and, in its place, a non-exit node is
> shown.
>
> Is this a known bug? Or something problematic with certain sites? Why are
> these sites different?
>
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>
I have noticed that the "Tor Circuit" list in Tor Browser sometimes shows
an incorrect IP (and location) when connected to specific web sites.
I used "StrictNodes 1" in torrc and selected the exit
"PrivacyRepublic0001" which is based in France and has an IP address of
178.32.181.96.
Usually when
Hi, all!
There's a new alpha Tor release! Because it's an alpha, you should
only run it if you're ready to find more bugs than usual, and report
them on trac.torproject.org.
The source code is available from the usual place on
www.torproject.org; if you build Tor from source, why not give it a
etwork*. And
> that's closer to Tor's model.
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Kevin Burress dijo [Mon, Dec 10, 2018 at 10:21:22AM -0500]:
> I just have to check, is tor secure yet?
>
> I was thinking it might be more secure with these AI based timing attacks
> now if the number of hops is more adjustable. Although I would like to see
> a means of negotiating a layer
I just have to check, is tor secure yet?
I was thinking it might be more secure with these AI based timing attacks
now if the number of hops is more adjustable. Although I would like to see
a means of negotiating a layer between a hidden service or exit node using
multiple connections in
1. not serious?
JS leaks my OS name, architecture name, clock setting, fonts, and
more... These are not my IP address even though I don't welcome JS.
2. serious!
If malicious attackers/softwares can get my IP address but can't send it
to their server directly, they may replace my OS name to
Well, there are many ways to use JavaScript to deanonymize you.
For instance, JS can be used to measure the speed of specific operations
on your computer, which already gives some information on what kind of
computer you are using. Firefox contains some counter-measures against
this, TorBrowser
Are there any serious disadvantages to using JS with the TBB.
As we know, disabling JS prevents some sites working at all while other
sites has reduced functionality.
Correct me if I am wrong, but I'm sure that server-side JS cannot get the
user's real (non-Tor) IP address.
If that's correct,
check this list:
clearnet
https://www.whonix.org/wiki/E-Mail#Anonymity_Friendly_Email_Provider_List
Onion link
http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion/wiki/E-Mail#Anonymity_Friendly_Email_Provider_List
enjoy :)
mimb...@danwin1210.me:
> I am asking for
I am asking for recommendations of Tor friendly email services.
The two problems I've noticed are:
1. Demanding SMS verification e.g. ProtonMail.
2. Having impossible CAPTCHAs.
VFEmail used to work but the last time I tried it just got stuck and could
never create an account.
Any suggestions?
On Tue, Dec 04, 2018 at 04:14:46PM +, iwanle...@cock.li wrote:
> The descriptors seem to indicate onion addresses. So if I act a relay, I
> seem to be able to get the addresses. Then how? ... Could someone skilled
> try to get the lists? :D
Please don't.
In particular, if we notice that your
[Typo in onion list address, fixed and resent herein]
> The descriptors seem to indicate onion addresses. So if I act a relay, I
> seem to be able to get the addresses. Then how? ... Could someone
> skilled try to get the lists? :D
Yes, many services, researchers, and privates routinely do this.
> with OnionCat to yield IPv6 and UDP transport among tor's P2P
> That's simply not possible with v3's no-IP TCP only onions.
That is to say, it's not possible with code that exists today...
the various possible solutions, and others yet to be proposed,
that could provide those things with v3
> The descriptors seem to indicate onion addresses. So if I act a relay, I
> seem to be able to get the addresses. Then how? ... Could someone
> skilled try to get the lists? :D
Yes, many services, researchers, and privates routinely do this.
The code exists in some repositories, or you can write
r/lib/tor/foo/hostname
>> [v2-hostname].onion [22-character-string] # client: [16-chracter-string]
>>
>> The client ID must be 16 alphanumeric characters. Then you use the 22
>> character string in the client torrc.
>>
>> In the client:
>>
>> $ sudo nano /e
.org
> <mailto:tor-talk@lists.torproject.org>
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Nathaniel Suchy writes:
> It's true that someone malicious can run a HSDir and get some (but not
> all) of the Onion Addresses however this would assume that your onion
> address ends up in a malicious HSDir (last time I checked it's
> published to 5 different HSDirs?).
v3 onions get rid of
gt;
> The client ID must be 16 alphanumeric characters. Then you use the 22
> character string in the client torrc.
