[swinog] Sicherheit von SS7 - mit Schweiz-Bezug

t;SS7 access" and "a bunch of global titles". In other words, he wanted a list of phone numbers, belonging to Robert's phone company, which could be used to send queries to other networks in other countries. (…) -- Matthias Leisi Katzenrütistrasse 68, 8153 Rümlang Mobile +4

[swinog] ip-plus.net Nameservers dead?

It looks like ip-plus.net nameservers are dead. ns1 times out, ns2 has no IP. I expect some fallout… — Matthias ___ swinog mailing list -- swinog@lists.swinog.ch To unsubscribe send an email to swinog-le...@lists.swinog.ch

Re: [swinog] Geldspielgesetz: 404 COMLOT renamed to GESPA? (or did they get hacked!?)

> Still of course, no official word about this change... > > Guess that fixing things is easier than communicating :) And the list is still hilariously stupid. It contains interwetten1.com through interwetten10.com , but not

Re: [swinog] SSL Certs question

> I still find it funny that Digicert allows "Org Validated" (OV) certs to be > issued there. That is one of the few business cases that is left (e.g for > bare IP SSL certificates) And it may make sense for S/MIME certs (even though „LE for S/MIME“ is on the horizon, see RFC 8823). —

Re: [swinog] Handling of UCE / RBL while minor misconfigurations

I think Markus misses the main point of the OP. The question of the OP is not whether SPF is a good or bad idea in general. The question is whether its reasonable to add a blacklisting entry for the server IP if you receive a single mail with a non-matching SPF record (ie, server with IP

[swinog] Fwd: [dns-operations] Advisory — D-root is changing its IPv4 address on the 3rd of January.

-- Forwarded message -- From: Jason Castonguay casto...@umd.edu Date: Thu, Dec 13, 2012 at 11:54 PM Subject: [dns-operations] Advisory — D-root is changing its IPv4 address on the 3rd of January. To: casto...@umd.edu -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Advisory —

[swinog] Change of dnswl.org operating model

Hi, As announced earlier, dnswl.org will change it's operating model. Heavy users (defined as those doing 100'000 queries/24 hours on the public nameservers) and vendors of anti-spam products and services will need a paid subscription. We are now ready to implement the model and will gradually

Re: [swinog] Swinog DNSRBL Whitelist

2010/1/26 Mike Kellenberger mike.kellenber...@escapenet.ch: The server in question was 194.11.148.23 (outmail43.swisscom.com). Or does anyone have a list of swisscom outmail servers? dnswl.org has: http://www.dnswl.org/search.pl?s=194.11.148.23 -- Matthias

Re: [swinog] swinog Digest, Vol 60, Issue 1

Things should be back to normal. -- Matthias Am 04.01.10 21:24, schrieb robert.guentensper...@swisscom.com: Hi We're investigating. Cheers Günti -Original Message- From: swinog-boun...@lists.swinog.ch [mailto:swinog-boun...@lists.swinog.ch] On Behalf Of

Re: [swinog] Vorratsdatenspeicherung

2009/7/12 Ihsan Dogan ih...@dogan.ch: Das würde aber schon fast nach einer Initiative schreien. Ging das eigentlich durch den Nationalrat? Ähm, BÜPF/VÜPF sind ganz normal durch die Gesetzgebungsmaschinerie gegangen. Hier geht es im Kern um Art. 5 Abs. 2 BÜPF

Re: [swinog] Post from Canton de Vaud

Oliver Bollisger schrieb: but what is the best method? blocking ip traffic to the site can also mean to block legitimate traffic to a shared hosting server!? Filter the traffic for specific IPs/networks/etc (eg by playing some BGP games) through transparent proxies and redirect forbidden

Re: [swinog] Netclean - news

Fredy Kuenzler schrieb: From http://www.blogg.ch/index.php?/archives/785-Netclean-Whitebox-effektive-Methode-gegen-Kinderpornografie-im-Netz.html Netclean Whitebox funktioniert zweistufig: 1. wird via BGP4 die Liste der verdächtigen IP Adressen in die Routingtabelle eingepflegt. Derzeit

Re: [swinog] The truth about UCEPROTECT-Blocklists

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Peter Keel schrieb: And yes, autoreplies are bad. This also includes out-of-office notifications. If you allow them out to the Internet at large, you're almost as bad as the next pill spammer. Try to explain that to the users at large and

Re: [swinog] dnswl.org ?

Per Jessen wrote: Since such ranges are usually not as trustworthy as /32s of well-respected mailserver operators, dnswl.org lists such ranges with a score of none; for all practical reasons, this should translate into do not greylist, since there is most likely a legitimate mailserver at

Re: AW: AW: AW: [swinog] Whitelist website

Radek Mrskos wrote: Ok, but this is exactly what do not belongs to this list. *.mail.ru (many others also) is a spamer domain. If the postmaster of *.rr.com, *.net.br, *.com.br calls you to enter his ranges, will you enter it? 194.67.23.0/24 does not equal the full set of *.mail.ru

Re: AW: [swinog] Whitelist website

Of course, but you got the hostname wrong. It's http://dnswl.swinog.ch aka http://antispam.imp.ch/swinog-dnsrbl-whitelist But not only Swiss Mailservers, this would be a bit useless :-) And of course there is also dnswl.org ;-) [Note that dnswl.org data also includes the Swinog whitelist,

Re: [swinog] Mail server - Unix

Jeroen Massar wrote: dns was not really questioned, but I would prefer djbdns (+patches, again) or bind. Patches, patches, patches. Bind9 is fine (and actually what I usually use) but pdnsnds are simply faster, thus for scalability I would go for those, then again it depends on ones

Re: [swinog] Providers supporting TLS (for SMTP, POP, IMAP, ...)?

Daniel Lorch wrote: Are you sure? Isn't that exactly the point of asymmetric cryptography? The way I see it, TLS and SSL work like this (analogous to PGP): You're almost right. 1. The client connects to the server and obtains the server's public key. The public key is a mathematical

[swinog] Providers supporting TLS (for SMTP, POP, IMAP, ...)?

Hi all, The subject says it all: do you know which providers support TLS (the technology formerly known as SSL) for SMTP, POP and/or IMAP for their residential or small-office dialup/broadband customers? If you are a provider yourself and you do not offer it: Are there particular reasons? Is it

Re: [swinog] Bluewin MX - mail-fwd.mx.hostcenter.com

SMAIL SMTP-Send MX = mail-fwd.mx.hostcenter.com. SMTP = mhs.ch From = [EMAIL PROTECTED] To = HIDDEN Failed ! SMTP-Error = 451 Exhausted MX records for domain HIDDEN Seen here as well for a handful of domains, but not all transactions through mail-fwd.mx.hostcenter.com are to be affected.