Geoff Brigham wrote:
WMF is getting professional translations in German, French, Spanish, and
Japanese, and will post by Tuesday.
I know that the RfC on PRISM has already been closed, but I have only
remembered this today: what happened with the professional translations
of
On 06/15/2013 05:48 PM, rupert THURNER wrote:
the conclusion is also interesting:
when a company that uses a certificate authority located in a
country different than the one in which it holds user data, it
needlessly exposes users’ data to the compelled disclosure by an
additional
On Fri, Jun 14, 2013 at 3:33 PM, Andy Mabbett a...@pigsonthewing.org.ukwrote:
PRISM
From @ShammaBoyarin on Twitter: Its not as if the NSA were mass
downloading articles from JSTOR.
Certainly if the evidence showed that the NSA were breaking into wiring
closets and hacking into computer
On Fri, Jun 14, 2013 at 3:33 PM, Andy Mabbett
a...@pigsonthewing.org.ukwrote:
PRISM
From @ShammaBoyarin on Twitter: Its not as if the NSA were mass
downloading articles from JSTOR.
Certainly if the evidence showed that the NSA were breaking into wiring
closets and hacking into computer
On Sat, Jun 15, 2013 at 10:16 AM, Fred Bauder fredb...@fairpoint.netwrote:
(Yes, you can speculate that they're probably doing this too, but this
particular scandal is the NSA getting information from computer networks
with the permission of the computer owners, not despite the owners
On Sat, Jun 15, 2013 at 10:16 AM, Fred Bauder
fredb...@fairpoint.netwrote:
(Yes, you can speculate that they're probably doing this too, but
this
particular scandal is the NSA getting information from computer
networks
with the permission of the computer owners, not despite the owners
On Sat, Jun 15, 2013 at 1:56 PM, Fred Bauder fredb...@fairpoint.net wrote:
The fact of the matter is that there would be a much bigger uproar if the
NSA were caught doing what Aaron Swartz did, on American soil against an
innocent American company. If NSA were caught breaking into wiring
PRISM
From @ShammaBoyarin on Twitter: Its not as if the NSA were mass
downloading articles from JSTOR.
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Do others feel that the letter to US Congress text at
https://optin.stopwatching.us/ (for which there does not seem to be a
direct URL, sorry) is appropriately worded?
I am far more impressed by the text at http://bestbits.net/prism-nsa/
which Jan Engelmann suggested on the Advocacy Advisors
Fred Bauder, 12/06/2013 22:47:
We hack network backbones like huge internet routers, basically that
give us access to the communications of hundreds of thousands of
computers without having to hack every single one,
I would like to raise the option of a more Wikipedia-like protest. How
about, on the English Wikipedia, picking one day to make the Main Page
topic-specific, similar to the traditional April 1 selection?
Candidates, off the top of my hat:
[[NSA]] / [[Black Chamber]]
[[PRISM (surveillance
Fred Bauder, 12/06/2013 22:47:
We hack network backbones  like huge internet routers, basically Â
that
give us access to the communications of hundreds of thousands of
computers without having to hack every single one,
I would like to raise the option of a more Wikipedia-like protest. How
about, on the English Wikipedia, picking one day to make the Main Page
topic-specific, similar to the traditional April 1 selection?
Candidates, off the top of my hat:
[[NSA]] / [[Black Chamber]]
[[PRISM (surveillance
Le 2013-06-11 14:09, Fred Bauder a écrit :
There will always be humans maintaining the system who must, in order
to
do their work, have potential access to everything.
A potential access to everything is a so vast and vague assertion
that it practicaly denote nothing.
Also, one could come
I encourage everyone to join the StopWatching campaign, individually.
It also seems like the right thing for Wikimedia to stand for; our
projects are among the more prominent supporters of anonymous and
pseudonymous knowledge-work on the web.
