministerial exception clearly does, require
constitutional protection.
Alan
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu]
On Behalf Of Marty Lederman [lederman.ma
Thanks, Ted. But just to be clear on a terminological point -- I don't
think centrality is the right way to think about it (or characterize it),
not least because the state is incapable of making such assessments of
centrality, and also because RFRA now expressly excludes such an inquiry.
I
What Chip and I -- see my Mirror of Justice post here:
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2012/02/a-question-from-marty-lederman.html
--
have been trying to get at is that the state should not simply accept *as
a given* that the College’s sincerely held religious beliefs
Well, if Alan is right that there is a substantial burden every time tax
dollars are used by the state on something proscribed by someone's
religion, then the substantial burden component of RFRA is simply an
empty vessel -- or, in any event, it will be satisfied regularly in
countless ordinary
...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *Marty Lederman
*Sent:* Tuesday, February 14, 2012 9:18 AM
*To:* Walsh, Kevin
*Cc:* Law Religion issues for Law Academics; Crowley, Donald;
conlawp...@lists.ucla.edu
*Subject:* Re: RFRA substantial burden analysis
** **
What Chip and I -- see my Mirror of Justice
Perhaps a topic worthy of its own dedicated thread: The phenomenon is
hardly unique to the evangelical movement. Doug is of course correct that
there are many lawyers and others, evangelical or otherwise, who do great
work on behalf of religious liberty for all. I am increasingly
concerned,
the Maccabiah Games feature only Jewish athletes.
Nope. See http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-332,00.html
It's open to all Israeli citizens without regard to religion, and to Jews
who are not citizens (presumably because they have an automatic right of
citizenship, although I don't
Can anyone point me to a good, thorough account of what happened in
Minneapolis, including (i) the explanations, if any, the cabbies offered
for why the lack of the exemption burdened their religious exercise (did it
mean they were unable to accept work as other forms of common carriers,
such as
(work fax)
mfailin...@hamline.edu (email)
Marty Lederman lederman.ma...@gmail.com 3/7/2012 5:35 AM
Can anyone point me to a good, thorough account of what happened in
Minneapolis, including (i) the explanations, if any, the cabbies offered
for why the lack of the exemption burdened
sorry about that -- wrong address!
On Thu, Mar 8, 2012 at 9:01 AM, Marty Lederman lederman.ma...@gmail.comwrote:
I had a couple of questions about Section 7 students. Thanks
___
To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
To subscribe
Thanks, Marie. Does anyone have a copy of the fatwa, or the alternative
interpretations?
On Mon, Mar 12, 2012 at 12:05 PM, Marie A. Failinger
mfailin...@gw.hamline.edu wrote:
Here is what I have learned about the Minneapolis cab controversy.
According to the civil rights leader I spoke
Just a slight emendation to Doug's post, with which I think he'll agree:
Yes, virtually every Justice has concluded that religious accommodations
*can be* constitutional, at least if they alleviate significant
state-imposed burdens on religious exercise, as the Ohio prison
accommodation would
The Conference of Catholic Bishops just issued this major Statement on
Religious Liberty:
http://usccb.org/issues-and-action/religious-liberty/upload/Our_First_Most_Cherished_Liberty.pdf
I'd be curious to hear what others think of it. Its basic thrust is that
religious liberty is now acutely
in the nineteenth century. If religious freedom becomes
a partisan issue, its future is sure to grow dimmer, not brighter.
Religious liberty, absolutely. Partisan politics, no.
On Fri, Apr 13, 2012 at 6:47 AM, Marty Lederman lederman.ma...@gmail.comwrote:
The Conference of Catholic Bishops just issued
I think there's rough consensus here:
Decisions such as Amos, Texas Monthly and Cutter establish that an effort
to alleviate a substantial *state-imposed* burden on religious exercise --
as RFRA and RLUIPA do by terms -- is not the sort of impermissible
religious purpose or objective that has
www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Published/111448.P.pdf
A South Carolina school district set up a Zorach-like release time program
for religious instruction at an unaccedited religious school. Then it
decided to give the participating students *academic credit* for their
purely religious studies in
-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *Marty Lederman
*Sent:* Saturday, June 30, 2012 9:58 AM
*To:* Law Religion issues for Law Academics
*Subject:* Providing public school credits for release-time religious
classes
** **
www.ca4.uscourts.gov
...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *Marty Lederman
*Sent:* Saturday, June 30, 2012 9:58 AM
*To:* Law Religion issues for Law Academics
*Subject:* Providing public school credits for release-time religious
classes
www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Published/111448.P.pdf
A South Carolina school
school to award me credits for those late afternoon and Sunday classes?
