Re: [sidr] comments on the repository analysis I-D

2013-03-21 Thread Oleg Muravskiy
Hi Christopher, Christopher Morrow wrote: Comment 1 (also related with 44): I agree that ISPs may operate caches in behalf end-users ASNs, but also I think that more than 1 cache may be operated by a single ISP. Imagine a global ASN operator with routers in several places. Are they going to

Re: [sidr] DDoS mitigation example (was: RE: comments on the repository analysis I-D)

2013-03-21 Thread Heather Schiller
..in line.. On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 10:57 PM, Danny McPherson da...@tcb.net wrote: On Mar 20, 2013, at 7:23 PM, Sriram, Kotikalapudi kotikalapudi.sri...@nist.gov wrote: The DDoS mitigation example was discussed before. It appeared there was a reasonable solution. Please see this post:

Re: [sidr] Princeton University:: Impacting IP Address Reachability via RPKI Manipulations

2013-03-21 Thread Shane Amante
On Mar 20, 2013, at 2:35 PM, Murphy, Sandra sandra.mur...@sparta.com wrote: Speaking as regular ol' member That all depends on the policy undertaken by each specific provider, doesn't it? How can you tell the difference between a route with no ROA because the registry has decertified, and a

Re: [sidr] Princeton University:: Impacting IP Address Reachability via RPKI Manipulations

2013-03-21 Thread Shane Amante
On Mar 21, 2013, at 8:36 AM, Randy Bush ra...@psg.com wrote: randy, who is not learning anything else new from this rinse repeat So, you're stating that operator input wrt impacts the RPKI will have on their networks is not useful to SIDR? OK, got it. -shane

Re: [sidr] Princeton University:: Impacting IP Address Reachability via RPKI Manipulations

2013-03-21 Thread Randy Bush
randy, who is not learning anything else new from this rinse repeat So, you're stating that operator input wrt impacts the RPKI will have on their networks is not useful to SIDR? OK, got it. no. i am saying nobody seems to be saying anything that has not already been said. but if you're

Re: [sidr] Princeton University:: Impacting IP Address Reachability via RPKI Manipulations

2013-03-21 Thread Murphy, Sandra
randy, who is not learning anything else new from this rinse repeat So, you're stating that operator input wrt impacts the RPKI will have on their networks is not useful to SIDR? OK, got it. Randy said nothing new, not nothing. --Sandy, speaking as regular ol' member.

Re: [sidr] comments on the repository analysis I-D

2013-03-21 Thread Christopher Morrow
On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 6:09 AM, Oleg Muravskiy o...@ripe.net wrote: Hi Christopher, Christopher Morrow wrote: Comment 1 (also related with 44): I agree that ISPs may operate caches in behalf end-users ASNs, but also I think that more than 1 cache may be operated by a single ISP. Imagine a

Re: [sidr] comments on the repository analysis I-D

2013-03-21 Thread Randy Bush
In our analysis we associate number of CAs in the global RPKI with the number of distinct IP resource holders. sure, and as a proxy for that 'AS Operator', it's not a 1:1 correlation to be sure but it should be reasonably close, no? do we have anything other than conjecture on which to base

Re: [sidr] comments on the repository analysis I-D

2013-03-21 Thread Christopher Morrow
On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 11:43 AM, Randy Bush ra...@psg.com wrote: In our analysis we associate number of CAs in the global RPKI with the number of distinct IP resource holders. sure, and as a proxy for that 'AS Operator', it's not a 1:1 correlation to be sure but it should be reasonably close,

Re: [sidr] DDoS mitigation example (was: RE: comments on the repository analysis I-D)

2013-03-21 Thread joel jaeggli
On 3/20/13 7:57 PM, Danny McPherson wrote: On Mar 20, 2013, at 7:23 PM, Sriram, Kotikalapudi kotikalapudi.sri...@nist.gov wrote: The DDoS mitigation example was discussed before. It appeared there was a reasonable solution. Please see this post:

Re: [sidr] Princeton University:: Impacting IP Address Reachability via RPKI Manipulations