>
> In the client:
>
> $ sudo nano /etc/tor/torrc
> ...
> HidServAuth [v2-hostname].onion [22-character-string]
> ...
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Tor does NOT have responsibility that the lists make onion sites
good/bad.
Who publishes the lists may have... a part of the responsibility?
Anyway I want the lists!
Then I studied below:
https://www.torproject.org/docs/onion-services
From this, DB (relay?) can get onion service descriptors.
On 12/03/2018 10:42 PM, Nathaniel Suchy wrote:
> You mentioned "HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient", a feature I did not know about.
> I'm going to figure out if this is possible to implement on the SSH System as
> that would solve some concerns about a leaked onion address. Could you
> elaborate
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
> <https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk>
>
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Hi,
The implementation details of the SSH thing I talked about in my last email may
of been unclear. When I said it's an security by advanced obscurity, I did not
mean it's the only security. Other forms of access control are still in place.
However keeping it only accessible over Onion
On 12/03/2018 02:35 PM, s7r wrote:
> There are other techniques lower at little-t-tor protocol level that
> suite your concerns, like HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient - you should
> better look into those if you are concerned about someone trying to
> connect to your onion address.
I use that,
Hello,
Nathaniel Suchy wrote:
> Consider the consequences of publishing the actual addresses. The number of
> addresses is fine but the actual addresses should stay private for privacy
> and security reasons.
>
> I’m aware there are crawers looking for new services to show however if the
>
dresses?
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Can the Tor Project publish the list? Some sites have published lists of
new .onion addresses, for example:
http://onionsnjajzkhm5g.onion/onions.php?cat=20=1=en
http://zlal32teyptf4tvi.onion/
http://56wr4dvq3abd2ivkf5z36nortvu7dgona55zqsihfaqo2aeg5er4moid.onion/
There may be no reason that the
we don't end up with unusable leftover circuits. Fixes bug 27471;
> bugfix on 0.3.2.1-alpha.
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; Can't Tor Project host one PHP script for this?
>>> I really need it for my server.
>>>
>>> e.g.
>>> Firewall:
>>> Allow only outgoing IF destination is Tor Nodes
>>> Deny all
>>
>> https://www.dan.me.uk/tornodes
>>
>&
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On 11/19/2018 05:33 PM, mi...@secmail.pro wrote:
> now the torstatus.blutmagie.de is going down, I need an alternative.
>
> I need a list of "Tor nodes IPv4".
> The IP list of (All Tor nodes) - (Tor Exit nodes) if possible.
>
> Can't Tor Project host one PHP script for this?
> I really need it
now the torstatus.blutmagie.de is going down, I need an alternative.
I need a list of "Tor nodes IPv4".
The IP list of (All Tor nodes) - (Tor Exit nodes) if possible.
Can't Tor Project host one PHP script for this?
I really need it for my server.
e.g.
Firewall:
Allow only outgoing IF
Hi, all!
There's a new alpha Tor release! Because it's an alpha, you should
only run it if you're ready to find more bugs than usual, and report
them on trac.torproject.org.
The source code is available from the downlaod page on
www.torproject.org; if you build Tor from source, why not give it a
Kevin Burress dijo [Sun, Nov 11, 2018 at 08:25:08PM -0500]:
> >> On Sat, Nov 10, 2018 at 01:22:00PM +, anan wrote:
> >>> How come I have now the same IP address on every tab?
> >>
> >> Circuit isolation is not per tab, but per site.
> >>
>
> >Wow, that's even better!
>
> I would rather have
gt; nodes as well as a button that lets you create a new circuit.
> >
>
> Excellent. Thank you very much!!
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Jonathan Marquardt:
> On Sat, Nov 10, 2018 at 01:22:00PM +, anan wrote:
>> How come I have now the same IP address on every tab?
>
> Circuit isolation is not per tab, but per site.
>
Wow, that's even better!
> For example, open two tabs, one with https://ipchicken.com/ and one with
>
On Sat, Nov 10, 2018 at 01:22:00PM +, anan wrote:
> How come I have now the same IP address on every tab?