On Sat, Jun 30, 2012 at 10:47 AM, Marty Lederman
lederman.ma...@gmail.comwrote:
Rick,
The statute says that the school district must use secular criteria to
determine whether the release time education qualifies for credits
, Jun 30, 2012 at 10:47 AM, Marty Lederman
lederman.ma...@gmail.comwrote:
Rick,
The statute says that the school district must use secular criteria to
determine whether the release time education qualifies for credits, but
those criteria have nothing to do with fulfillment of any of the secular
Oh, sure. If a school counts credits for graduation purposes based on
total hours spent in any school -- such that it gives credit for the
student's outside courses in pottery, Pilades, drivers' education, SAT
test-taking, etc. -- then of course it should not, and need not,
discriminate against
an academic
perspective. Sounds to me like it is potentially watering down the 3Rs
Marci
On Jun 30, 2012, at 11:11 AM, Marty Lederman lederman.ma...@gmail.com wrote:
I should add that, wholly apart from whether the particular Spartanburg
Bible School class was in any way
Actually, I don't think Paul's comment is a one-liner -- the fact that
this decision comes from Germany is surely the most striking and
disconcerting -- and important -- thing about it.
As far as analysis is concerned, well, how could there be a correct
answer? I think we can all agree that such
Chip writes that under our tradition (without regard to religious
liberty), the state has the burden of proof that a practice is abusive.
So, when reasonable people can and do differ about the social, medical, or
hygienic benefits of a practice --as is obviously the case with infant male
Eugene's tattoo example is very helpful for teeing up what has seemed to me
to be the important distinction here (one I've tried to stress in my
earlier posts):
I think one big reason that most of us, unlike Eugene, are opposed to an
anti-circumcision law is because most men who were circumcised
Eugene: Without regard to what adult subjects generally think of the
procedure having been done (or not done) to them? Shouldn't we defer to
parents at least until such time as there are many adults who are outraged
that the state didn't step in?
On Fri, Jul 6, 2012 at 6:19 PM, Volokh, Eugene
Perry: very helpful. Would you add this as a third category?: if the state
demonstrates that many (most) adult men regret their parents' decision to
circumcise. It's if and when that ever happens -- not before -- that this will
seem like a difficult question.
Sent from my iPhone
On Jul
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2012/07/when-would-it-no-longer-be-too-soon-for.html
On Sun, Jul 1, 2012 at 11:09 AM, Eric Rassbach erassb...@becketfund.orgwrote:
I'd be interested to know what the list thinks about the reasoning of the
recent decision by a state appeals court in Cologne holding
working link to opinions:
better link:
www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?submit=showbrshofile=10-2922_004.pdf
On Tue, Jul 24, 2012 at 2:32 PM, Conkle, Daniel O. con...@indiana.eduwrote:
In a decision announced yesterday, the en banc 7th Circuit has ruled,
7-3, that a public school
http://www.haaretz.com/jewish-world/jewish-world-news/complaint-filed-against-israeli-rabbi-in-germany-for-carrying-out-circumcision.premium-1.459792
___
To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
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According to the NYT (
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/27/science/benefits-of-circumcision-outweigh-risks-pediatric-group-says.html?_r=1hp
):
In Europe, a government ethics committee in Germany last week overruled a
court
Excuse me if this is already well-known. I thought it was quite striking
in light of the current religious composition of the Court.
Was just reading through AG Francis Biddle's autobiography and happened
upon this fascinating anecdote: While Jim Byrnes was on *de facto *leave
from the Court to
Strikingly, the court rejects the RFRA claim on the ground that there is no
substantial burden. The key reasoning, some of which might also be
relevant to several other sorts of cases (e.g., landlord cases) in which
the religious burden theory is that the provision of funds or services
...@lists.ucla.edu] on behalf of Marty Lederman [
lederman.ma...@gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, September 29, 2012 8:43 PM
To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Re: Court Rejects Religious Liberty Challenges To ACA Mandate
Strikingly, the court rejects the RFRA claim on the ground
My post bounced, apparently because of the number of recipients! Resending
without so many cc's. Sorry for any duplicate receipts.
On Sun, Sep 30, 2012 at 12:52 PM, Marty Lederman
lederman.ma...@gmail.comwrote:
For what it's worth, at our Georgetown Conference on this issue last week
a Quaker being required to enter into contracts with gun
dealers for provision of guns to his or her employees. Beyond the question
of directness, a contract is an agreement; contract is about assent.
** **
Mark
** **
*From:* Marty Lederman [mailto:lederman.ma...@gmail.com]
*Sent
Rob's thoughts are well worth reading -- he puts his finger on a bunch of
questions that are sure to be central to these cases going forward.
One caveat on the equivalence point raised by Rob and Rick:
To the extent the court is rejecting a proximate cooperation with evil
theory of substantial
** **
Blogs:
** **
Prawfsblawg http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/
Mirror of Justice http://www.mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/
** **
*From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *Marty Lederman
*Sent:* Monday, October
.
Marci A. Hamilton
Paul R. Verkuil Chair in Public Law
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law
Yeshiva University
55 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10003
(212) 790-0215
hamilto...@aol.com
-Original Message-
From: Marty Lederman lederman.ma...@gmail.com
To: Law Religion issues for Law
, including the morning-after and week-after pills that the
employer believes sometimes kill human beings. The employer contracts for
those services and pays for those services, and these employers say they
cannot in conscience do those things.
On Mon, 1 Oct 2012 19:46:50 -0400
Marty Lederman
Very helpful, thanks Doug (and Shruti). I suppose that, had the drafters
of RFRA (and/or RLUIPA, which also amended RFRA) foreseen the confusion,
the statute could and should have been amended to say something such as
assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and
obtain
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