Re: [tor-relays] Please help us find a working alternative to using MaxMind's GeoLite2 databases

On 2020-02-12 16:05, Karsten Loesing wrote: > Hi relay operators, > > as you might have heard, MaxMind has changed access and use of their > GeoLite2 databases: > > https://blog.maxmind.com/2019/12/18/significant-changes-to-accessing-and-using-geolite2-databases/ > &

[tor-relays] Please help us find a working alternative to using MaxMind's GeoLite2 databases

Hi relay operators, as you might have heard, MaxMind has changed access and use of their GeoLite2 databases: https://blog.maxmind.com/2019/12/18/significant-changes-to-accessing-and-using-geolite2-databases/ This affects Onionoo and tor, and I'm trying to find a working alternative on the

[tor-relays] ExoneraTor results may be incomplete between April 25 and 30, 2019 and during other periods

Hello relay operators, it turns out that our exit scanner had an issue between April 25 and 29, 2019 and that ExoneraTor results may be incomplete during this time. Some context, taken from the ExoneraTor page: https://metrics.torproject.org/exonerator.html "The ExoneraTor service maintains a

[tor-relays] [release] ExoneraTor 4.0.0

Good evening, today we released and deployed version 4.0.0 [0] of the ExoneraTor service [1]. This new version greatly reduces database size and variance of query response times. Changes in this version are heavily based on work done by Sebastian Hahn. Earlier ExoneraTor databases can be

Re: [tor-relays] Onionoo protocol broken?

On 2018-08-14 00:57, nusenu wrote: > > even though there is no sign of it in the list of versions > https://metrics.torproject.org/onionoo.html#versions > they deployed the fix Yep, the fix is deployed. (The reason why it's not listed in the protocol versions is that the release has not

Re: [tor-relays] Help us get recent cached consensuses from your relay

On 2018-08-06 16:41, Roger Dingledine wrote: > On Mon, Aug 06, 2018 at 09:07:32PM +1000, teor wrote: >> We???re now looking for a few more operators who have more than: >> >> 70 document-type consensus >> >> So that we have a few redundant copies. > > moria1 reported 86. I've put the tarball

Re: [tor-relays] Publishing bridge contact information

On 2018-03-04 23:26, Roger Dingledine wrote: > On Tue, Feb 20, 2018 at 05:51:44PM +0100, Karsten Loesing wrote: >> FWIW, we collected all feedback from this thread, discussed this change >> in the metrics team, and forwarded our planned change to the Tor >> Research Safety Bo

Re: [tor-relays] Publishing bridge contact information

On 2018-02-07 17:45, Karsten Loesing wrote: > We're now considering to drop one step in the sanitizing step, which is > to remove contact information. The result would be that we'd keep > contact information in sanitized descriptors in the exact same way as > the bridge

Re: [tor-relays] Publishing bridge contact information

On 2018-02-12 11:19, Alexander Dietrich wrote: > On 2018-02-11 00:43, nusenu wrote: > >> - we could tell operators that running obfs3 and obfs4 is a bad idea > > Are you saying obfs3 and obfs4 shouldn't run simultaneously on the same > bridge? That would be good to know indeed. Citing from the

Re: [tor-relays] Publishing bridge contact information

On 2018-02-12 11:39, nusenu wrote: > Once the decision has been made to publish contactInfo, people with > access to the current contactInfo (bridgeDB, isis?) should sent current > bridge operators > a pre-notice about the upcoming change so they have a chance to react to it. > > I assume you

Re: [tor-relays] Publishing bridge contact information

On 2018-02-11 00:43, nusenu wrote: >> Possible advantages are: >> - Relay Search would support searching for bridges by contact information. >> - People who keep a watching eye on the Tor network could reach out to >> bridge operators to inform them that they're running an outdated tor/PT >>

Re: [tor-relays] Publishing bridge contact information

On 2018-02-08 19:48, to...@protonmail.com wrote: > Whatever you decide, I think you should have this mentioned in the setup docs > for bridges. We have the following explanation in the manual: "Administrative contact information for this relay or bridge. This line can be used to contact you if

