On Fri, 1 Apr 2011, Andrei Robachevsky wrote:
Hi, I propose the inclusion of the following requirement: 3.x A BGPsec design should not decrease the performance characteristics of the BGP, nor have a negative impact on the overall resilience of the routing system.
Could you say how strictly you would want this requirement interpreted? For example, I would say that not even TCP-AO has NO impact on performance and resilience. Do you want the requirement to forbid TCP-AO?
--Sandy, speaking as wg co-chair
Examples that I have in mind is the convergence time or a solution that can make the global routing system more fragile (e.g. an expired signature blacking out a significant part of the Internet). Perhaps that should also be covered in the deployment considerations, since this depends partly on local policy decisions. Andrei _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
_______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
