Re: [SC-L] Functional Correctness

2009-08-24 Thread Cassidy, Colin (GE Infra, Energy)
Brad Andrews Writes: > After all, we can just "implement this maturity model and eliminate > all our security problems, at least in the application, > right?" That > is likely to end up resulting in even more resistance in the future > when management questions why they need to keep spe

Re: [SC-L] NSA comparison of source code analysis tools

2009-09-29 Thread Cassidy, Colin (GE Infra, Energy)
The document properties suggests June 2009, and it's a shame that there isn't much details as we are looking to evaluate 3 of the code analysis tools for our development here. CJC > -Original Message- > From: sc-l-boun...@securecoding.org > [mailto:sc-l-boun...@securecoding.org] On Beha

Re: [SC-L] Provably correct microkernel (seL4)

2009-10-02 Thread Cassidy, Colin (GE Infra, Energy)
I have a few concerns with formal proofs particularly applying them in a non-academic environment (some of which may be my own naïve lack of understanding and my feeble memory of my university years studying formal methods). Firstly whilst the code provably does what you said that it would do, tha

Re: [SC-L] Secure Coding Standards

2008-09-29 Thread Cassidy, Colin (GE Infra, Energy)
Hi, Something you may want to consider is how you plan on rolling this out within your organisation, where I work we have a strong culture of using and following coding standards and guidelines, so rolling out secure coding guidelines was not that difficult. That said we started small with a fe

Re: [SC-L] Security as a part of code quality (Was: Re: Where Does Secure Coding Belong In the Curriculum?)

2009-08-21 Thread Cassidy, Colin (GE Infra, Energy)
Martin Gilje Jaatun wrote: > Karen, Matt & all, > > Goertzel, Karen [USA] wrote: > > I'm more devious. I think what needs to happen is that we > need to redefine what we mean by "functionally correct" or > "quality" code. If determination of functional correctness > were extended from "must o