SJ
On Tue, Jun 11, 2013 at 2:17 PM, Luis Villa
Le 2013-06-11 14:09, Fred Bauder a écrit :
There will always be humans maintaining the system who must, in order to
do their work, have potential access to everything.
A potential access to everything is a so vast and vague assertion
that it practicaly denote nothing.
Also, one could come
Le 2013-06-10 12:21, Fred Bauder a écrit :
Correct. If Osama Bin Laden had been editing Wikipedia, before his
death
of course, through some account in Pakistan, it would have been
rather
reasonable to respond favorable to a request for information.
Be careful, the underlying assumption of
Le 2013-06-10 14:29, Craig Franklin a écrit :
If the NSA, CIA, or some other spook agency is getting information
off of
Wikimedia servers, they don't have a CU account or anything like
that.
They'd have a program running at the operating system level that
extracts
the data in a standardised
Le 2013-06-10 16:01, John Vandenberg a écrit :
It would be good *if* the WMF can provide assurances to editors that
they havent received any national security letters or other
'trawling'
requests from any U.S. agency.
I doubt they can. Even if they say so, how do you check? May be you can
On Tue, Jun 11, 2013 at 5:52 AM, Mathieu Stumpf
psychosl...@culture-libre.org wrote:
Le 2013-06-10 16:01, John Vandenberg a écrit :
It would be good *if* the WMF can provide assurances to editors that
they havent received any national security letters or other 'trawling'
requests from any
Le 2013-06-10 14:29, Craig Franklin a écrit :
If the NSA, CIA, or some other spook agency is getting information
off of
Wikimedia servers, they don't have a CU account or anything like
that.
They'd have a program running at the operating system level that
extracts
the data in a
On Tue, Jun 11, 2013 at 8:09 AM, Fred Bauder fredb...@fairpoint.net wrote:
There will always be humans maintaining the system who must, in order to
do their work, have potential access to everything.
No, there isn't. This statement is about as recklessly false as your
previous one that WMF
On 06/11/2013 08:19 AM, Anthony wrote:
Putting everything in a single database which can be accessed by a single
developer is a choice.
It is, also, the only *reasonable* choice given the resources at our
disposal.
I've contracted with CSIS in the past and had the immense pleasure of
working
Perhaps we as individuals, or the WMF as an organisation, might also like
to sign up to Mozilla's campaign stopwatching.us?
Blogpost -
https://blog.mozilla.org/blog/2013/06/11/stopwatching-us-mozilla-launches-massive-campaign-on-digital-surveillance/
Website - https://optin.stopwatching.us/
I
[+ Advocacy Advisors]
On Tue, Jun 11, 2013 at 9:08 AM, Liam Wyatt liamwy...@gmail.com wrote:
Perhaps we as individuals, or the WMF as an organisation, might also like
to sign up to Mozilla's campaign stopwatching.us?
Blogpost -
We'd should ask the NSA if they'd like a Wikipedian-in-Residence.
Think of the citations we could add to BLPs!
On Jun 10, 2013 2:17 AM, Liam Wyatt liamwy...@gmail.com wrote:
This is a simple question with a potentially very complicated answer.
What, if any, are the implications of the
On 6/11/2013 1:03 PM, Andy Mabbett wrote:
We'd should ask the NSA if they'd like a Wikipedian-in-Residence.
Why not just go all the way and ask them to release everything they've
collected under a free license? (Well, so the copyright to most of it
probably doesn't belong to them. Does that
Would they be considered a reliable source?
Peter
- Original Message -
From: Andy Mabbett a...@pigsonthewing.org.uk
To: Wikimedia Mailing List wikimedia-l@lists.wikimedia.org
Sent: Tuesday, June 11, 2013 10:03 PM
Subject: Re: [Wikimedia-l] PRISM
We'd should ask the NSA if they'd like
On Tue, Jun 11, 2013 at 10:41 AM, Marc A. Pelletier m...@uberbox.orgwrote:
On 06/11/2013 08:19 AM, Anthony wrote:
Putting everything in a single database which can be accessed by a single
developer is a choice.
