Hi Rob
wg chair hat off comments follow On 03/09/2008, at 7:51 AM, Rob Austein wrote: > Just finished paper and red pencil WGLC review of rpki-manifests-02. > This may seem a little odd, given that I'm a co-author, but it's how I > usually review my own documents for WGLC anyway, and in this case the > responsible WG chair asked me to post my comments to the list rather > than just sending them to my co-authors. > > I found one substantive issue: an incorrect (IMHO) requirement to use > one-off EE certs to sign manifests associated with CA certificates. > Allowing one-off EE certificates is fine, mandating them is wrong. > The manifest must be regenerated every time that something in the > collection changes, so if there are a lot of non-batched changes > within one manifest thisUpdate/nextUpdate cycle, requiring one-off EE > certificates requires listing a lot of old EE certificates in the CRL. > Given that the CA certificates do not cycle anywhere near that > quickly, this seems like an unreasonable requirement. > I think this is a valid comment and we should alter the spec to allow this reuse of the EE cert in this fashion As usual, though, this does raise another question: If, at all times, the EE cert is only used to sign the "current" manifest, then does the EE cert require its own SIA and publication area? My inclination is to say that any point in time it looks like a single use EE cert, its just that you MAY keep the private key on hand, and MAY reuse the cert to sign a sequence of manifests.. Is this consistent with your view? > > Rest of review is clarification, no major substantive issues unless > people get worked up about SHOULD vs MUST clarifications. > > === > > Section 2.1: First paragraph is confusing and flat wrong in a few > places. I think this stems from attempting to talk about a "CA's" > publication point rather than a "CA certificate's" publication point. > Second paragraph has minor issues along the same lines. Suggested > rewrite of the entire section: > > In the case of a CA certificate's manifest of its associated > publication repository in the scope of the Resource Certificate PKI > (RPKI), the manifest contains the current published certificates > issued by this CA certificate, the most recent CRL associated with > the CA certificate, and all objects that are signed using a > "single-use" EE certificate issued by this CA certificate. > > In the case where an EE certificate has a defined publication > repository, the EE certificate's manifest contains all published > objects that have been signed by the EE certificate's key pair. > Now i'm in a terminology soup too. I thought that it was appropriate to talk about a CA, where CA stands for "Certification Authority", which is an entity that issues digital certificates for use by other parties, so it was appropriate to talk about a CA's manifest, CRLs issued by a CA and certificates issued by a CA, You are proposing to use the term "CA certificate" instead. Now for me the "CA certificate" is not the active entity, its the "CA". I looked arounf in RFC5280 and did not find any use of "CA certificate" and heading off into wiki-land also found use of the term "CA", but not "CA Certificate" as an activity entity. So I'll hold off on this and see if others could offer views on what is usual here in terms of accepted terminology. > === > > Section 2.2.1.3.2.1: Last sentence of first paragraph assumes one-off > EE cert and is wrong anyway. Rewrite: > > Any revoked EE certificates used to sign previous manifests will be > removed from the CRL upon expiration. > yep, agreed > -=== > > Section 2.2.1.3.2.1.4: Last sentence requires one-off EE certs. > Rewrite: > > In such a case, if one-off manifest EE certificates are being used, > when the authority issues the new manifest, it MUST also issue a > new CRL that includes the EE certificate corresponding to the old > manifest. > yep, agreed > === > > Section 2.2.1.4: This could probably be relaxed slightly. The MUST > requirement is there to ease validation of manifests for CA > certificates; it's not really necessary for manifest of EE > certificates, as the validator already has the EE certificate in hand > by the time it gets to the manifest in that case. The requirement is > harmless in any case, so I'm ok with leaving this as it stands. this was a topic of a discussion some time back and the MUST was a result of that conversation. Its not necessarily the case that the validator has the EE certificate in hand - the CA MAY elect not to publish the EE certificate separately and publish it ONLY in the form of including it in the CMS wrapper of the manifest. So I thought that the outcome was that the EE cert MUSt be in the CMS wrapper of the manifest and MAY be separately published in a repository publication point. So I propose to leave this as it stands, which I assume from your comment above is still ok with you. > > > === > > Section 3.1: This is is where my fundamental disagreement with the > one-off EE certificate requirement shows up. > > Steps 1 and 2 should only require new keypair and EE certificate if > none already exists or if the CA has chosen to use one-off EE > certificates. Rewrite: > > 1. If no keypair exists, or if using one-off manifest EE > certificates, generate a key pair, then generate an EE > certificate for this key pair to enable relying parties to > verify the signature on the manifest. > > Then renumber following steps, since I just collapsed two steps into > one (easier to read than spreading a conditional across two steps). > agreed > Step 2 bullet list: > > First bullet requires an id-ad-signedobject SIA extension in the EE > certificate. This is harmless, and could conceivably be useful, but > is not really required given that the EE certificate will be bundled > into the CMS anyway. I'm ok with leaving this as it stands, am just > pointing it out in case it's an oversight from a previous edit. this is not so straightforward, as it now impacts on the res-cert draft, section 3.9.7 Assuming that a sequence of manifests issued by a CA (and a CA has a single key value) has a single publication point object name then the id-as-signedobject SIA points to this object and all works fine. But this assumption is a stipulation in the third bukket point of section 3.3, so I guess that this is a long winded way of saying that even with an EE certificate being used to sign multiple manifests in sequence the id-ad-signedobject text is stillvalid and I propose to leave that part of the text as it stands. Again, I assume from your comment above that this