On 29/06/07, Tom McCabe <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

But when you talk about "yourself", you mean the
"yourself" of the copy, not the "yourself" of the
original person. While all the copied selves can only
exist in one body, the original self can exist in more
than one body. You can pull this off without violating
causality because once the original self has been
copied, you can't refer to it experiencing anything as
there's no longer an "it" to refer to. So while the
original self exists in more than one body, it doesn't
simultaneously experience multiple lives, because it
doesn't experience anything at all, because it's no
longer a coherent entity. Confused yet?

Ordinary life involves 1:1 copying. The half-life of proteins in mouse
brain tissue ranges from  hours to minutes, including structural
proteins such as those in the myelin sheath. It's easy enough to
imagine a situation where human metabolism is sped up to the point
where you go to sleep with one brain and wake up with another brain -
at least, a person wakes up in your bed who believes he is you and has
your memories etc. A believer in a mystical theory of personal
identity might say that the original person has died and been replaced
by a copy, or he might say that he is still the same person because
the consciousness has been retained in the cranium (or wherever it
resides) whereas dastardly destructive duplication experiments destroy
the old consciousness and create a new one which thinks it's the
original person but isn't really.

The only really consistent and unambiguous way to look at these
questions is to acknowledge that there is no conscious entity extended
through time in any absolute sense, but simply a series of moments of
conscious experience (observer-moments, in the terminology I believe
originated by Nick Bostrom) which associate in a particular way due to
their information content. The important point is that consciousness
does not "flow" from one observer-moment to the next, but only seems
to do so because of our linear existence from birth to death,
responsible for our psychology and for the "paradoxes" of personal
identity when we try to make sense of the various transhuman
situations.



--
Stathis Papaioannou

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