It is, also, the only *reasonable* choice given the resources at our
disposal.
On Sun, Jun 9, 2013 at 11:05 PM, Anthony wikim...@inbox.org wrote:
By access logs I meant HTTP access logs. It's pretty clear that without
taking extraordinary measures, what you're editing is not anonymous. But
some people are probably under the impression that what they're reading and
Benjamin Lees, 10/06/2013 08:13:
http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.org.wikimedia.foundation/49712/focus=49727 is
probably relevant (if what Domas said then is still true).
While I'm not aware of privacy changing substantially, speaking of
fantastic names, Kraken is going to change things a bit
Federico Leva wrote:
...
WMF will log the same (partial) data, but for 100 % of visits rather than
1/1000.
How much more will that cause the Foundation to spend on processing
subpoenas from law enforcement agencies? Will those agencies be
charged for the time and organizational overhead of
On 06/10/2013 08:49 AM, Federico Leva (Nemo) wrote:
Benjamin Lees, 10/06/2013 08:13:
http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.org.wikimedia.foundation/49712/focus=49727
is
probably relevant (if what Domas said then is still true).
While I'm not aware of privacy changing substantially, speaking of
are visible
to all volunteers admins. Wikipedia's inherently a pretty transparent
system...
,
Salvidrim!
-Original Message- From: Anthony
Sent: Sunday, June 09, 2013 10:37 PM
To: Wikimedia Mailing List
Subject: Re: [Wikimedia-l] PRISM
There is plenty of reason to think the government
Everything passing over the internet is archived. Nearly everything done
at Wikipedia passes over the internet.
Fred
My understanding is that PRISM focused on private electronic
communication. I can't see a situation where we would be concerned by
that.
But some official statement could
On 10 June 2013 10:56, Florence Devouard anthe...@yahoo.com wrote:
Precisely, they could ask to have CU accounts...
There are people who closely monitor who has what powers.
- d.
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On 06/10/2013 04:53 AM, Benoit Landry wrote:
What information could the WMF disclose that isn't already available
to some volunteers anyhow? The IP addresses of logged-in editors are
visible to volunteer CUs; deleted revisions and log entries are visible
to all volunteers admins. Wikipedia's
There is plenty of reason to think the government would be interested in
Wikipedia access logs.
On the other hand, there's very little reason to believe an organization
when they say they haven't been turning over information under a top
secret
order which they're not allowed to tell anyone
On 06/10/2013 03:17 AM, Liam Wyatt wrote:
This is a simple question with a potentially very complicated answer.
What, if any, are the implications of the PRISM scandal for Wikimedia?
Does the fact that our servers are based in the US now compromise our
mission either in a technical,
Tobias wrote:
I think Wikimedia should protest openly against such unethical
surveillance. While previous posts have pointed out that indeed
Wikipedia contains less private information than Facebook or Google, it
still has a lot that should remain private. Most notably access logs of
both
If the NSA, CIA, or some other spook agency is getting information off of
Wikimedia servers, they don't have a CU account or anything like that.
They'd have a program running at the operating system level that extracts
the data in a standardised format and sends it off to some secret server
On Mon, Jun 10, 2013 at 6:10 AM, Fred Bauder fredb...@fairpoint.net wrote:
Everything passing over the internet is archived. Nearly everything done
at Wikipedia passes over the internet.
Encrypted, if you're using https everywhere (and Wikipedia hasn't
intentionally or unintentionally
I don't understand this line of discussion.
From an intelligence stand-point, the goal of the program seems to be
communication interception COMINT through SIGAD means. From phone calls, to
emails, to private and public posts. I'm not sure how that would have any
bearing on Wikipedia though, the
On Mon, Jun 10, 2013 at 6:21 AM, Fred Bauder fredb...@fairpoint.net wrote:
Correct. If Osama Bin Laden had been editing Wikipedia, before his death
of course, through some account in Pakistan, it would have been rather
reasonable to respond favorable to a request for information. But plenty
On Mon, Jun 10, 2013 at 8:59 AM, Theo10011 de10...@gmail.com wrote:
I'm not sure how that would have any
bearing on Wikipedia though, the purpose there is to write an article, fix
typos, add pictures, occasionally there is cross-communication between
different editors.