Re: [tor-relays] Publishing bridge contact information

On 2018-02-08 12:19, nusenu wrote: > >> Possible advantages are: > > another advantage I can come up with: > we will be able to analyze bridge shares (if most have contactInfo set), > meaning > is one or two entity running all bridges? How many operators are there? > > Obviously you could also

Re: [tor-relays] Publishing bridge contact information

On 2018-02-08 10:54, Sebastian Hahn wrote: > Hi there, Hello! > I don't want to declare it a showstopper outright, but: > >> On 8. Feb 2018, at 09:42, Karsten Loesing <kars...@torproject.org> wrote: >> >> These sound like variants of the first disadvanta

Re: [tor-relays] Publishing bridge contact information

On 2018-02-07 19:37, Sebastian Hahn wrote: > >> On 7. Feb 2018, at 18:55, Geoff Down <geoffd...@fastmail.net> wrote: >> >> >> >> On Wed, Feb 7, 2018, at 4:45 PM, Karsten Loesing wrote: >> >>> Possible disadvantages are: >>> - If

[tor-relays] Publishing bridge contact information

Hello relay and/or bridge operators, you might already know this: we're publishing sanitized versions of bridge descriptors on Tor Metrics. https://metrics.torproject.org/collector.html#bridge-descriptors We're using these sanitized descriptors to visualize interesting facts about Tor bridges,

Re: [tor-relays] Relay not listed in atlas

On 2018-01-09 19:18, Fabian A. Santiago wrote: > On January 9, 2018 8:29:50 AM EST, "Fabian A. Santiago" > wrote: >> One of my relays is no longer listed in atlas. I'm curious why and how >> can I go about examining the issue? It had been running for several >> weeks

Re: [tor-relays] Testing Golang relay implementation

On 2017-10-26 00:09, teor wrote: > On 26 Oct 2017, at 06:58, Michael McLoughlin > wrote: >> I can easily change the descriptor if necessary? > > As long as it conforms to the spec, it's fine. Agreed. FWIW, the descriptor published by this

Re: [tor-relays] Stats not updated for several days?

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Hi everyone, can you check once again? There was a problem with the data-collecting service that silently died on October 30 at around 23:00 UTC. I have been working on that problem for an hour or two, and it should be resolved by now. Please

Re: [tor-relays] New tor relay not showing up on Atlas

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 01/09/16 04:33, teor wrote: > >> On 1 Sep 2016, at 12:07, Marina Brown >> wrote: >> >> Hi All: >> >> I've set up a new relay and it is not showing up on Atlas. This >> is the Log output. >> >> Sep 01 03:52:27.000

Re: [tor-relays] ExoneraTor down

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 18/08/16 12:46, Ralph Seichter wrote: > On 18.08.2016 09:05, Karsten Loesing wrote: > >> It's back now! > > The encoding of https://exonerator.torproject.org/ is not correct, > however, at least not for the German loca

Re: [tor-relays] ExoneraTor down

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 17/08/16 17:19, Peter Palfrader wrote: > On Wed, 17 Aug 2016, Alexander Dietrich wrote: > >> I just tried to use ExoneraTor, but it seems to be down: >> https://exonerator.torproject.org/ > > There is some database maintenance going on. It

Re: [tor-relays] Tor Weather has been discontinued

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 05/04/16 06:00, Markus Koch wrote: > Any chance I could *buy* some t-shirts? I am running 4 tor middles > nodes atm and 2 exit nodes coming soon and I would kill for some > t-shirts. Just in case nobody reached out to you yet, please get in

Re: [tor-relays] Tor Weather has been discontinued

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Hi Eran, On 04/04/16 17:31, Eran Sandler wrote: > So, I was also thinking about basing a new system off of onionoo. Sounds great. I'm happy to help with this effort by implementing any missing Onionoo features that are needed to build a

[tor-relays] Who operates the bridge with nickname antirio?

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Hi everyone, does anybody here know who operates the bridge with nickname antirio? https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/16609212922F6F1077A1BBA299709E19F9A3FB65 I'm asking, because that bridge has a nice distribution of IPv4 and IPv6 clients:

Re: [tor-relays] Should Onionoo consider relays with the same ip# to be part of the same family?

