> -----Original Message----- > From: Russ White [mailto:[email protected]] > Sent: Tuesday, November 15, 2011 7:32 PM > To: Jakob Heitz > Cc: [email protected] > Subject: Re: [sidr] Burstiness of BGP updates > > > > The only utility I can see is in protecting reachability. > > The only problem I can imagine with installing an unsigned route > is > > that the destination becomes unreachable. If it was unreachable to > > begin with, no harm is done. > > When you're protecting reachability, what are you protecting? > Whether or not someone can reach something. I assume that the > "something" you're trying to protect reachability to would/must > include things where you enter your password. > > Hence, I look at this entire problem a little differently than > simply trying to enforce a small subset of policies, or as a > theoretical exercise... If we can't prevent real world consequences > with this work, then --why are we doing it?
We are doing it to protect reachability. We are not protecting your password in clear text on the internet. -- Jakob Heitz. x25475. 510-566-2901 _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
