--- Randall Randall <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:

> 
> On Jun 28, 2007, at 11:26 PM, Tom McCabe wrote:
> > --- Randall Randall <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > wrote:
> >> and
> >> What should a person before a copying experiment
> >> expect to remember, after the experiment?  That
> is,
> >> what should he anticipate?
> >
> > Waking up as a copy, as this will be true for all
> the
> > copies which later remember his anticipation. If
> he
> > anticipates waking up as copy A, copy B will think
> he
> > was wrong.
> 
> Exactly.  If the experiment is run 10 times (as in
> an earlier iteration), the end copies will find that
> a 50% anticipation of waking up as the first copy
> and a 50% anticipation of waking up as the second
> copy works out closest to accurate viewed across all
> of their experiences.
> 
> >> Obviously, the only way to determine the answer
> to
> >> the second question is to answer the first.  Once
> >> you've answered the first, and noted the various
> >> answers from various viewpoints of people that
> all
> >> remember being the "original", it seems obvious
> >> that the way to handle the anticipation question
> >> is via probability.  If A goes to sleep and B and
> >> C wake up remembering having been A, since B
> doesn't
> >> remember having been C and C doesn't remember
> >> having been B, it's clear that the original, A,
> >> should have expected to wake up B 50%, and C 50%.
> >
> > This would be true if A were some magical
> conserved
> > essence that *could not be created or destroyed*
> and
> > was split evenly between B and C. In reality, of
> > course, A never wakes up (we're assuming A is
> > destroyed and B and C are preserved, right?) and
> so
> > the statement is moot.
> 
> I don't understand why you would think that magic
> or conservation has anything to do with this.  There
> are two individuals after the copying.  One is B,
> and the other is C.  Since B will say, "Hey, I woke
> up as B, and not as C!  How about that!", and C
> likewise in reverse, it seems clear that there are
> two cases which happened to the set of people who
> remember having been A (leaving to the side the
> ever argumentative question of whether they "are"
> A; it's not important for this).  So, there are
> two cases, which are exclusive (neither of them
> remembers being the other, only A).

Agreed. The point is, that when A goes to sleep, he
doesn't have a 50/50 chance of waking up as B or
waking up as C. Since consciousness isn't conserved,
you can create more of it during the copying process,
and so A can wake up as B and C, and isn't forced to
choose between them, or have a probability
distribution over possible wakings up that sums to 1.
As for magic, I simply reference it because there's no
physical support whatsoever for any "stuff" that makes
people conscious independent of their brain
information. I don't know whether you in particular
believe in it, but quite a few people do.

> I'm not sure how you could come to any other
> conclusion, except by asserting that the question
> of "what should A expect" is nonsensical.
> 
> I've snipped quite a bit of this, because the parts
> I snipped don't seem germane to the "what should A
> expect?" question that we (I?) started with.
>
> --
> Randall Randall <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> "This is a fascinating question, right up there with
> whether rocks
> fall because of gravity or being dropped, and
> whether 3+5=5+3
> because addition is commutative or because they both
> equal 8."
>    - Scott Aaronson
> 
> 
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 - Tom


 
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