Geoff & Rob,

First, my recollection is that we decided that the cert for a manifest appears only in the manifest data structure, which still seems like a useful simplification.

So, I suggest that this EE cert appear only in this location, and this not have its own publication point. That does require that the cert be used ONLY for manifest validation. In the terminology Geoff crafted for the manifest I-D, this makes the EE cert for a manifest a single-use cert, (optionally a sequential use cert) even if it is not a one-time-use cert.

Geoff's message emphasized reuse of the private key, but Rob's message emphasized the desire to not have to put the manifest EE cert on a CRL if a manifest is reissued one or more times before its next scheduled issuance time. There was no mention of the validity interval is for this cert in either Geoff's or Rob's messages.

For a one-time-use cert, the manifest I-D suggests that the EE cert lifetime match that of the manifest. That will cause each new EE to be on the CRL until the matching manifest expires, when a manifest is issued before the nextUpdate time. Presumably this is what triggered Rob's concern. The manifest I-D does not provide (useful) guidance for the validity period for a sequential-use EE cert associated with a manifest. Presumably the validity period will be longer than that anticipated for the manifest, else it makes no sense to view this as a sequential-use cert. So, it appears to me that a sequential-use, single-use cert satisfies Rob's concern about CRL growth.

The primary security rationale for revoking the EE cert for a manifest when a new manifest is issued is to alert RPs of the manifest change. The argument is that the revoked EE cert for the manifest will appear on the CRL, and RPs will thus know not to accept the old manifest. This argument presumes that RPs will acquire the new CRL in orders to perform this check. However, if an attacker replaces the new manifest and new CRL with the older, not yet expired versions, RPs will not be able to tell the difference, so the cited rationale is not a good one.

This suggests that a sequential-use EE cert for the manifest is just as secure as a one-time-use cert, relative to the unscheduled manifest change case.

Given this observation, I suggest that we mandate that the manifest nextUpdate value and the nextUpdate value in the CRL that covers the EE cert used to verify the manifest be the same. Otherwise, if the CRL is scheduled to be reissued before the manifest, the manifest will have to be reissued at that time, so that it contains the current CRL hash value, and we'll create a preventable stale manifest problem. (I also suggest that this analysis be included in the manifest I-D.) If CRL and manifest issuance are synchronized, as suggested above, then a sequential-use EE cert for a manifest can safely have a lifetime that spans multiple manifests. The primary argument for one-time-use EE certs for manifests, is the same as for ROAs, i.e., the underlying private key can be forgotten after use, making the system somewhat safer as a result.


As for terminology, a CA is an entity, a CA cert is not. We can talk about the current CRL issued by a CA and verified using the CA's cert, but a manifest is issued by a CA (through an EE representing the CA), nit by a CA cert.

Finaly, the document has LOTS of instances where is refers to objects signed by a given cert. This has to be fixed, as certs are not used to sign objects; they are used to verify signed objects.

I'l, send Geoff a marked up version of the manifest I-D with some of the edits based on my comments above.

Steve
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