intrigeri:
anonym and I have made great progress on this front, and we would like
feedback from you folks regarding the state of our current reasoning
and preferred design:
https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/5462
https://tails.boum.org/blueprint/persistent_Tor_state/
In particular,
Hi,
anonym wrote (16 Jun 2015 13:11:47 GMT) :
On 06/15/2015 07:09 PM, Alan wrote:
The 1st drawback: If the attacker records that someone has been
using a given Entry Guard at a given location in the past, and then
someone uses the same Entry Guard at the same location, then there are
chances
Hi,
anonym wrote (16 Jun 2015 13:11:44 GMT) :
On 05/21/2015 05:38 PM, sajolida wrote:
So would it then make sense to hash:
hash(Tails device secret, N bits of gateway MAC, SSID)
Of course, I'm simplifying here to Wi-Fi only as there is no notion of
SSID with wired connections. But you
On 05/21/2015 05:38 PM, sajolida wrote:
intrigeri:
anonym and I have made great progress on this front, and we would like
feedback from you folks regarding the state of our current reasoning
and preferred design:
https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/5462
On 06/15/2015 07:09 PM, Alan wrote:
The 1st drawback: If the attacker records that someone has been
using a given Entry Guard at a given location in the past, and then
someone uses the same Entry Guard at the same location, then there are
chances that it's the same person who is back to that
Hi,
anonym and I have made great progress on this front, and we would like
feedback from you folks regarding the state of our current reasoning
and preferred design:
https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/5462
https://tails.boum.org/blueprint/persistent_Tor_state/
I've read through
Hi,
anonym and I have made great progress on this front, and we would like
feedback from you folks regarding the state of our current reasoning
and preferred design:
https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/5462
https://tails.boum.org/blueprint/persistent_Tor_state/
In particular, the Drawbacks