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 [Removing metrics-team@ to avoid cross posting.] On 28/01/16 21:22, Tim Wilson-Brown - teor wrote: > >> On 29 Jan 2016, at 07:20, Roman Mamedov wrote: >> >> On Fri, 29 Jan 2016 06:33:51 +1100 Tim Wilson-Brown - teor >>

Re: [tor-relays] Onionoo down?

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 The host ran out of free inodes, I sent a request to admins to make more inodes available. It might take another 12 or 24 hours until the service is back. Sorry for the inconvenience. On 03/10/15 12:02, Tim Wilson-Brown - teor wrote: > >> On 3

Re: [tor-relays] Simplifying ExoneraTor

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 17/07/15 18:17, Karsten Loesing wrote: On 17/07/15 18:13, Karsten Loesing wrote: On 17/07/15 14:58, Joshua Lee Tucker wrote: Hi Karsten, thanks for the feedback. Hi Joshua, I've updated the copy on my webserver (http://tucker.wales/tor

Re: [tor-relays] Simplifying ExoneraTor

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 20/07/15 11:40, Pascal Terjan wrote: On 2 July 2015 at 10:45, Joshua Lee Tucker josh@tucker.wales wrote Hash: SHA256 Hi Karsten, I've made a patch to the page to add the HTML5 date components - it should work nicely across the majority of

Re: [tor-relays] Simplifying ExoneraTor

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 20/07/15 11:36, Joshua Lee Tucker wrote: Hi Karsten, And there's another problem: we broke the print output, which is quite important here. I just reverted this change to make the print output usable again. If you can come up with a fix to

Re: [tor-relays] Simplifying ExoneraTor

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 20/07/15 16:36, Joshua Lee Tucker wrote: Hi Karsten, The issue with the hard-coded 180 (or 200) pixels remains though. Do you have any idea how to fix that? (Or does it look good for you and you have no idea what I'm talking about?) I

Re: [tor-relays] Simplifying ExoneraTor

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 16/07/15 23:16, Joshua Lee Tucker wrote: Hi guys, Hello Joshua, I've made some simple (improvements?) changes to the ExoneraTor page - I've basically made the about section a sticky footer (no JS) and spaced the content a little better. I've

Re: [tor-relays] Simplifying ExoneraTor

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 17/07/15 14:58, Joshua Lee Tucker wrote: Hi Karsten, thanks for the feedback. Hi Joshua, I've updated the copy on my webserver (http://tucker.wales/tor/exonerator/) to clean up the markup a little (I rushed the previous version out at 3AM).

Re: [tor-relays] Simplifying ExoneraTor

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 17/07/15 18:13, Karsten Loesing wrote: On 17/07/15 14:58, Joshua Lee Tucker wrote: Hi Karsten, thanks for the feedback. Hi Joshua, I've updated the copy on my webserver (http://tucker.wales/tor/exonerator/) to clean up the markup

Re: [tor-relays] Simplifying ExoneraTor

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 14/07/15 23:44, Jens Kubieziel wrote: * Karsten Loesing schrieb am 2015-07-14 um 16:05 Uhr: https://exonerator.torproject.org/ - Could give a better explanation than summary.invalidparams.invalidip.body when a non-IP address was entered

Re: [tor-relays] Simplifying ExoneraTor

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 02/07/15 09:40, Karsten Loesing wrote: https://people.torproject.org/~karsten/volatile/exonerator-mockup/ The main idea behind this redesign was to simplify the existing ExoneraTor service by omitting technical details (e.g., Tor descriptor

Re: [tor-relays] Simplifying ExoneraTor

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 08/07/15 08:56, josh@tucker.wales wrote: On 8 Jul 2015, at 04:56, Zack Weinberg za...@cmu.edu wrote: I may have gotten this project mixed up with the one that is replacing Atlas/Onionoo, for which a dashboard showing the relay's status at the

Re: [tor-relays] Simplifying ExoneraTor

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 07/07/15 17:40, Zack Weinberg wrote: On Tue, Jul 7, 2015 at 10:19 AM, Joshua Lee Tucker josh@tucker.wales wrote: I personally don't like displaying the ports in the overview page - I would also much rather have this information displayed in a

