On 2/20/08, Stan Nilsen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > It seems that when philosophy is implemented it becomes like nuclear > physics e.g. break down all the things we essentially understand until > we come up with pieces, which we give names to, and then admit we don't > know what the names identify - other than broken pieces of something we > used to understand when it was whole. My limited experience with those > who practice philosophy is that they love to go to the absurd - I > suspect this is meant as a means of proof, but often comes across as > "macho philosophoso." Kind of "I can prove anything you say is absurd." > I welcome the thoughts of "Philosophers."
I think most or at least many philosophers, myself included, would actually agree that most of what (usually other) philosophers produce is garbage. Of course, they won't agree about *which* philosophical views and methods are garbage. I would propose that the primary explanation for this is simply that philosophy is really, really hard. It is almost by definition those areas of intellectual inquiry in which there is little established methodology. (I think that is a little overstated since at least in analytic philosophy, there is broad agreement on the logical structure of arguments and rather less broad but growing agreement on the nature of conceptual analysis.) Notice that it is not just philosophers who say stupid stuff in philosophy. Evolutionary biologists, computer scientists, economists, scientists, and just people in general can all be found saying stupid things when they try to venture into ethics, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, etc. In fact, I would say that professional philosophers have a significantly better track record in philosophy than people in general or the scientific community when they venture into philosophy (which may not say very much about their track record on an absolute scale). By the way, I think this whole tangent was actually started by Richard misinterpreting Lanier's argument (though quite understandably given Lanier's vagueness and unclarity). Lanier was not imagining the amazing coincidence of a genuine computer being implemented in a rainstorm, i.e. one that is robustly implementing all the right causal laws and the strong conditionals Chalmers talks about. Rather, he was imagining the more ordinary and really not very amazing coincidence of a rainstorm bearing a certain superficial isomorphism to just a trace of the right kind of computation. He rightly notes that if functionalism were committed to such a rainstorm being conscious, it should be rejected. I think this is true whether or not such rainstorms actually exist or are likely since a correct theory of our concepts should deliver the right results as the concept is applied to any genuine possibility. For instance, if someone's ethical theory delivers the result that it is perfectly permissible to press a button that would cause all conscious beings to suffer for all eternity, then it is no legitimate defense to claim that's okay because it's really unlikely. As I tried to explain, I think Lanier's argument fails because he doesn't establish that functionalism is committed to the absurd result that the rainstorms he discusses are conscious or genuinely implementing computation. If, on the other hand, Lanier were imagining a rainstorm miraculously implementing real computation (in the way Chalmers discusses) and somehow thought that was a problem for functionalism, then of course Richard's reply would roughly be the correct one. ------------------------------------------- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604&id_secret=96140713-a54b2b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