is ok with you. > > > Second bullet mentions IP resources but omits ASN resources. Both > should be handled via RFC 3779 inheritance, so rewrite: > > * This EE certificate SHOULD describe its RFC 3779 address and > ASN resources using the "inherit" attribute rather than > explicit description of a resource set. > agreed > Third bullet once again pushes for one-off EE certificates. > Rewrite: > > * The validity times of the EE certificate SHOULD exactly match > the thisUpdate and nextUpdate times of the manifest when > using a one-off EE certificate. The validity times of the > EE certificate MUST encompass the interval from thisUpdate > to nextUpdate in any case. > agreed > Step 6 assumes one-off EE certificates. Rewrite: > > > 6. If using one-off EE certificates, the private key associated > with the EE certificate SHOULD now be destroyed. > agreed > You will no doubt have noted that I'm using the term "one-off" instead > of "single-use" here. This is not an accident. "Single-use" has > proven to be ambiguous, in that it could mean a certificate that's > used to sign multiple generations of a single object or a certificate > that's used to sign exactly one generation of that same object. A > better term than either might be "throw-away certificate", but that > might be perceived as pejorative (which it's not, the technique is > clever when used appropriately). again I agree that this concept, that a certificate is in use once at any time, but is used multiple times in series is indeed ambigiuous with the term "single use" I too would be loathe to use "throwaway" certificate, and I would liek to keep the term "single use" in a fashion that is consistent with res- certs, but I will think about this some more and see if there is some text at the start of the manifest draft that could draw the distinction between "single-use, used once only", and "single-use, but could be reused multiple times" EE certificates > > > For an example of the other meaning of "single-use" within this same > document, see the last paragraph of section 3.2. and that last paragraph actually holds in both these cases for manifests > > > === > > Section 3.2, last paragraph. Other sense of term "single-use", as > noted above. In this case it appears to mean "an EE certificate that > has no id-ad-signedObjectRepository accessMethod in its SIA > extension" (ie, the first sentence is a tautology). Rewrite: > > EE certificates that do not contain an id-ad-signedObjectRepository > accessMethod in their SIA extensions do not have repository > publication points. The object signed by such an EE certificate is > published in the repository publication point of the CA certificate > that issued the EE certificate, and is listed in the corresponding > manifest for this CA certificate. > > More generally, at this point I consider all occurances of the term > "single use" (or variants such as "single-use") in this document to be > suspect; in each case I think it's clear from context which meaning > was intended, but given that the same term can be understood in either > of two very different ways, I think it's best to avoid it entirely. > again, I agree, and it needs more thought as to getting the words clear - I think we both agree what's going on here. > === > > Section 3.3: > > Fourth bullet item is dead wrong. Manifest scope is all objects > signed by a particular certificate, not all objects signed by a > particular authority. A persistant name is indeed required, but it > certainly can derived in part from the public key value, and probably > should be to minimize the risk of manifest collision during key > rollover. I'd just remove the fourth bullet item entirely. yes - with the definition of a CA as one that is boiund to a single key pair this is dead wrong. so I agree > > > Fifth bullet item: s/the old CA associated/the old CA certificate > associated/ (the distinction matters, particularly in this paragraph). well I'm still having trouble with this one, terminology-wise! > > > === > > Section 4: There are several occurance of a rather odd phrase: > > The issuer SHOULD honour these values in the issued certificate or > MUST reject the Certificate Request. > > I don't know what this means. Either it's a SHOULD or it's a MUST, > can't have it both ways. If there's something more subtle going on > here, somebody's going to have to explain it to me, preferably by > rephrasing all of the occurances of this incantation, because it's > totally opaque to me. > ok - the ISSUER MUST honor the values in the issued certificate says that the issuer has no choice but to honor them. = i.e. the issuer cannot reject the request if the MUST truly is a MUST. The proposed wording says - either issue the certificate as requested (SHOULD honor) OR reject (MUSt reject). No other option is possible So I would say that SHOULD honour or MUST reject is appropriate. But I would be interested to hear your suggestion of alternate wording that conveys the same intent more clearly. > === > > Section 6.2, last sentence: s/undetected deletions/undetected > deletions or replays/. agreed > > > === > > Section 6.3, second paragraph: s/valid manifest is also/valid manifest > covering the signed objects is also/. agreed > > > === > > Section 6.4: Interaction between manifests and CRLs is complex. It's > discussed briefly in section 6.6, this section and 6.6 should > reference each other. good point - agreed > > > Section 6.4, last paragraph: this is not not necessarily publisher > error, the relying party's clock might be wrong. Absent other data, > either explanation is plausible. > agreed > === > > Section 6.6: I find the discussion of the interaction between manifest > and CRL here a bit disturbing for the case where the manifest is stale > and the CRL is current. Everything this section says is correct, but > one could easily come away with the belief that it's better to believe > an old stale copy of the CRL than to believe the current CRL, just > because the (stale) manifest matches the (old, stale) CRL. I don't > think we want to prefer stale CRLs over current ones when we have both > and both are valid, so there's some clarification needed here. Does the "this is a matter of local policy" apply in such cases? > > > I haven't figured out yet whether this interaction is complicated > enough to merit its own subsection with inbound pointers from both > section 6.4 and section 6.6. > I'm not sure either, and I'll think about this some more > === > > That's it. wow - excellent - many thanks! Geoff _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