Wikipedia is not a
On Mon, Jun 10, 2013 at 6:33 PM, Anthony wikim...@inbox.org wrote:
Wikipedia is not a top traffic website from people editing. 99% of the
traffic is reading/searching.
Yes, and I as I pointed to the email written by Domas, that those logs
don't exist.
We know that people's Google
On Mon, Jun 10, 2013 at 6:10 AM, Fred Bauder fredb...@fairpoint.net
wrote:
Everything passing over the internet is archived. Nearly everything done
at Wikipedia passes over the internet.
Encrypted, if you're using https everywhere (and Wikipedia hasn't
intentionally or unintentionally
They tap directly into the internet backbone. Only if there is some
particular matter which interests them which they would need our help to
decipher would they contact the Foundation. There are a few things out
there that I can imagine them being interested in, but very few. For
example, there
You are right, Anthony, never assume you're not dealing with idiots. If
NSA is doing doing detailed surveillance of Tea Party activists or
defense lawyers we are truly well along the road to hell.
Fred
On Mon, Jun 10, 2013 at 6:21 AM, Fred Bauder fredb...@fairpoint.net
wrote:
Correct. If
National Security Letters have been served on Libraries. However, as we
keep no track whatever off who is reading the site; it is hard to see how
serving one on us would accomplish anything; we can't produce records we
don't keep. I suppose a secret court order could be applied for which
would
On Mon, Jun 10, 2013 at 11:00 PM, Anthony wikim...@inbox.org wrote:
On Mon, Jun 10, 2013 at 6:21 AM, Fred Bauder fredb...@fairpoint.net wrote:
No, massive amounts of information about people doing ordinary
things like editing articles about Homer Simpson is kind of the opposite
of
On 06/10/2013 03:30 PM, Fred Bauder wrote:
Encrypted, if you're using https everywhere (and Wikipedia hasn't
intentionally or unintentionally compromised their certificate).
But simple encryption that NSA can break at will.
No one will bother trying to break SSL/TLS. The NSA certainly
It would be good *if* the WMF can provide assurances to editors that
they havent received any national security letters or other 'trawling'
requests from any U.S. agency.
If the WMF has received zero such requests, can the WMF say that?
There wouldn't be any gag order.
On Mon, Jun 10, 2013 at 7:31 PM, John Vandenberg jay...@gmail.com wrote:
Or DeCSS, or AACS, ..
Or 2012 Benghazi attack, Efforts to impeach Barack Obama, Drone
attacks in Pakistan, ..
Or PRISM (surveillance program), Edward Snowden, Bradley Manning, ..
It would be good *if* the WMF can
I think the key here is not to keep more information about users than
necessary.
Of course, there is the question of if the NSA asks for our checkuser data.
I am relatively confident of WMF's honesty here. They have been pretty
concerned about user privacy in general (I am sure that there is
Forwarded to legal at wikimedia.org
Fred
I think the key here is not to keep more information about users than
necessary.
Of course, there is the question of if the NSA asks for our checkuser
data.
I am relatively confident of WMF's honesty here. They have been pretty
concerned about
On 10/06/13 14:12, Tobias wrote:
No one will bother trying to break SSL/TLS. The NSA certainly doesn't
need to. They can just sign their own certificates and perform
man-in-the-middle attacks. Browsers will in most cases accept those
forged certificates, since the NSA can make sure that they
Encrypted, if you're using https everywhere (and Wikipedia hasn't
intentionally or unintentionally compromised their certificate).
But simple encryption that NSA can break at will.
