On Mon, Aug 24, 2015 at 10:44 AM, Yoav Nir <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On Aug 24, 2015, at 5:31 PM, Watson Ladd <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> On Mon, Aug 24, 2015 at 7:29 AM, Ilari Liusvaara >> <[email protected]> wrote: >>> On Mon, Aug 24, 2015 at 07:22:23AM -0700, Watson Ladd wrote: >>>> On Mon, Aug 24, 2015 at 6:33 AM, David Mazieres >>>> >>>> This is a misreading: I'm proposing that at any time there is only one >>>> suite that everyone uses, and versioning is just for transitions. >>> >>> This becomes highly problematic when one needs to: >>> - Support multiple security levels. >>> - There isn't one technically (meaning, ignore legal constraints) >>> superrior algorithm. >> >> In case of point 2, why is there a need to use multiple algorithms? > > Because I believe algorithm A is superior, you believe algorithm B is > superior, but neither of us thinks the other algorithm is so bad that we > might as well use cleartext. > > So both of our implementations (or configurations) support both algorithms, > but whichever one gets to choose chooses according to our preference. > > AES-GCM vs ChaCha20/Poly1305. Which is superior?
Would you cry if you had to pick one? Clearly not. So why worry about making it possible to do this? > > Yoav > -- "Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains". --Rousseau. _______________________________________________ Tcpinc mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tcpinc
