On Mar 10, 2008, at 5:22 PM, Stephen Kent wrote: > Pekka, > > I agree that a title with a narrow scope is appropriate, but I > believe that you suggested revision is too narrow. The RPKI is > broader in scope than just route origination, as Geoff noted. For > example, the SBGP and soBGP proposals, which were debated > extensively in RPSEC, both address path validation and both rely on > the sort of PKI that is being covered in this document. I think some > additional wordsmithing on the title and abstract is needed.
But RPKI provides an infrastructure *to enable those*, OR a static route filter, or any of a number of other things. Listing the array of things that might be done and implying that SIDR itself provides that capability is misleading. -danny _______________________________________________ Sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
