2.6.32-longterm review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let us know.
------------------ From: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]> commit 9f260e0efa4766e56d0ac14f1aeea6ee5eb8fe83 upstream. Since the socket address is just being used as a unique identifier, its inode number is an alternative that does not leak potentially sensitive information. CC-ing stable because MITRE has assigned CVE-2010-4565 to the issue. Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]> Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]> Cc: Moritz Muehlenhoff <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> --- net/can/bcm.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/net/can/bcm.c +++ b/net/can/bcm.c @@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ struct bcm_sock { struct list_head tx_ops; unsigned long dropped_usr_msgs; struct proc_dir_entry *bcm_proc_read; - char procname [20]; /* pointer printed in ASCII with \0 */ + char procname [32]; /* inode number in decimal with \0 */ }; static inline struct bcm_sock *bcm_sk(const struct sock *sk) @@ -1519,7 +1519,7 @@ static int bcm_connect(struct socket *so if (proc_dir) { /* unique socket address as filename */ - sprintf(bo->procname, "%p", sock); + sprintf(bo->procname, "%lu", sock_i_ino(sk)); bo->bcm_proc_read = proc_create_data(bo->procname, 0644, proc_dir, &bcm_proc_fops, sk); _______________________________________________ stable mailing list [email protected] http://linux.kernel.org/mailman/listinfo/stable