Circuit isolation is not per tab, but per site.
For example, open two tabs, one with https://ipchicken.com/ and one with
https://wtfismyip.com/. The circuits should differ.
> How come
Hi,
I remember Tor Broswer used to create a new circuit per tab. It had also
the "Create new circuit" button.
What happened?
How come I have now the same IP address on every tab?
How come the new-cicuit button is not there anymore?
I am also curious to know why the list of the three nodes being
Hi, all!
There's a new alpha Tor release! Because it's an alpha, you should
only run it if you're ready to find more bugs than usual, and report
them on trac.torproject.org.
The source code is available from the Download page on
www.torproject.org; if you build Tor from source, why not give it a
> On Oct 23, 2018, at 2:14 PM, Nathan Freitas wrote:
>
> On Tue, Oct 23, 2018, at 1:55 AM, Roger Dingledine wrote:
>> On Mon, Oct 22, 2018 at 05:13:39PM +0100, Iain Learmonth wrote:
>>> It might also be that half-duplex communication (even if implemented
>>> with humans saying "over") could
On Tue, Oct 23, 2018, at 1:55 AM, Roger Dingledine wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 22, 2018 at 05:13:39PM +0100, Iain Learmonth wrote:
> > It might also be that half-duplex communication (even if implemented
> > with humans saying "over") could bring benefits as this would allow you
> > to increase the
> On Oct 23, 2018, at 7:49 AM, Iain Learmonth wrote:
>
> Signed PGP part
> Hi,
>
> On 23/10/18 01:27, grarpamp wrote:
>
>> Yes, one cannot rationally overload all 128 bits for that without colliding
>> upon allocated IPv6 space that may appear in one's host stack.
>> However the 1:1 key
Hi,
On 23/10/18 01:27, grarpamp wrote:
> Bittorrent users don't need lifetime / PQC level authentication
> between peers, they just need enough to prevent nuisance
> collisions from degrading operations. Today even the less
> than 32 bits of IPv4 (reality: users don't typically brute the ISPs)
>
Hi,
On 23/10/18 13:18, Conrad Rockenhaus wrote:
> If it were to be offered as a non-hidden service, what about the UDP portion
> of the VoIP services, or do we just force everything to be TCP?
You still have 3-hops to the rendezvous point that are going through Tor
so it all still has to be
Iain,
If it were to be offered as a non-hidden service, what about the UDP portion of
the VoIP services, or do we just force everything to be TCP?
Thanks,
Conrad
> On Oct 22, 2018, at 11:13 AM, Iain Learmonth wrote:
>
> Signed PGP part
> Hi Conrad,
>
> On 20/10/18 06:07, Conrad Rockenhaus
On Mon, Oct 22, 2018 at 05:13:39PM +0100, Iain Learmonth wrote:
> It might also be that half-duplex communication (even if implemented
> with humans saying "over") could bring benefits as this would allow you
> to increase the buffer sizes without having people talking over each other.
Reminds me
> Tor Metrics has some data on average latencies for client to Onion
> service. This is your absolute minimum latency, with the only way to
> reduce this being to have latency-aware path selection
Apps like VoIP, IRC, shell could all benefit from that selection.
Tor doesn't proffer path selection
Hi Conrad,
On 20/10/18 06:07, Conrad Rockenhaus wrote:
> 4)Results of a test were conducted and one second round trip latency was
> noticed from PSTN to a soft phone connected via Tor (via OpenVPN). Hopefully
> performance improvement will be noticed with OnionCat.
Tor Metrics has some
Hello All,
I have the demonstration PBX online right now - rgeg3ziyvgdgxg52.onion - it’s
running Onioncat as well.
Contact me if you would like an extension so you can try to provision a phone.
Thanks,
Conrad
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> architecture to Tor <—> OnionCat <—> Asterisk
> test ... one second round trip latency ... PSTN to a soft phone connected via
> Tor (via OpenVPN).
> Hopefully performance improvement will be noticed with OnionCat.
OnionCat can provide access to using UDP and IPv6
over Tor without the extra
Hello All,
We had a discussion on IRC regarding this and the following suggestions were
made:
1) Change the architecture to FreeBSD box<—> Tor <—> OnionCat <—>
Asterisk, or even drop the FreeBSD box completely if the Asterisk box is able
to handle the load.