Re: [tor-relays] Simplifying ExoneraTor

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 07/07/15 03:45, teor wrote: On 7 Jul 2015, at 09:46 , josh@tucker.wales wrote: From the perspective of someone investigating abuse, I think it's important that 'not an exit relay' means 'not capable of exiting on any port at all'. Ergo I

Re: [tor-relays] Simplifying ExoneraTor

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 07/07/15 16:19, Joshua Lee Tucker wrote: On 7/7/15, teor teor2...@gmail.com wrote: Organisation X experiences an attack on their website via an IP address, and they want to identify the origin of the attack. Exonerator tells them that the IP

Re: [tor-relays] Simplifying ExoneraTor

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 06/07/15 00:31, Geoff Down wrote: On Sun, Jul 5, 2015, at 02:26 PM, Karsten Loesing wrote: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 05/07/15 14:20, teor wrote: On 5 Jul 2015, at 19:37 , Karsten Loesing kars...@torproject.org

Re: [tor-relays] Simplifying ExoneraTor

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 04/07/15 10:55, David Serrano wrote: On 2015-07-02 09:40:31 (+0200), Karsten Loesing wrote: Julius and I have been working on a design mockup for the ExoneraTor service for the past few months and would want to hear what you think about

Re: [tor-relays] Simplifying ExoneraTor

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 05/07/15 14:20, teor wrote: On 5 Jul 2015, at 19:37 , Karsten Loesing kars...@torproject.org wrote: Results: do we really need the Exit: yes column? Seems pretty redundant to me. I think this is answered later in this thread. We should

[tor-relays] Simplifying ExoneraTor

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Hello relay operators, Julius and I have been working on a design mockup for the ExoneraTor service for the past few months and would want to hear what you think about this: https://people.torproject.org/~karsten/volatile/exonerator-mockup/ The

Re: [tor-relays] Simplifying ExoneraTor

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 02/07/15 11:15, Jens Kubieziel wrote: * Karsten Loesing schrieb am 2015-07-02 um 09:40 Uhr: Please take a look at the design mockup, maybe compare it to the existing ExoneraTor service, and let us know your thoughts. - I find the logo 1

Re: [tor-relays] Simplifying ExoneraTor

, Karsten Joshua Lee Tucker On Thu, Jul 2, 2015 at 8:40 AM, Karsten Loesing kars...@torproject.org wrote: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Hello relay operators, Julius and I have been working on a design mockup for the ExoneraTor service for the past few months and would

Re: [tor-relays] Simplifying ExoneraTor

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 02/07/15 11:45, Joshua Lee Tucker wrote: Hi Karsten, I've made a patch to the page to add the HTML5 date components - it should work nicely across the majority of browsers (maybe even all with a plaintext fallback). I wasn't sure exactly

Re: [tor-relays] Why can't I see authorities bandwith stats

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 04/05/15 01:58, Dedalo wrote: I was making some changes in my relay configuration and I made some queries in GLOBE and ATLAS and something happened. I noticed that all authorities are not showing bandwidth stats from the last week and I was

Re: [tor-relays] onionoo backend seems to be down.

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 21/04/15 21:37, Paul Staroch wrote: Hi, Am 2014-08-24 um 02:29 schrieb ja...@icetor.is: Anyone else notice onionoo and the tools that rely on it (globe.torproject.org atlas.torproject.org) seem to be down? -Jason It seems that

Re: [tor-relays] List of longest lived Exits and Relays

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 16/03/15 21:54, grarpamp wrote: Is there a list somewhere (preferably on metrics) of exits and relays sorted by longest period of service (years) on the same IP? Preferably this would subset by exit policy... whether open, or using some

Re: [tor-relays] Strong bumps in traffic with 0.2.6.3

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 20/02/15 15:50, Christian Sturm wrote: I noticed on my Tor relay that deploying 0.2.6.3 resulted in the bandwidth going up an down a lot which can be seen here: https://globe.torproject.org/#/relay/CE75BF0972ADD52AF8807602374E495C815DB304

Re: [tor-relays] Consensus weight dropped

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 21/01/15 06:03, Sebastian Hahn wrote: On 21 Jan 2015, at 05:10, eric gisse jowr...@gmail.com wrote: Holy crap, 40%? And that's been historically acceptable? I don't think it was historically like that. Actually, it's not that bad:

Re: [tor-relays] Consensus weight dropped

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 21/01/15 11:54, Network Operations Center wrote: My dropping consensus overlaps exactly with the blue line on that graph time-wise. The 1 Month Graph shows this pretty well.

