At 5:46 PM -0600 3/10/08, Danny McPherson wrote: >On Mar 10, 2008, at 5:22 PM, Stephen Kent wrote: > >>Pekka, >> >>I agree that a title with a narrow scope is appropriate, but I >>believe that you suggested revision is too narrow. The RPKI is >>broader in scope than just route origination, as Geoff noted. For >>example, the SBGP and soBGP proposals, which were debated >>extensively in RPSEC, both address path validation and both rely on >>the sort of PKI that is being covered in this document. I think some >>additional wordsmithing on the title and abstract is needed. > >But RPKI provides an infrastructure *to enable those*, OR a static >route filter, or any of a number of other things. Listing the array >of things that might be done and implying that SIDR itself provides >that capability is misleading. > >-danny
Listing the capabilities that the RPKI enables seems reasonable to me, so long as we don't claim that the near term work items will yield solutions to all of them. The RPKI is not designed to support "any number of things." It is designed to support a set of near and longer term BGP routing security solutions. Steve _______________________________________________ Sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
