If the current situation is one where end users, of which I am one, and
likely we all are in spite of our other roles, are paying a premium of
dollars to lose the war against abuse; I'd just as soon see my same
money spent winning that battle, or preventing the abuse. For
connectiviity, a provider could require a "security deposit" (pre-pay
second 6 months of service), and/or access restrictions for the first
3-6 months (port 25 blocking, minimum if any personal web space, server
restrictions on DSL or cable, rate limiting outbound RCPT TO:s), signed
contracts, etc.
Heck, we spend a lot of bandwidth blocking mail which comes out of
known open relays and open proxies; why can't ISPs block their
customers from sending mail TO known open relays. I'm sure that there
is a technical solution to do this.
It seems from my dimly lit patch of the forest that connectivity
providers just aren't trying hard enough to prevent the outbound abuse,
both spam email and intrusive probing or viral promulgation.
Heck, Nimda broadcast its infections to every IP on the subnet. How
many ISPs shut down their infected clients, having just been notified
by the infected client of the infection? Why's that?
I don't mean to sound harsh. I just find the situation to be
incredulous.
`~Maynard
_______________________________________________
spamcon-general mailing list
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://mail.spamcon.org/mailman/listinfo/spamcon-general#subscribers
Subscribe, unsubscribe, etc: Use the URL above or send "help" in body
of message to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Contact administrator: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