Re: [tor-relays] Consensus weight dropped

://collector.torproject.org/recent/relay-descriptors/votes/ And of course you'll notice on Atlas whether the consensus weight fraction of your new relay will be 0.0% or not. All the best, Karsten On 21.01.2015 01:22 PM, Karsten Loesing wrote: On 21/01/15 11:54, Network Operations Center wrote: My

Re: [tor-relays] MiB/s / metrics

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Hi grarpamp, thanks for the detailed explanation. I just changed MiB/s to Gbit/s. All the best, Karsten On 20/01/15 00:08, grarpamp wrote: On Mon, Jan 19, 2015 at 5:55 AM, Sebastian Urbach sebast...@urbach.org wrote: I opened a ticket recently

Re: [tor-relays] Consensus weight dropped

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 19/01/15 20:14, Bram de Boer wrote: Sebastian wrote: One theory might be that the addition of a new bwauth has shifted which vote gets picked for the consensus. It's conceivable that bwauths rate relays which are placed topologically close

Re: [tor-relays] Mismatched fingerprints

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 18/01/15 19:02, Patrick Scharmer wrote: Hi, I’ve been running a bridge for over a year and noticed recently that the fingerprint shown in ARM (and that actually works when connecting to the bridge) differs from the fingerprint displayed for

Re: [tor-relays] Location of Tor relays being incorrectly reported in Atlas

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 03/01/15 15:25, Joshua Lee Tucker wrote: Hi guys, Two of my Tor relays are being reported as being located within the USA within Atlas; these nodes are actually located within London, UK - the location is correctly identified when using an

Re: [tor-relays] bridge pool assignments

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 28/12/14 04:06, eliaz wrote: Karsten Loesing: On 27/12/14 04:03, eliaz wrote: isis: Can a bridge carry client traffic even though the bridge hasn't been assigned to a pool? [snip] As I recall, for previous restarts I've seen pool

Re: [tor-relays] bridge pool assignments

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 27/12/14 04:03, eliaz wrote: isis: eliaz transcribed 0.9K bytes: Can a bridge carry client traffic even though the bridge hasn't been assigned to a pool? [snip] As I recall, for previous restarts I've seen pool assignments within a few

Re: [tor-relays] Atlas slow/not working?

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 06/12/14 17:48, usprey wrote: My hats off to you good Sirs!!! Have been missing my atlas and globe fix so very much. =) I'm really glad that we have the thecthulhu.com mirrors in place! https://compass.torproject.org/ seems to wokr although i

Re: [tor-relays] Why isn't my relay getting indexed?

On 12/11/14 18:35, Dedalo wrote: Very interesenting :/ don't know why is this happening... any special line to search for in the log? I'm running just one relay in that IP. And now none of the directory authorities consider your relay as running. Which makes sense, because the last descriptor

Re: [tor-relays] Tor metrics regarding bridges running transports

On 04/10/14 23:27, Jan Nielsen wrote: Hi all. I was wondering if these metrics exist? I couldn't find anything on tor metrics. They list the amount of users using transports but there is no information regarding the number of bridges running particular pluggable transports. These metrics

Re: [tor-relays] Oniontip

On 28/09/14 19:56, Thomas White wrote: I have a server that can be used but I'd rather not personally maintain it so if somebody can manage it, I can provide the hardware connection. Thanks, Thomas, for the offer. Following up in private mail. All the best, Karsten

Re: [tor-relays] Oniontip

On 29/09/14 16:45, Sanjeev Gupta wrote: On Mon, Sep 29, 2014 at 1:24 AM, Karsten Loesing kars...@torproject.org wrote: Speaking of, we're looking for hosting for a second Onionoo instance. It would be set up and maintained by iwakeh, cc'ed, who recently contributed some great patches

Re: [tor-relays] Oniontip

On 28/09/14 16:00, George Kadianakis wrote: Thomas White thomaswh...@riseup.net writes: My concern (which has been highlighted before by Mike Perry) is that the site lacks accountability and transparency. There is no way to verify the donations actually reach the operators. -T Also, I

Re: [tor-relays] fingerprint info propogation

On 07/09/14 10:01, Toralf Förster wrote: On 09/07/2014 03:00 AM, ja...@icetor.is wrote: (I know nicknames are depreciated now) Said that, when I setup my first exit node I do no longer need to define a nickname ? Tor clients won't make critical decisions based on your relay's nickname.

