> There is no entity > that owns or can be held responsible for the code, or is capable > of providing a solid evidentuary path from commit to your hands.
I thought if we buy the CDs we WILL get "a solid evidentuary path from commit to" our hands. So this isn't the case? On Wed, Sep 11, 2013 at 1:58 PM, Peter N. M. Hansteen <pe...@bsdly.net>wrote: > On Wed, Sep 11, 2013 at 01:49:14PM +0300, Valentin Zagura wrote: > > > We are going to use a OpenBSD system in a PCI-DSS compliant environment. > > Is there any way we can prove to our PCI-DSS assessor that the OpenBSD > > image we use for our installation can be checked so that it is the > correct > > one (is not modified in a malicious way by a third party) ? > > Probably not what you want to hear, but starting with > http://www.openbsd.org/orders.html > is usually an excellent idea in this context. Verifiably delivered from a > trusted source. > > > A https link to some kind of ISO checksum or something similar (but using > > strong cryptography) I think would do it, but I could not find any > (except > > a line in the FAQ stating "If the men in black suits are out to get you, > > they're going to get you." which is not the case :) ) > > It's possible some of the more prominent entries on > http://www.openbsd.org/support.html > could be persuaded to provide something like that (M:Tier comes to mind, > but why are > they not on that page?) in exchange for a reasonable fee. > > But again, for -RELEASE, the CD sets are a good starting point. > > - Peter > > -- > Peter N. M. Hansteen, member of the first RFC 1149 implementation team > http://bsdly.blogspot.com/ http://www.bsdly.net/ http://www.nuug.no/ > "Remember to set the evil bit on all malicious network traffic" > delilah spamd[29949]: 85.152.224.147: disconnected after 42673 seconds. >