No one will bother trying to break SSL/TLS. The NSA certainly doesn't
need to. They can just sign their
On Mon, Jun 10, 2013 at 9:09 AM, Theo10011 de10...@gmail.com wrote:
On Mon, Jun 10, 2013 at 6:33 PM, Anthony wikim...@inbox.org wrote:
We know that people's Google searches have been used against them in
court. I'm not aware of any cases where Wikipedia searches have been
used. But I
On Mon, Jun 10, 2013 at 9:36 AM, Fred Bauder fredb...@fairpoint.net wrote:
You are right, Anthony, never assume you're not dealing with idiots. If
NSA is doing doing detailed surveillance of Tea Party activists or
defense lawyers we are truly well along the road to hell.
Maybe we are. It
They tap directly into the internet backbone. Only if there is some
particular matter which interests them which they would need our help to
decipher would they contact the Foundation. There are a few things out
there that I can imagine them being interested in, but very few. For
example, there
Hi, all-
For your information, we have not been approached to participate in
PRISM, and we have never received or honored an NSA or FISA subpoena
or order. If we were to be approached in the future, we would reject
participation in any PRISM-type program to the maximum extent possible
and
Luis Villa wrote:
For your information, we have not been approached to participate in
PRISM, and we have never received or honored an NSA or FISA subpoena
or order.
Google and Facebook both flatly denied having any relationship to
PRISM, and it turned out not to be exactly true—is there any
Because Luis, Geoff and Stephen all know me well, and in particular they
know that if they did sign up to such a programme I'd deck them :P.
On 10 June 2013 23:29, Tomasz W. Kozlowski tom...@twkozlowski.net wrote:
Luis Villa wrote:
For your information, we have not been approached to
On 11/06/13 05:21, Anthony wrote:
On Mon, Jun 10, 2013 at 9:36 AM, Fred Bauder fredb...@fairpoint.net wrote:
You are right, Anthony, never assume you're not dealing with idiots. If
NSA is doing doing detailed surveillance of Tea Party activists or
defense lawyers we are truly well along the
On Tue, Jun 11, 2013 at 8:15 AM, Luis Villa lvi...@wikimedia.org wrote:
Hi, all-
For your information, we have not been approached to participate in
PRISM, and we have never received or honored an NSA or FISA subpoena
or order. If we were to be approached in the future, we would reject
David Gerard wrote:
On 10 June 2013 18:01, Rand McRanderson therands...@gmail.com wrote:
I think the key here is not to keep more information about users than
necessary.
In particular - at present. as I understand it, we don't keep full
access logs, just 1/1000 samples.
We need to not keep
David Gerard wrote:
On 10 June 2013 18:01, Rand McRanderson therands...@gmail.com wrote:
I think the key here is not to keep more information about users than
necessary.
In particular - at present. as I understand it, we don't keep full
access logs, just 1/1000 samples.
We need to not keep
On Mon, Jun 10, 2013 at 6:15 PM, Luis Villa lvi...@wikimedia.org wrote:
We should have a blog post up within the next few days to discuss
PRISM and our values in more detail; we will pass that along here when
it is posted.
Thanks. I do appreciate this. And it seems to be better worded than
On Mon, Jun 10, 2013 at 7:13 PM, John Vandenberg jay...@gmail.com wrote:
e.g. we have never received or honored an NSA or FISA subpoena or
order is good (and far better than I've seen from Google or
Facebook), but ...
does that exclude all possible orders under the Patriot Act?
does that
Anthony and John beat me to it -- I was going to second the suggestion that
the sentence spend a bit of time being wordcrafted on Meta for extra eyes,
to clarify things like the National Security Letters, NSL gag orders, etc.
-Dan
Dan Rosenthal
On Tue, Jun 11, 2013 at 4:02 AM, Anthony
Fred Bauder wrote:
This has come up in the context of database dumps and database
replication. We're basically asking for this information to one day be
leaked by retaining it indefinitely (including usernames that out
individuals, CheckUser logs, content buried inside page histories,
etc.).
