Thank you Karen for this work. I have a question regarding 1.6.3., a section that was always confusing to me.
It says: > 1.6.3. Person determining CP suitability for the policy > > The IESG MUST judge consensus of the IETF community for changes to > this policy. But from my reading of RFC3647 the suitability that is meant here is "whether a CA should be allowed to operate within or interoperate with a PKI". If that is indeed the case, I am not sure if the IESG plays any role here. If we look at the current INR distribution system, such determination is done by a parent registry by establishing business relationships and allocating resources downstream. Usually, there are certain checks and conditions in place and checking for all the MUSTS in the CPS and approving it might be included. That would be, IMO, the most natural way of building a compliant RPKI. However, I don't think we need this in the CP, at least not at this stage of RPKI development. I'd recommend that we make 1.6.3. "not applicable" and relax the requirements for the CPS, by removing all "MUST"s that must be in there, including the requirement that each CA MUST publish a CPS. In general, I agree with most of the previous comments and think that the CP itself won't make routing more secure. I'd prefer to have this document as lightweight and simple as possible and hope it can be published as an RFC before the RIRs start issuing production certificates. Thanks, Andrei _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