2013-03-21 Thread Sharon Goldberg
Thanks for the interest in our work. We wanted to clarify a few points: -- We have a technical report, which contains motivation and details that the slide deck does not. See http://www.cs.bu.edu/~goldbe/papers/RPKImanip.pdf -- As we point out in the paper (and as John Curran, Carlos, and others

Re: [sidr] comments on the repository analysis I-D

2013-03-21 Thread Randy Bush
I have, a model that says: If you want to publish a ROA, you need to have a CA and you need to run a publication point land this a roa and a CA). Wherever did you get that? what is the ratio of hosted LIRs to delegated today? -- phone email, so sucky

Re: [sidr] comments on the repository analysis I-D

2013-03-21 Thread Christopher Morrow
On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 1:55 PM, Randy Bush ra...@psg.com wrote: I have, a model that says: If you want to publish a ROA, you need to have a CA and you need to run a publication point land this a roa and a CA). Wherever did you get that? I figured in the worst case you'd end up with 1:1... I

Re: [sidr] DDoS mitigation example (was: RE: comments on the repository analysis I-D)

2013-03-21 Thread Danny McPherson
On 2013-03-21 10:45, joel jaeggli wrote: Might work for Joel, not me... That's entirely possible. I was only filtering through my experience as one customer. Yep, I concur, hence my comment :-) We have _lots of customers with varying requirements and capabilities, not that that's in scope

Re: [sidr] comments on the repository analysis I-D

2013-03-21 Thread Stephen Kent
Chris, ...most likely you are not... I think I jump to 'CA == REPO == AS-Operator == ASN allocated' because lacking any direct data otherwise it seems like a good estimation of numbers. Essentially each ASN allocated is going to be a repository that needs to be gathered, right? If there are 10%

Re: [sidr] comments on the repository analysis I-D

2013-03-21 Thread Chris Morrow
On 03/21/2013 04:11 PM, Stephen Kent wrote: Chris, ...most likely you are not... I think I jump to 'CA == REPO == AS-Operator == ASN allocated' because lacking any direct data otherwise it seems like a good estimation of numbers. Essentially each ASN allocated is going to be a repository

Re: [sidr] comments on the repository analysis I-D

2013-03-21 Thread Chris Morrow
On 03/21/2013 04:15 PM, Stephen Kent wrote: Chris, On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 11:43 AM, Randy Bush ra...@psg.com wrote: In our analysis we associate number of CAs in the global RPKI with the number of distinct IP resource holders. sure, and as a proxy for that 'AS Operator', it's not a 1:1

Re: [sidr] comments on the repository analysis I-D

2013-03-21 Thread Christopher Morrow
On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 4:42 PM, Danny McPherson da...@tcb.net wrote: On 2013-03-21 14:29, Chris Morrow wrote: TODAY it reduces the number, yes. 100% agree. TOMORROW the number of repositories, even those which are 'hosted' will be split up by name and/or ip-address... I have a feeling

Re: [sidr] comments on the repository analysis I-D

2013-03-21 Thread Christopher Morrow
On Thu, Mar 21, 2013 at 5:42 PM, Danny McPherson da...@tcb.net wrote: so, to me, this is just 'more objects with a tight(er) timeframe on delivery' right? meaning: today you have (for sake of the conversation) relatively static content in the repository, where data changes 1/2/3

Re: [sidr] comments on the repository analysis I-D

2013-03-21 Thread Danny McPherson
true, but the repository conversation stops at: all gatherers in the system have the data inside each ASN it's really up to the ASN operator to get from gatherer - cache - router in a 'timely fashion'. If you're signing a route with something, and your upstreams are signing their secure

Re: [sidr] comments on the repository analysis I-D

2013-03-21 Thread Randy Bush
So far the 1,300+ folks who have signed up for managed CA services have also let the RIRs manage their pub points, which dramatically reduces the number of repositories. That could change over time, e.g., if these this is measurement TODAY it reduces the number, yes. 100% agree. TOMORROW