--- Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On 29/06/07, Charles D Hixson > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > Yes, you would live on in one of the copies as > if uploaded, and yes > > > the selection of which copy would be purely > random, dependent on the > > > relative frequency of each copy (you can still > define a measure to > > > derive probabilities even though we are talking > infinite subsets of > > > infinite sets). What do you think would happen? > > Why in only one of the copies? This is the part of > the argument that I > > don't understand. I accept that over time the > copies would diverge, but > > originally they would be substantially the same, > so why claim that the > > original consciousness would only be present in > one of them? > > Both copies are equivalent, so your consciousness > can equally well be > said to exist in each of them. However, each copy > can only experience > being one person at a time, a simple physical > limitation. So although > from a third person perspective you are duplicated > in both copies, > from a first person perspective you can only expect > to find yourself
But when you talk about "yourself", you mean the "yourself" of the copy, not the "yourself" of the original person. While all the copied selves can only exist in one body, the original self can exist in more than one body. You can pull this off without violating causality because once the original self has been copied, you can't refer to it experiencing anything as there's no longer an "it" to refer to. So while the original self exists in more than one body, it doesn't simultaneously experience multiple lives, because it doesn't experience anything at all, because it's no longer a coherent entity. Confused yet? > one of the copies post-duplication, and which one > has to be > probabilistic (since we agreed that they're both > equally well > qualified to be you). They both *are* you, in every possible sense of the term. Again, it's not like some magical sticky stuff exists in you, which is transferred to only one of the copies. It's not a coinflip whether "you" will awake as copy A or copy B, like it's a coinflip which body the sticky stuff winds up in; both will awake as you. > In the many worlds interpretation of quantum > mechanics, every time you > toss a coin you are duplicated and half the versions > of you see heads > while the other half see tails. The reason why this > interpretation > cannot be proved or disproved is precisely because > you experience > exactly the same thing if there is only one world > and a 1/2 > probability that the result will be heads or tails. So then why bother with interpretations at all? Why not just do the math and be done with it? - Tom > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > > ----- > This list is sponsored by AGIRI: > http://www.agiri.org/email > To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: > http://v2.listbox.com/member/?&; > ____________________________________________________________________________________ Don't pick lemons. See all the new 2007 cars at Yahoo! Autos. http://autos.yahoo.com/new_cars.html ----- This list is sponsored by AGIRI: http://www.agiri.org/email To unsubscribe or change your options, please go to: http://v2.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604&user_secret=7d7fb4d8
