All, FWIW, I agree with the sentiments echo'ed by Pekka & Danny and would support a narrowing of the Title, etc. to more accurately reflect the present architecture being discussed.
-shane Stephen Kent wrote: > At 5:46 PM -0600 3/10/08, Danny McPherson wrote: >> On Mar 10, 2008, at 5:22 PM, Stephen Kent wrote: >> >>> Pekka, >>> >>> I agree that a title with a narrow scope is appropriate, but I >>> believe that you suggested revision is too narrow. The RPKI is >>> broader in scope than just route origination, as Geoff noted. For >>> example, the SBGP and soBGP proposals, which were debated >>> extensively in RPSEC, both address path validation and both rely on >>> the sort of PKI that is being covered in this document. I think some >>> additional wordsmithing on the title and abstract is needed. >> But RPKI provides an infrastructure *to enable those*, OR a static >> route filter, or any of a number of other things. Listing the array >> of things that might be done and implying that SIDR itself provides >> that capability is misleading. >> >> -danny > > Listing the capabilities that the RPKI enables seems reasonable to > me, so long as we don't claim that the near term work items will > yield solutions to all of them. The RPKI is not designed to support > "any number of things." It is designed to support a set of near and > longer term BGP routing security solutions. > > Steve > _______________________________________________ > Sidr mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr _______________________________________________ Sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
