[tor-relays] Lots of dropped onion skins

2022-10-07 Thread Jonathan D. Proulx
HI All, I was checkign up on my (middle) relay stats: https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#details/9715C81BA8C5B0C698882035F75C67D6D643DBE3 and saw an "overload" banner, after some learning I see lots of onionskins being dropped in the metrics:

Re: [tor-relays] Current state of HSDir attacks on hidden services

2018-12-13 Thread Jonathan D. Proulx
Thanks Roger, That helped a lot. The big piece I was missing was that hiddenservices are on v3 now (clearly I've not been paying attention here). And I misunderstood HSDirs thinking they were in the data path not just the look up so could collude on traffic timing. I guess lookups are part of

Re: [tor-relays] A vote for the amateur relay operator

2018-09-13 Thread Jonathan D. Proulx
On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 04:00:06PM +, to...@protonmail.com wrote: :Maybe I'm not a "real" relay operator for this one, but I think that's okay; I'm contributing to OS diversity, and a new exit relay. You're definitely a real operator. The primary difficulty in being an operator is exposing

Re: [tor-relays] freebsd port 80 and 443

2018-02-14 Thread Jonathan D. Proulx
On Wed, Feb 14, 2018 at 05:39:17PM +0100, TorGate wrote: : Hi to all, : : question: i have testet a config with ORPort 443 and dirport 80, hm but : there are a permission issue with freebsd. : : On my testsystem is no http installed, : : Can i only install tor on freebsd with orport 9001

Re: [tor-relays] companies and organizations running relays

2017-12-06 Thread Jonathan D. Proulx
MIT CSAIL has operated an exit for many years, longer than there's been CSAIL actually started as a pet project of min in (now defunct) AI Lab. At this point it has grown some level of officialness. -Jon On Tue, Dec 05, 2017 at 07:03:00PM +, Alison Macrina wrote: :Hi all, : :Phoul and I

Re: [tor-relays] Individual Operator Exit Probability Threshold

2017-09-25 Thread Jonathan D. Proulx
On Sat, Sep 23, 2017 at 02:36:00PM +, Duncan wrote: :Hi Jonathan, : :Jonathan Proulx: :> :> To the initial question for a honest operator who's open about their :> ownership and enters proper family membership data I can't see how :> more exit volume is a problem. TOR needs to be resilient

Re: [tor-relays] Fwd: Your TOR relay

2017-08-08 Thread Jonathan D. Proulx
As a general comment I try and assume the best of everyone on the mailing list and the worst of everyone in actual practice... When offering sensitive anonymization services it's best to take the opposite view of yourself. Operate with the best intentions but seriously think about what harm you

[tor-relays] Operating system diversity?

2014-06-17 Thread Jonathan D. Proulx
Hi All, In the recent thread relating to Debian relay Puppet modules it was suggested that a greater diversity of operating systems in tor nodes wooudl be preferable. I'm not sure if this was meant as a technical or aesthetic preference, but I am curious. Is there any technical benefit to

Re: [tor-relays] relays in the cloud

2013-10-02 Thread Jonathan D. Proulx
On Tue, Oct 01, 2013 at 04:35:15PM -0700, Andy Isaacson wrote: :In summary, it seems likely that IaaS is pwned wholesale. Colo hardware :is somewhat more expensive to attack and possibly succeeds in raising :the bar from software to attacker has to roll a truck to pwn me, :which is my current

[tor-relays] relays in the cloud

2013-10-01 Thread Jonathan D. Proulx
Hi All, There must be discussion of this I'm not finding so references to that are welcomed. As I understand it there are three risk layers in each Tor node: 1) The node operator (who has r00t) 2) The data center (who has net) 3) The legal jurisdiction I've recently started running a couple

[tor-relays] (Re)Introduction

2013-09-29 Thread Jonathan D. Proulx
Hi All, It's been quite a while since I've been active in TOR, but recent events have reminded me I should be doing more. To that end I've started running a Fast Exit again: racktor fingerprint: 8B7D6BFF6AE63BE39E438FE7A4249FEA1A340EBD This is running in the Rackspace public cloud (Chicago