Of course routing security is considered. The reason that you want TLS in the first place is precisely the fact that routing can be compromised (ranging from WiFi evil twin up to BGP attack).
Security has to look at all sources of error but that does not mean it has to eliminate them. Security is risk mitigation and not risk elimination - as some of us were saying before a certain well known person wrote a book making that claim. In this particular instance there is still going to be a residual routing security risk with respect to denial of service so BGP security remains an issue, albeit one that is rather different to that the proposals attempt to address. On Thu, Jan 26, 2012 at 4:43 PM, David Conrad <[email protected]> wrote: > On Jan 26, 2012, at 1:34 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote: >> If a system is going to be robust in practice it has to take account >> of all possible sources of error including administrative incompetence >> and user error. > > I'm curious: where do you draw the line? Should routing system security be > included? Email security (since many transactions relating to DNS zone > administration occur via email)? Telephone? Etc. > >> Security that only looks at malice is brittle security. > > Security that looks at 'all possible sources of error' seems to me to be a > halting state problem > > Regards, > -drc > -- Website: http://hallambaker.com/ _______________________________________________ therightkey mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/therightkey