2) Traumschule is
Hello All,
So prior to opening up the service for beta, Iain suggested that we have a
discussion regarding my proposed service and my planned architecture to see
if there’s any room for improvements in the design or any vulnerabilities
that can take away someone’s anonymity.
So the design is
Hi!
There's a new alpha Tor release! Because it's an alpha, you should
only run it if you're ready to find more bugs than usual, and report
them on trac.torproject.org.
The source code is available from the usual place on
www.torproject.org; if you build Tor from source, why not give it a
try?
Nathaniel Suchy:
> Hi,
>
> I'm a bit curious as to if anyone released macOS Seatbelt Sandbox Profiles
> for Tor Browser?
We used such profiles in the past but that broke with Firefox's content
sandboxing. It seems that is not easy to fix.[1] (If it is, please let
us know)
Georg
[1]
Hi,
I'm a bit curious as to if anyone released macOS Seatbelt Sandbox Profiles
for Tor Browser?
Cordially,
Nathaniel Suchy
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On Fri, 28 Sep 2018 14:08:17 +, Lara wrote:
...
> It would be quite ironic, given the latency they face in orbit.
The ISS doesn't fly that high - having a link directly down would
means a few millisecond ping time. But they have to link via (other)
satellites because you'd need an awful lot
dversaries.
>> However, if you're careful, you can use VPNs through Tor to 1) avoid
>> Tor-specific CAPTCHAs, 2) route UDP traffic, and 3) use online services
>> that generally don't work well with Tor alone.
>>
>>
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if you're careful, you can use VPNs through Tor to 1) avoid
> Tor-specific CAPTCHAs, 2) route UDP traffic, and 3) use online services
> that generally don't work well with Tor alone.
>
>
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On 09/29/2018 09:29 AM, panoramix.druida wrote:
>
> ‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐
> El sábado, 29 de septiembre de 2018 11:58, J B
> escribió:
>
>> Hi,
>> Could you please explain in what sequence the two should be activated and
>> why
>> (which setup is secure) ?
>> TB -- VPN or web proxy
h?v=f4U8YbXKwog
>
> jb
>
> -
>
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you can read it here:
- User -> VPN -> Tor -> Internet
https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Tunnels/Connecting_to_a_VPN_before_Tor
- User -> Tor -> VPN -> Internet
https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Tunnels/Connecting_to_Tor_before_a_VPN
- User -> Tor -> Proxy -> Internet
Hi,
Could you please explain in what sequence the two should be activated and
why
(which setup is secure) ?
TB -- VPN or web proxy
or
VPN or web proxy -- TB
jb
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I know that what Nasa uses is space to ground networking. I am sure it
would work. We need to keep in mind that there is a time delay from
space to earth so somebody up there running a relay may throw off the
tor network a bit.
On 9/28/2018 10:01 AM, Nathaniel Suchy wrote:
Hi everyone,
That would be epic!
A Tor node in space would be amazing
On September 28, 2018 2:01:43 PM UTC, Nathaniel Suchy wrote:
>Hi everyone,
>
>Do we know if anyone has ever connected to the Tor Network from the
>International Space Station? This would be a really interesting data
>point
>to have / know
On Fri, 28 Sep 2018, at 14:01, Nathaniel Suchy wrote:
> Do we know if anyone has ever connected to the Tor Network from the
> International Space Station?
It would be quite ironic, given the latency they face in orbit.
Cheers!
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To
Hi everyone,
Do we know if anyone has ever connected to the Tor Network from the
International Space Station? This would be a really interesting data point
to have / know about. Does NASA use their own ASN for the station or
something else? I know people there can use Twitter so Tor would
Hello!
There's a new alpha Tor release! Because it's an alpha, you should
only run it if you're ready to find more bugs than usual, and report
them on trac.torproject.org.
The source code is available from the usual place on
www.torproject.org; if you build Tor from source, why not give it a
Hi, all!
There's a new alpha Tor release! Because it's an alpha, you should
only run it if you're ready to find more bugs than usual, and report
them on trac.torproject.org.
The source code is available from the usual place on the download page
of www.torproject.org; if you build Tor from
Please ignore this. I saved it as a draft, then fixed the actual
problem and when I deleted the draft, it apparently "sent".
