It is nonsense. Let us consider a Tier 6 security regime applied to management of a CA:
Separation of duties - increases the number of trusted parties No sequential access - increases the number of trusted parties No lone zone - increases the number of trusted parties. Those are all NSA/GCHQ doctrines. I am pretty sure that they understand security engineering at some level. People need to stop talking about links in chains. If you have a serious security architecture it does not look like a chain, it does not have a single point failure mode. On Thu, Jan 26, 2012 at 5:55 PM, Richard L. Barnes <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> As security engineers, our role is to (a) reduce the number of >>>> entities we trust; (b) reduce the extent to which we trust the >>>> remaining trusted entities; and (c) determine the trustworthiness of >>>> trusted entities. >>> >>> Really? >> >> Yep. > > +1 > > One of the better definitions I've heard. I would question whether (c) is > even in scope; seems like a relying party function. -- Website: http://hallambaker.com/ _______________________________________________ therightkey mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/therightkey