Anthony wrote:
One thing I'd also appreciate is that if indeed Wikipedia access logs are
not even collected in the first place (except for 1/1000 samples), that
this be stated officially, rather than relying on a two-year-old comment
by a single, now-former employee.
Minor point: I can't tell for
Federico Leva (Nemo) wrote:
Benjamin Lees, 10/06/2013 08:13:
http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.org.wikimedia.foundation/49712/focus=49727
is probably relevant (if what Domas said then is still true).
While I'm not aware of privacy changing substantially, speaking of
fantastic names, Kraken is going
On Mon, Jun 10, 2013 at 10:06 PM, MZMcBride z...@mzmcbride.com wrote:
Anthony wrote:
One thing I'd also appreciate is that if indeed Wikipedia access logs are
not even collected in the first place (except for 1/1000 samples), that
this be stated officially, rather than relying on a
On 11/06/13 10:41, Anthony wrote:
One thing I'd also appreciate is that if indeed Wikipedia access logs are
not even collected in the first place (except for 1/1000 samples), that
this be stated officially, rather than relying on a two-year-old comment by
a single, now-former employee.
In
All edits and other actions are archived, but I would think there would
be zero interest or utility to NSA. I would simply ignore the matter.
Fred
This is a simple question with a potentially very complicated answer.
What, if any, are the implications of the PRISM scandal for Wikimedia?
My understanding is that PRISM focused on private electronic
communication. I can't see a situation where we would be concerned by
that.
But some official statement could help put at ease people worries :)
--
Christophe
On 10 June 2013 03:34, Fred Bauder fredb...@fairpoint.net wrote:
All edits
2013/6/9 Fred Bauder fredb...@fairpoint.net
All edits and other actions are archived, but I would think there would
be zero interest or utility to NSA. I would simply ignore the matter.
How about private messages from Special:EmailUser?
Just asking. I haven't studied the subject of PRISM much
I think an official statement would be unnecessary and ill advised. It
doesn't affect Wikimedia projects, there is no reason to think it
does, and involving itself would be a mistake the WMF can and should
avoid.
On Sun, Jun 9, 2013 at 10:12 PM, Christophe Henner
christophe.hen...@gmail.com
There is plenty of reason to think the government would be interested in
Wikipedia access logs.
On the other hand, there's very little reason to believe an organization
when they say they haven't been turning over information under a top secret
order which they're not allowed to tell anyone
...
,
Salvidrim!
-Original Message-
From: Anthony
Sent: Sunday, June 09, 2013 10:37 PM
To: Wikimedia Mailing List
Subject: Re: [Wikimedia-l] PRISM
There is plenty of reason to think the government would be interested in
Wikipedia access logs.
On the other hand, there's very little reason
On Sun, Jun 9, 2013 at 10:53 PM, Benoit Landry benoit_lan...@hotmail.comwrote:
What information could the WMF disclose that isn't already available to
some volunteers anyhow?
I don't know what information some volunteers have access to, who
qualifies as some volunteers (does the board
I'd suggest that while Wikimedia projects are somewhat less susceptible to
PRISM-style snooping, simply because we're not a communications medium like
Google or Facebook are. However, there is plenty of non-public information
that could be of interest:
- The IP addresses and identities of logged
On Mon, Jun 10, 2013 at 12:05 AM, Craig Franklin
cfrank...@halonetwork.netwrote:
I wouldn't say that there's nothing to worry about, but at the same time I
doubt we're near the top of the spooks' priority list.
Maybe not priority-wise, but remember that the cooperation between
Mediawiki
On Mon, Jun 10, 2013 at 2:30 PM, Anthony wikim...@inbox.org wrote:
Maybe not priority-wise, but remember that the cooperation between
Mediawiki developers and the CIA goes back several years at the least.
Please feel free to elaborate, Just because they use MediaWiki doesn't
mean the
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