Re: [tor-relays] icetor's loki2 update status (CVE-2014-5117)

On 19/08/14 03:25, s7r wrote: There is something going on with atlas and globe. They have huge lag. A relay is not running for 2 days (it has changed IP address and fingerprint) but still showing as running on atlas and counting uptime forward. in https://consensus-health.torproject.org

Re: [tor-relays] icetor's loki2 update status (CVE-2014-5117)

On 19/08/14 09:09, Karsten Loesing wrote: On 19/08/14 03:25, s7r wrote: There is something going on with atlas and globe. They have huge lag. A relay is not running for 2 days (it has changed IP address and fingerprint) but still showing as running on atlas and counting uptime forward

Re: [tor-relays] icetor's loki2 update status (CVE-2014-5117)

On 19/08/14 19:08, ja...@icetor.is wrote: On 08/19/2014 04:07 PM, Rex Wolf wrote: This morning, all my relays show with correct uptime and version on Globe. Thanks! loki{1..3) from Icetor all reporting in fine now! -Jason Rex, Jason, thanks for letting me know. FYI, here's what went

Re: [tor-relays] CLI tool like Atlast

On 23/06/14 02:31, ja...@icetor.is wrote: Here's the code for anyone interested: https://github.com/woeisme/torchart pretty basic json query to php and pchart Added a link to the Onionoo clients on https://onionoo.torproject.org/, so that others can re-use, improve, contribute, etc. All the

Re: [tor-relays] Grouping cloud relays running within same provider

On 22/04/14 20:42, grarpamp wrote: On Fri, Apr 18, 2014 at 4:21 PM, Paul Syverson paul.syver...@nrl.navy.mil wrote: Of those 15,000 paths, 163 (or ≈ 1.1%) contained an entry and exit node that resided in the same AS despite having an IP address from different /16 subnets. Out of those 163

Re: [tor-relays] No Bridges Being Returned by Onionoo

On 21/04/14 12:58, Matthew Dobbins wrote: Does anyone know why no bridges are being returned by the Onionoo Service? The summary page (https://onionoo.torproject.org/summary) lists normal relays, but returns an empty bridge list. Also, a detailed bridge query

Re: [tor-relays] Metrics for assessing EFF's Tor relay challenge?

On 05/04/14 17:46, Lukas Erlacher wrote: Hello Nikita, Karsten, On 04/05/2014 05:03 PM, Nikita Borisov wrote: On Sat, Apr 5, 2014 at 3:58 PM, Karsten Loesing kars...@torproject.org wrote: Installing packages using Python-specific package managers is going to make our sysadmins sad, so we

Re: [tor-relays] Metrics for assessing EFF's Tor relay challenge?

: On 27.03.2014 16:25, Karsten Loesing wrote: On 27/03/14 11:57, Roger Dingledine wrote: Hi Christian, other tor relay fans, I'm looking for some volunteers, hopefully including Christian, to work on metrics and visualization of impact from new relays. We're working with EFF to do another Tor

Re: [tor-relays] Metrics for assessing EFF's Tor relay challenge?

On 27/03/14 19:51, Runa A. Sandvik wrote: On Thu, Mar 27, 2014 at 3:25 PM, Karsten Loesing kars...@torproject.org wrote: Before going through your list of things we'd want to track below, let's first talk about our options to turn a list of fingerprints into fancy graphs: Would

Re: [tor-relays] Metrics for assessing EFF's Tor relay challenge?

