On 21/02/2008, John Ku <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On 2/20/08, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > On 21/02/2008, John Ku <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > By the way, I think this whole tangent was actually started by Richard > > > misinterpreting Lanier's argument (though quite understandably given > > > Lanier's vagueness and unclarity). Lanier was not imagining the > > > amazing coincidence of a genuine computer being implemented in a > > > rainstorm, i.e. one that is robustly implementing all the right causal > > > laws and the strong conditionals Chalmers talks about. Rather, he was > > > imagining the more ordinary and really not very amazing coincidence of > > > a rainstorm bearing a certain superficial isomorphism to just a trace > > > of the right kind of computation. He rightly notes that if > > > functionalism were committed to such a rainstorm being conscious, it > > > should be rejected. > > > > Only if it is incompatible with the world we observe. > > > I think that's the wrong way to think about philosophical issues. It > seems you are trying to import a scientific method to a philosophical > domain where it does not belong. Functionalism is a view about how our > concepts work. It is not tested by whether it is falisified by > observations about the world. > > Or if you prefer, conceptual analysis does produce scientific > hypotheses about the world, but the part of the world in question is > within our own heads, something that we ourselves don't have > transparent access to. If we had transparent access to the way our > concepts work, the task of cognitive science and philosophy and along > with it much of AI would be considerably easier. Our best way of > testing these hypotheses at the moment is to see whether a proposed > analysis would best explain our uses of the concept and our conceptual > intuitions.
Functionalism at least has the form of a scientific hypothesis, in that it asserts that a functionally equivalent analogue of my brain will have the same mental properties. Even though in practice it isn't empirically falsifiable we can examine it to make sure it is internally consistent, compatible with observed reality, and in keeping with the principle of Occam's razor. We should certainly be wary of a theory that sounds ridiculous, but unless it fails in one of these three areas it is wrong to dismiss it. -- Stathis Papaioannou ------------------------------------------- singularity Archives: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/11983/=now RSS Feed: http://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/11983/ Modify Your Subscription: http://www.listbox.com/member/?member_id=4007604&id_secret=96140713-a54b2b Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
