On Apr 1, 2011, at 8:37 AM, Andrei Robachevsky wrote: > Hi, > > I propose the inclusion of the following requirement: > > 3.x A BGPsec design should not decrease the performance characteristics > of the BGP, nor have a negative impact on the overall resilience of the > routing system. > > Examples that I have in mind is the convergence time or a solution that > can make the global routing system more fragile (e.g. an expired > signature blacking out a significant part of the Internet). Perhaps that > should also be covered in the deployment considerations, since this > depends partly on local policy decisions.
As much as I'd love to support this, ultimately, any time you add integrity mechanisms to an information system you simply introduce more ways to fail, no? OTOH, it's important to be aware that new externalities and/or dependencies are being added, and we should aim not to step all the way back to RIPv1 scaling properties - brushing aside all that's been learned over the past several decades. -danny _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