My apologies!
Charles Bell
On 09/12/2018 10:29 AM, Charles T. Bell wrote:
>
>
> On 09/12/2018 08:00 AM, tor-talk-requ...@lists.torproject.org wrote:
>> Send tor-talk
Hi everyone,
I'm not sure if anyone saw here however recently an exploit vendor dropped
a 0day in Tor Browser 7 on Twitter (See:
https://www.zdnet.com/article/exploit-vendor-drops-tor-browser-zero-day-on-twitter/).
Do we know if this has been exploited in the wild yet?
Cordially,
Nathaniel Suchy
On Tue, Aug 07, 2018 at 08:09:10PM -0400, Nick Mathewson wrote:
> Changes in version 0.3.4.6-rc - 2018-08-06
> Tor 0.3.4.6-rc fixes several small compilation, portability, and
> correctness issues in previous versions of Tor. This version is a
> release candidate: if no serious bugs are
Conrad Rockenhaus dijo [Fri, Aug 31, 2018 at 04:00:30PM -0500]:
> Good God every conversation, now. Anyway.
>
> This exit isn’t bad exit material. Turkey has been known to block
> Tor though, I’m actually proud of this guy for having the cajones
> (also known as balls to those of you who don’t
Good God every conversation, now. Anyway.
This exit isn’t bad exit material. Turkey has been known to block Tor though,
I’m actually proud of this guy for having the cajones (also known as balls to
those of you who don’t habla espanol) to operate an exit in country such as
Turkey, which
What if a Tor Bridge blocked connections to the tor network to selective
client IPs? Would we keep it in BridgeDB because its sometimes useful?
On Thu, Aug 30, 2018 at 10:02 PM arisbe wrote:
> Children should be seen and not herd. The opposite goes for Tor relays.
> Arisbe
>
>
> On 8/30/2018
So you are totally cool allowing Tor Exits to censor with impunity?
Allowing this one Turkey exit risks losing new Tor users thinking the
product doesn’t work after all.
On Thu, Aug 30, 2018 at 8:30 PM Pascal Terjan wrote:
> How is situation 1 different from 2 from the user perspective? In both
Matthew: Built in functionality, maybe, an addon, no. Also either solution
is a bandaid to the actual problem that we're allowing an exit with no
contact information to censor Tor users with impunity!
On Thu, Aug 30, 2018 at 8:01 PM Matthew Glennon
wrote:
> Could this be mitigated with a
The exit is behind a filtered ISP. Opposed to a website blocking exits.
That’s the difference.
1) The content provider causes the block.
2) The exit causes the block.
In situation two a censored user may give up on Tor entirely. Should we
allow exits in China or Iraq or Syria or Turkey or the
That’s a website blocking Tor users. Not a Tor Exit blocking a website.
On Thu, Aug 30, 2018 at 7:06 PM Pascal Terjan wrote:
>
>
> On Thu, 30 Aug 2018, 14:11 Nathaniel Suchy, wrote:
>
>> So this exit node is censored by Turkey. That means any site blocked in
>> Turkey is blocked on the exit.
So this exit node is censored by Turkey. That means any site blocked in
Turkey is blocked on the exit. What about an exit node in China or Syria or
Iraq? They censor, should exits there be allowed? I don't think they
should. Make them relay only, (and yes that means no Guard or HSDir flags
too)
Sorry for late.
Whats up...?
here is my : alexflores866@yahoo.comtlak to here...
Sent from my iPhone
On Saturday, August 25, 2018 2:46 AM, Nick Mathewson
wrote:
Hi, all!
There's a new Tor release candidate! Because it's not an official
release,, you should only run it if you're
Hi, all!
There's a new Tor release candidate! Because it's not an official
release,, you should only run it if you're ready to find more bugs
than usual, and report them on trac.torproject.org.
The source code is available from the usual place on
www.torproject.org; if you build Tor from source,
On Thu, Aug 23, 2018 at 8:59 AM Conrad Rockenhaus
wrote:
> > usage of a container (Snap or otherwise) to improve security?
>
> It takes at least double the amount of time to build a snap than it does
> to build a deb, and in the end you can get the same result.
Yes. We can all imagine the
es at least double the amount of time to build a snap than it does
> to build a deb, and in the end you can get the same result.
