As that old draft's author/editor (started as editor, ended up more as author, with suggestions), perhaps I can add some clarification to some of what's being re-hashed here. It's likely many already understand it; some don't; some could be aided by different wording.
Steve Kent takes the approach that working through the processing and propagation of updates and securing those operations to the spec. The notion appears to me to be to model behavior based on discrete events and the BGP FSM. Russ White takes the approach that the overall deployed system is very complex containing many dimensions of variability including but not limited to time, topology, and local practice/policy. Following from that is a concern that, beyond a point, adding the additional complexity being proposed results in either no benefit or negative impact to the goals of the global routing system. Hopefully I've characterized things reasonably and this might help anyone who's having trouble following at home. Tony On Thu, Nov 17, 2011 at 7:19 PM, Geoff Huston <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 17/11/2011, at 5:10 PM, Randy Bush wrote: > > >> The process SIDR has used is backwards --choose a solution, then build > >> the requirements around that solution. > > > > the bgpsec requirements document was started from the 2008 document > > draft-ietf-rpsec-bgpsecrec-10 > > That document never managed to reconcile the various views relating to > AS Path validation, so I'm unclear if you are citing this as a completed > activity, because to me it certainly appeared to be an incomplete piece > of work. > > To be specific to quote from section 7 of this draft: > > AS_PATH Feasibility Check: The AS_PATH list may correspond to a > valid list of autonomous systems according to the first > verification category listed in the "Areas to Secure" Section > above. Further study will determine the extent to which this is a > security requirement. > > > > _______________________________________________ > sidr mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr >
_______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
