Re: [tor-relays] Publishing bridge contact information

On 2018-03-04 23:26, Roger Dingledine wrote: > On Tue, Feb 20, 2018 at 05:51:44PM +0100, Karsten Loesing wrote: >> FWIW, we collected all feedback from this thread, discussed this change >> in the metrics team, and forwarded our planned change to the Tor >> Research Safety Board. I don't know how

Re: [tor-relays] Publishing bridge contact information

Roger Dingledine: > And speaking of > community-building, are there volunteers lined up who would contact > bridge operators if given the chance, or is this more of a theoretical > "maybe it would happen"? I'll eventually add a check for "is exit operator also a bridge operator?" and might

Re: [tor-relays] Publishing bridge contact information

On Tue, Feb 20, 2018 at 05:51:44PM +0100, Karsten Loesing wrote: > FWIW, we collected all feedback from this thread, discussed this change > in the metrics team, and forwarded our planned change to the Tor > Research Safety Board. I don't know how fast that will move, but I could > imagine it's a

Re: [tor-relays] Publishing bridge contact information

On 2018-02-07 17:45, Karsten Loesing wrote: > We're now considering to drop one step in the sanitizing step, which is > to remove contact information. The result would be that we'd keep > contact information in sanitized descriptors in the exact same way as > the bridge operator put it into their

Re: [tor-relays] Publishing bridge contact information

  Am Montag, 12. Februar 2018 um 12:33 schrieb nusenu :   If you block the ORPort, won't the reachability check fail? Fine question. At least this has been the case in the past, though I know there was discussion and maybe development to overcome this weakness. But

Re: [tor-relays] Publishing bridge contact information

>> If you block the ORPort, won't the reachability check fail? > > Fine question. At least this has been the case in the past, though I > know there was discussion and maybe development to overcome this > weakness. But even if it's not possible yet, having bridge contact > information would allow

Re: [tor-relays] Publishing bridge contact information

On 2018-02-12 11:19, Alexander Dietrich wrote: > On 2018-02-11 00:43, nusenu wrote: > >> - we could tell operators that running obfs3 and obfs4 is a bad idea > > Are you saying obfs3 and obfs4 shouldn't run simultaneously on the same > bridge? That would be good to know indeed. Citing from the

Re: [tor-relays] Publishing bridge contact information

On 2018-02-12 11:39, nusenu wrote: > Once the decision has been made to publish contactInfo, people with > access to the current contactInfo (bridgeDB, isis?) should sent current > bridge operators > a pre-notice about the upcoming change so they have a chance to react to it. > > I assume you

Re: [tor-relays] Publishing bridge contact information

Once the decision has been made to publish contactInfo, people with access to the current contactInfo (bridgeDB, isis?) should sent current bridge operators a pre-notice about the upcoming change so they have a chance to react to it. I assume you will not implement this change retroactively

Re: [tor-relays] Publishing bridge contact information

On 2018-02-11 00:43, nusenu wrote: >> Possible advantages are: >> - Relay Search would support searching for bridges by contact information. >> - People who keep a watching eye on the Tor network could reach out to >> bridge operators to inform them that they're running an outdated tor/PT >>

Re: [tor-relays] Publishing bridge contact information

On 2018-02-08 19:48, to...@protonmail.com wrote: > Whatever you decide, I think you should have this mentioned in the setup docs > for bridges. We have the following explanation in the manual: "Administrative contact information for this relay or bridge. This line can be used to contact you if

Re: [tor-relays] Publishing bridge contact information

> Possible advantages are: > - Relay Search would support searching for bridges by contact information. > - People who keep a watching eye on the Tor network could reach out to > bridge operators to inform them that they're running an outdated tor/PT > version, or that running bridges and exits

Re: [tor-relays] Publishing bridge contact information

Whatever you decide, I think you should have this mentioned in the setup docs for bridges. ​ Sent with ProtonMail Secure Email. ​ Original Message On February 8, 2018 6:53 AM, Karsten Loesing wrote: >On 2018-02-08 12:19, nusenu wrote: >> >>>Possible

Re: [tor-relays] Publishing bridge contact information

On 2018-02-08 12:19, nusenu wrote: > >> Possible advantages are: > > another advantage I can come up with: > we will be able to analyze bridge shares (if most have contactInfo set), > meaning > is one or two entity running all bridges? How many operators are there? > > Obviously you could also

Re: [tor-relays] Publishing bridge contact information

> Possible advantages are: another advantage I can come up with: we will be able to analyze bridge shares (if most have contactInfo set), meaning is one or two entity running all bridges? How many operators are there? Obviously you could also see this as disadvantage. When discussing bridge

Re: [tor-relays] Publishing bridge contact information

On 2018-02-08 10:54, Sebastian Hahn wrote: > Hi there, Hello! > I don't want to declare it a showstopper outright, but: > >> On 8. Feb 2018, at 09:42, Karsten Loesing wrote: >> >> These sound like variants of the first disadvantage listed above. There >> are two

Re: [tor-relays] Publishing bridge contact information

Hi there, I don't want to declare it a showstopper outright, but: > On 8. Feb 2018, at 09:42, Karsten Loesing wrote: > > These sound like variants of the first disadvantage listed above. There > are two additional assumptions in here, though: > > 1) bridge operators

Re: [tor-relays] Publishing bridge contact information

On 2018-02-07 19:37, Sebastian Hahn wrote: > >> On 7. Feb 2018, at 18:55, Geoff Down wrote: >> >> >> >> On Wed, Feb 7, 2018, at 4:45 PM, Karsten Loesing wrote: >> >>> Possible disadvantages are: >>> - If somebody runs a relay and a bridge, both with the same contact >>>

Re: [tor-relays] Publishing bridge contact information

> On 7. Feb 2018, at 18:55, Geoff Down wrote: > > > > On Wed, Feb 7, 2018, at 4:45 PM, Karsten Loesing wrote: > >> Possible disadvantages are: >> - If somebody runs a relay and a bridge, both with the same contact >> information, a censoring adversary might guess that

Re: [tor-relays] Publishing bridge contact information

On Wed, Feb 7, 2018, at 4:45 PM, Karsten Loesing wrote: > Possible disadvantages are: > - If somebody runs a relay and a bridge, both with the same contact > information, a censoring adversary might guess that the bridge might run > on a nearby IP address as the relay. However, they could as

[tor-relays] Publishing bridge contact information

Hello relay and/or bridge operators, you might already know this: we're publishing sanitized versions of bridge descriptors on Tor Metrics. https://metrics.torproject.org/collector.html#bridge-descriptors We're using these sanitized descriptors to visualize interesting facts about Tor bridges,