On 27/03/14 11:57, Roger Dingledine wrote: Hi Christian, other tor relay fans, I'm looking for some volunteers, hopefully including Christian, to work on metrics and visualization of impact from new relays. We're working with EFF to do another Tor relay challenge [*], to both help raise

Re: [tor-relays] [Question] Onion router's bandwidth

Please don't crosspost. Let's keep this discussion on *rolls dice* tor-talk@. Setting Reply-To: to tor-talk@, though mailman might not respect that. But please only post replies to tor-talk@. Thanks. On 1/23/14 7:51 AM, hyoseok Lee wrote: Hi I am junior student in Sungkyunkwan

Re: [tor-relays] bandwidth authority algorithm is cracked

Hi starlight, hi Julien, the bandwidth scanner system is quite complex, so it might be the case that part of it is broken. But from this thread that's hard to say, and it's impossible to know what part needs fixing. Want to help us debug the problem(s) you observed? Here are a few possible

Re: [tor-relays] Irony and inconsistency

Please! Every mail on this list, including every mail that you just sent, contains a link at the bottom that you can use to unsubscribe, and you'll never ever receive any emails from this list again! Have a nice weekend On 1/18/14 8:11 AM, Fabiano London wrote: Please! I am not participate in

Re: [tor-relays] Tor Cloud: still not listed

On 1/15/14 4:30 PM, Runa A. Sandvik wrote: On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 3:08 PM, Kostas Jakeliunas kos...@jakeliunas.com wrote: On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 3:30 PM, Patrick ZAJDA patr...@zajda.fr wrote: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 Hi all, I have set up an Amazon EC2 instance to

Re: [tor-relays] stable flag voting differences

On 10/27/13 7:32 PM, starlight.201...@binnacle.cx wrote: I observed an interesting behavior in the authority votes regarding relay stability and am curious if anyone can comment. Have a new relay, about ten days old. Relay is marked Fast Guard Running Stable Valid One 10 minute

[tor-relays] Traceroute measurement from Tor relays

if you have any questions or concerns. And also feel free to contact any of us for help or with suggestions. Because of you, Tor is the king of anonymous communication. With your help, we will keep improving to face the new challenges to privacy and freedom online. Thank you, Karsten Loesing kars

[tor-relays] What do bridge operators expect when providing a ContactInfo line?

Hi bridge operators, Nick rightly suggests moving this discussion from Trac here: What do bridge operators expect when providing a ContactInfo line? Details are on Trac, pasting below: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9854 There's an interesting question in the Tor

Re: [tor-relays] Reimbursement of Exit Operators

On 9/18/13 2:53 AM, Damian Johnson wrote: Unless maybe stem already does exactly this for us? Yup, stem parses the extrainfo descriptors... https://stem.torproject.org/api/descriptor/extrainfo_descriptor.html#stem.descriptor.extrainfo_descriptor.ExtraInfoDescriptor The only pesky bit is

Re: [tor-relays] onionoo

On 9/2/13 5:52 PM, eliaz wrote: On 9/2/2013 9:58 AM, Karsten Loesing wrote: On 9/2/13 3:52 PM, eliaz wrote: Been having a devil fo a time keeping my bridge up this week. One question: With the bridge up running, the map showing it connecting to circuits, why is onionoo reporting

Re: [tor-relays] onionoo

On 9/3/13 5:59 AM, eliaz wrote: On 9/2/2013 11:59 AM, Steve Snyder wrote: On 09/02/2013 10:02 AM, Kostas Jakeliunas wrote: [1]: http://globe.rndm.de/ Having this tool on an unencrypted HTTP site doesn't seem safe to me. Anybody can sniff the bridge IP addresses that users submit for

Re: [tor-relays] Tor bridge on Amazon not doing much

On 8/2/13 4:37 AM, Andrew Lewman wrote: On Thu, 1 Aug 2013 14:11:38 -0700 Shawn A. Miller salexandermil...@gmail.com wrote: I've been running a Tor bridge on the Amazon EC2 cloud computing platform (per instructions at https://cloud.torproject.org/) since July 27, and while the bridge is up

[tor-relays] Munin graphs from fast relays before/after crypto acceleration

Hi fast-relay operators, I'm looking for some Munin graphs (or similar) showing the effect of turning on crypto acceleration on fast relays. Does anyone have such graphs to share that show decrease in CPU load and corresponding increase in bandwidth use? Thanks! Karsten

Re: [tor-relays] EC2 IP vs Region Does this matter in the Tor network?

