Here are my comments on the CP. I do not believe that this document is ready
for the IESG at this stage.
On 03/10/2010, at 8:21 AM, Karen Seo wrote:
> 1.2. Overview -- replaced 2nd paragraph with 2 paragraphs
>
> From: This PKI parallels the existing INR distribution hierarchy. These
> resources are distributed by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
> (IANA) to the Regional Internet Registries. In some regions,
> National Internet Registries (NIRs) form a tier of the hierarchy
> below the RIRs for internet number resource (INR) distribution. ISPs
> and network subscribers form additional tiers below registries.
>
> To: The structure of the RPKI is modeled on the existing organizational
> structure that is already responsible for IP address and AS number
> resource allocation. In this allocation hierarchy, IANA allocates
> resources to five Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), each of which
> manages address and AS number allocation within a defined
> geopolitical region. The RIRs in turn allocate resources to Internet
> Service Providers, to subscribers with so-called provider-
> independent ("portable") allocations, and in some regions, to
> National Internet Registries (NIRs). (The term LIR is used in some
> regions to refer to what other regions define as an ISP. Throughout
> the rest of this document we will use the term ISP to simplify
> references to these entities.)
>
> As noted in the RPKI architecture document [ARCH], although IANA
> and/or the five RIRs are obvious candidates to be default TAs for
> the RPKI, each RP ultimately chooses the set of trust anchors it
> will use for certificate validation. For example, an RP (e.g., an
> LIR/ISP) could create a trust anchor to which all address space
> and/or all AS numbers are assigned, and for which the RP knows the
> corresponding private key. The RP could then issue certificates
> under this trust anchor to whatever entities in the PKI it wishes,
> with the result that the certification paths terminating at this
> locally-installed trust anchor will satisfy the RFC 3779 validation
> requirements.
>
there is much to be said for brevity and simplicity and the original section
1.2 had both - the expanded version of this description is not a good fit, and
the introduction of the TA considerations into the CP does not appear to sit
easily in the context of this document, in my opinion - I prefer the original
words!
> 1.4.1. Certification authorities -- 2nd paragraph
> From: Organizations that do not distribute INRs, but hold such resources
> also act as CAs when they create EE certificates.
> To: Organizations that do not distribute INRs, but hold such resources
> also act as CAs when they create EE certificates. Subscribers with
> PI space are the principle examples of this class of CAs.
>
I'd drop this change - the distinction between PI space and otherwise is poorly
made here. Again. I prefer the original words,
>
>
> 1.7 Definitions and acronyms
>
> Added:
> LIR - In some regions, the term Local Internet Registry (LIR) is
> used to refer to what is called an ISP in other regions.
>
> Provider-independent (PI) address space - PI address space is
> allocated directly by an Internet Registry to a subscriber. This space
> cannot be further allocated by the subscriber to other entities. The
> subscriber must contract with an ISP to obtain routing of the address
> block within the Internet. PI space enables the subscriber to change
> service providers without renumbering its networks and to use multiple
> ISPs in a multi-homed configuration.
>
>
I'd drop reference to PI space altogether - again it sits uncomfortably in the
context of the CP and the distinction is unclear here.
section 2.3
please change the formatting to make the list explicit (use bullets or similar?)
Also that is the purpose of "Also, please note" in para 3 - are the other
sentences in this section not worthy of noting? :-)
>
> 3.1.2 Need for names to be meaningful
>
> From: The Subject name in each certificate MUST be unique relative to all
> Subject names certified by the same Issuer, but the name does not
> need to be meaningful. There is no requirement, and no guarantee,
> that subject names are globally unique in this PKI. The certificates
> issued under this PKI are used for authorization in support of
> applications that make use of attestations of Internet resource
> holding, not for identification. The PKI binds a public key to sets
> of INRs. The name of the holder of the INR is not intended to be
> "meaningful".
> To: The Subject name in each certificate does not need to be meaningful.
> The certificates issued under this PKI are used for authorization in
> support of applications that make use of attestations of Internet
> resource holdings, not for identification. The PKI binds a public
> key to sets of INRs. The name of the holder of the INR is not
intended to be "meaningful".
This is still unclear for me.
The first sentence says that a subject "does not need to be meaningful". yet
sentence 4 states that the name is "not intended to be meaningful". I'm no
wiser whether meaningful subject names are permitted or not by this text.
>
> 3.1.6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks
>
> From: Because the Subject names are not intended to be meaningful, there
> is no provision to recognize or authenticate trademarks, service
> marks, etc.
> To: Since Subject names are not intended to be meaningful, there is no
> provision to recognize or authenticate trademarks, service marks,
> etc. When generating subject names, CAs should use a mechanism that
> is unlikely to result in Subject names that include trademarks,
> service marks, etc. CAs MUST NOT knowingly issue a certificate with
> a Subject name that a court of competent jurisdiction has determined
> infringes on the trademark of another individual or organization.
>
is that a "should" or a "SHOULD" in sentence 2?
Again my preference is for the original text - the revised text is an
unrealistic imposition on the CA and is discordant with section 3.1.2
3.2.2: s/bedescribed/be described/
3.2.3: Could you explain the purpose of 3.2.3? It does not appear to be
referenced elsewhere, nor is there any statement relating to the currency of
such individuals so identified. It seems out of place to me and I would
recommend dropping this section.
>
>
> 4.6 Certificate renewal
>
> Added: This section describes the procedures for certificate renewal.
> Certificate renewal is the issuance of a new certificate to replace an old
> one prior to its expiration. Only the validity dates and the serial number
> are changed. The public key and all other information remain the same.
>
>
> 4.6.1. Circumstance for certificate renewal -- first paragraph.
>
> Added: An overlap period of at least 24 hours is RECOMMENDED.
if the name of the renewed certificate at the repository publication point is
the same as that of the previous certificate then this "overlap" recommendation
is confusing. If this section is limited to referring to the valid times in the
certificates, and that a renewed certificate SHOULD be issued prior to 24 hours
before the validto time, then why not say so?
4.8.1. Circumstance for certificate modification
Modification of a certificate occurs to implement changes to
selected attribute values in a certificate. In the context of this
PKI, the only changes that are accommodated by certificate
modification are additions to the INR holdings described by the RFC
3779 extension.
what if the subject wishes to change their SIA?
4.8.1 ..." When a certificate modification is approved, a new certificate is
issued. The new certificate MUST contain the same public key and the
same expiration date as the original certificate, but with the
incidental information corrected and/or the INRs expanded.
Revocation of the previous certificate is not required."
but if the INR shrinks, then revocation of the previous cert IS required
(section 4.9.1). I'm confused by what this says.
5.6 This certificate SHOULD have a validity period that is at
least as long as that of any certificate being issued under that
certificate.
I believe that this is not correct, and that certificate lifetimes reflect
business relationships. It is admissible in the RPKI for a subordinate CA to
issue a cert with valid to times in excess of the CA cert of the issuers.
>
> 6.3.2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods
>
> From: The INRs held by RIRs and the NIRs periodically change because these
> registries receive new distributions. Therefore it is appropriate for
> their certificates to hae lifetimes that match the periodicity of these
> changes
>
> To: The INRs held by a CA may periodically change because it receives
> new distributions. Therefore it is appropriate for its certificate to
> hae a lifetime that matches the periodicity of these changes.
I would like to see the CP accommodate an operating practice where the issued
certificate has a lifetime that reflects the nature of the business
relationship between the INR distributor and the INR recipient.
Geoff
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