> Yes, the hosted keep your private key, but you can modify your ROAs > anytime you want. At least the hosted systems that I know provide a web > interface to do that. The ROA would be published immediately or a few > minute/hours later, depending of the rpki-operator (my personal view and > with my network operator hat on is that it should be immediately or in > minutes).
Modulo the propagation time... But isn't it bad to allow automated changes to a certificate that's designed to operate "at human speeds," (based on other conversations on this list), and is so critical to the operation of the routing system? Aren't we just adding to the total attack surface available against the routing system by allowing users to go into a web page and change what's advertised into the ROA system? I know --it takes that bit of the problem out of the actual BGP space, and moves it into another space altogether, but... I don't see banking as being "more secure" because you can do all your banking on line --it's more convenient, but I think there's a clear tradeoff in security and convenience here, right? If this is the type of system that's envisioned, shouldn't the risks involved be documented someplace? Russ -- <>< [email protected] [email protected] _______________________________________________ sidr mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/sidr
