Re: [SC-L] Re: Application Insecurity --- Who is at Fault?

2005-04-14 Thread Michael Silk
I don't think that analogy quite fits :) If the 'grunts' aren't doing their job, then yes - let's blame them. Or at least help them find ways to do it better. -- Michael [Ed. Let's consider this the end of the thread, please. Unless someone wants to say something that is directly relevant to

Re: [SC-L] Re: Application Insecurity --- Who is at Fault?

2005-04-14 Thread Dave Paris
Michael Silk wrote: I don't think that analogy quite fits :) If the 'grunts' aren't doing their job, then yes - let's blame them. Or at least help them find ways to do it better. If they're not doing their job, no need to blame them - they're critically injured, captured, or dead. ...or in the

Re: [SC-L] Re: Application Insecurity --- Who is at Fault?

2005-04-13 Thread Michael Silk
On 4/13/05, der Mouse [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I would question you if you suggested to me that you always assume to _NOT_ include 'security' and only _DO_ include security if someone asks. Security is not a single thing that is included or omitted. Again, in my experience that is not

Re: [SC-L] Re: Application Insecurity --- Who is at Fault?

2005-04-13 Thread Dave Paris
So you blame the grunts in the trenches if you lose the war? I mean, that thinking worked out so well with Vietnam and all... ;-) regards, -dsp I couldn't agree more! This is my whole point. Security isn't 'one thing', but it seems the original article [that started this discussion] implied that

Re: [SC-L] Re: Application Insecurity --- Who is at Fault?

2005-04-12 Thread der Mouse
The programmer is neither the application architect nor the system engineer. In some cases he is. Either way, it doesn't matter. I'm not asking the programmer to re-design the application, I'm asking them to just program the design 'correctly' rather than 'with bugs' Except that sometimes

Re: [SC-L] Re: Application Insecurity --- Who is at Fault?

2005-04-12 Thread ljknews
At 4:21 PM -0400 4/11/05, Dave Paris wrote: Joel Kamentz wrote: Re: bridges and stuff. I'm tempted to argue (though not with certainty) that it seems that the bridge analogy is flawed in another way -- that of the environment. While many programming languages have similarities and many

Re: [SC-L] Re: Application Insecurity --- Who is at Fault?

2005-04-12 Thread der Mouse
I would question you if you suggested to me that you always assume to _NOT_ include 'security' and only _DO_ include security if someone asks. Security is not a single thing that is included or omitted. Again, in my experience that is not true. Programs that are labelled 'Secure' vs

Re: [SC-L] Re: Application Insecurity --- Who is at Fault?

2005-04-11 Thread Dave Paris
Michael Silk wrote: Ed, [...] Back to the bridge or house example, would you allow the builder to leave off 'security' of the structure? Allow them to introduce some design flaws to get it done earlier? Hopefully not ... so why is it allowed for programming? Why can people cut out 'security' ?

RE: [SC-L] Re: Application Insecurity --- Who is at Fault?

2005-04-11 Thread Chris Matthews
Dave Paris wrote: It's also much more likely that the foreman (aka programming manager) told the builder (programmer) to take shortcuts to meet time and budget - rather than the programmer taking it upon themselves to be sloppy and not follow the specifications. I'd note that there is the

Re: [SC-L] Re: Application Insecurity --- Who is at Fault?

2005-04-11 Thread Michael Silk
Dave, On Apr 11, 2005 9:58 PM, Dave Paris [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: The programmer is neither the application architect nor the system engineer. In some cases he is. Either way, it doesn't matter. I'm not asking the programmer to re-design the application, I'm asking them to just program the

Re: [SC-L] Re: Application Insecurity --- Who is at Fault?

2005-04-11 Thread Carl G. Alphonce
on Monday April 11, 2005, Damir Rajnovic wrote: On Mon, Apr 11, 2005 at 12:21:30PM +1000, Michael Silk wrote: Back to the bridge or house example, would you allow the builder to leave off 'security' of the structure? Allow them to introduce some design flaws to get it done earlier?

Re: [SC-L] Re: Application Insecurity --- Who is at Fault?

2005-04-11 Thread Dave Aronson
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Re: [SC-L] Re: Application Insecurity --- Who is at Fault?

2005-04-11 Thread Dave Paris
Joel Kamentz wrote: Re: bridges and stuff. I'm tempted to argue (though not with certainty) that it seems that the bridge analogy is flawed in another way -- that of the environment. While many programming languages have similarities and many things apply to all programming, there are many