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> On Aug 22, 2018, at 3:50 PM, Nathaniel Suchy wrote:
>
> The confinement capabilities of "Snap" packages are quite interesting. As
> Tor Browser continues to grow in usage, I'm interested in seeing what new
> techniques are adopted to improve security. What do you all think about the
> usage
The confinement capabilities of "Snap" packages are quite interesting. As
Tor Browser continues to grow in usage, I'm interested in seeing what new
techniques are adopted to improve security. What do you all think about the
usage of a container (Snap or otherwise) to improve security?
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Hi,
On Sat, 18 Aug 2018, Nathaniel Suchy wrote:
> Hello,
>
> I see Tor Browser 8 is in the alpha testing phase. Do we know the estimated
> time when the final build of Tor Browser 8 will be out?
It is planned for 2018-09-05.
Nicolas
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Hello,
I see Tor Browser 8 is in the alpha testing phase. Do we know the estimated
time when the final build of Tor Browser 8 will be out?
Cordially,
Nathaniel
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Hi,
Thanks for the information, pretty useful.
I have visited Tahoe-LAFS, seems interesting.
I couldn't contact "Aktie" however,
maybe they block tor connections ?
We should discuss it at "tor-talk",
moderators could tell us we are off-topic.
Cheers,
Lluís
mlnl:
> Hi,
>
>> Maybe "anonymous
Hi,
> Maybe "anonymous file storage" is a better subject ?
>
> I'm posting it on tor-talk too, and we can follow the discussion
> there.
>
> And back to the topic, maybe it would be possible to set up a
> pilot-test so one could see how many use cases free haven could
> properly solve.
>
> If
Maybe "anonymous file storage" is a better subject ?
I'm posting it on tor-talk too, and we can follow the
discussion there.
And back to the topic, maybe it would be possible to
set up a pilot-test so one could see how many use
cases free haven could properly solve.
If I didn't understand from
> The project called Free Haven never got finished, because of the hard
> research questions described on the front page:
> https://www.freehaven.net/
Where does (or should) the line or guidepath go on such projects
in the space between say bulletproof (for all, most, or some use cases),
and good
On 8/8/2018 6:22 PM, Need Secure Mail wrote:
Grizzled long-time Tor user here. I seek basic, reliable POP/IMAP/SMTP
service with an option to use my own domain (to avoid lock-in with a
provider), from a well-established provider who will not likely disappear
*and* will never block my account for
gandi.net
https://www.reddit.com/r/emailprivacy/
https://www.reddit.com/r/onions/
deepdotweb
search: email tor onion
Etc.
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vfemail.net
Probably many others still on bitcoin.it and other wikis.
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Grizzled long-time Tor user here. I seek basic, reliable POP/IMAP/SMTP
service with an option to use my own domain (to avoid lock-in with a
provider), from a well-established provider who will not likely disappear
*and* will never block my account for Tor logins, demand selfies with
gov-id, etc. I
Hi, all!
There's a new Tor release candidate! Because it's not a stable
release yet, you should only run it if you're ready to find bugs and
report them on trac.torproject.org.
The source code is available from the usual place on
https://www.torproject.org/download/download.html; if you build
On Fri, 03 Aug 2018 12:00:02 +
tor-talk-requ...@lists.torproject.org wrote:
> Send tor-talk mailing list submissions to
> tor-talk@lists.torproject.org
>
> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
> https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
>
Hi, all!
There's a new Tor release candidate! Because it's not a stable
release yet, you should only run it if you're ready to find bugs and
report them on trac.torproject.org.
The source code is available from the usual place on
www.torproject.org; if you build Tor from source, why not give it
On 04/08/2018 05:12 PM, Joe wrote:
On 04/05/2018 11:34 PM, Joe wrote:
On 04/05/2018 06:19 AM, Georg Koppen wrote:
A safe thing to do would be downloading a clean, new Tor Browser from
our website and start over again (mabye exporting the bookmarks from the
currently used Tor Browser and
Thanks Tortilla.
I don't see how your reply answers the question - maybe it wasn't
intended to.
It appears if the general.useragent.override string isn't the same as
what ever / where ever check.torproject.org stores as a valid
useragent.override value, it reports that you're not using TBB at
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