Am Sonntag, 10. Februar 2013 schrieb Karsten Loesing : On 2/10/13 8:20 AM, David Gilbert wrote: Hello, I'm operating 6 relays in the EC2 where 4/6 claim to be located outside the US but only 1/6 show up as outside of the US based on the IP address and report on atlas (https

Re: [tor-relays] EC2 IP vs Region Does this matter in the Tor network?

On 2/10/13 8:20 AM, David Gilbert wrote: Hello, I'm operating 6 relays in the EC2 where 4/6 claim to be located outside the US but only 1/6 show up as outside of the US based on the IP address and report on atlas (https://atlas.torproject.org/#search/relay1org, don't heckle, I'm getting an

Re: [tor-relays] What's wrong with TorStatus?

On 1/11/13 2:29 AM, Steve Snyder wrote: The TorStatus pages at rueckgr.at and all.de have stopped reflecting the actual state of the Tor relays. The page at rueckgr.at displays uptime as the length of time between 04 Jan and now, regardless of the actual history of the relays. The page at

Re: [tor-relays] Call for discussion: turning funding into more exit relays

On 1/8/13 10:40 PM, Moritz Bartl wrote: I wrote a small incapable script [4] that visualizes how often a relay is a fast relay over time. In its current form, it is not very helpful, but slightly modified to output monthly overviews or just a percentage figure per relay, it might already be

Re: [tor-relays] nickname to fingerprint

On 7/28/12 5:47 AM, Aichetou Med wrote: my question is : is there an easy way to translate relay nickname to fingerprint ? if not is it possible to download descriptors for some specific relays given Digest string from consensus file? i mean before launching tor. besides is there a reason for

Re: [tor-relays] Script to get top relays, AS and countries weights

On 7/26/12 4:50 PM, Moritz Bartl wrote: On 26.07.2012 16:39, delber wrote: Compass is fine by me. Although, you have to admit that it does not say more than `tor-relay-stats`. I agree that Compass does not say more than tor-relay-stats. But it's a name, and once you know about it, it's much

Re: [tor-relays] task-6329 / tor relays stats patch

Hi Michael, I'm cc'ing tor-relays for the discussion here, because I figured if you're okay with sharing the patch, you're probably also okay with a public discussion of it. :) On 7/21/12 4:19 PM, Michael Zeltner wrote: Hi Karsten, On my way out, and I would otherwise forget but here you go,

Re: [tor-relays] How many PK operations does a typical home-run relay or bridge do in 24 hours?

On 7/18/12 7:50 AM, Roger Dingledine wrote: On Wed, Jul 18, 2012 at 03:01:19AM +, k...@damnfbi.tk wrote: Loki https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/088ADAB38DA02BD83286872120F85259D44DED88 088A Wed Jul 18 02:58:22 GMT 2012 3620058 onionskins decrypted 1258679 server-side TLS handshakes

Re: [tor-relays] Script to get top relays, AS and countries weights

On 7/15/12 7:37 PM, delber wrote: On Sun, Jul 15, 2012 at 10:26:14AM +0200, Karsten Loesing wrote: I played around with the script and made a few more changes here: https://gitweb.torproject.org/karsten/metrics-tasks.git/commitdiff/dd6329a I didn't merge these changes into the official

Re: [tor-relays] [tor-dev] Can we stop sanitizing nicknames in bridge descriptors?

[Cc'ing tor-relays, because this discussion might be relevant for relay/bridge operators, too. Please keep the discussion on tor-dev. See https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2012-May/003489.html for the whole thread.] Hi Sebastian, On 5/2/12 9:35 PM, Sebastian G. bastik.tor wrote:

Re: [tor-relays] https://metrics.torproject.org/networkstatus.html

On 1/19/12 7:56 PM, Sebastian Urbach wrote: Im receiving the following error since a few days: Proxy Error The proxy server received an invalid response from an upstream server. The proxy server could not handle the request GET /networkstatus.html. Reason: Error reading from remote

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