Dear David, It is practically axiomatic among cognitive psychologists that cognitive *processes* (can) take place unconsciously. (Retrieve the capital of France from memory. How did you do it?). Indeed Zenon Pylyshyn made it virtually definitional of fundamental cognitive processes that they be "cognitively imprenetrable," as he put it.
That said, the main problem with "repressed memories" is that cognitive psychologists know more about memory than almost any other aspect of cognition, and "repression" (as laid out by its advocates today) simply doesn't make any sense given what we know (and Beth Loftus' reconstructive account of what is *taken* to be "repression" makes a whole lot of sense). Defenders of repression have been forced to such blatantly ad hoc attempts to shore up their foundering position as: "there's a whole separate memory system to handle traumatic memories that operates unlike any of the other memory systems." In short, and to answer your question directly, in general, I think, experimental cognitive psychologists (I can't speak for *all* experimental psychologists) have no problem at all with unconscious mental processes. They have a profound problem, however, with the latter-day accounts of repression that take their lead from Freud. Regards, -- Christopher D. Green Department of Psychology York University Toronto, Ontario, Canada M3J 1P3 e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] phone: 416-736-5115 ext. 66164 fax: 416-736-5814 http://www.yorku.ca/christo/ ======================== David Lieberman wrote: > Stephen Black had a TIPS email a few weeks ago in which he listed myths > that many students believe, one of which is that children can repress the > memory of having been sexually abused, only for this memory to resurface > for many years. > > He and I got into an extended correspondence about whether the repression > of painful memories should really be regarded as a myth (from my point of > view, very enjoyable), and in the end it seemed to me that we differed not > so much in our interpretations of the evidence (though we did) as in our > fundamental assumptions about whether it was plausible that people could > inhibit or repress memories about traumatic events. As we continued to > discuss this, it seemed to me that this might be part of a much wider > division between psychologists about the reality of repression�that is, > not simply whether memories can be repressed, but more broadly whether > emotions can be suppressed, so that people are not consciously aware of > them. > > Because of my particular background in psychology (reading Freud as a > teenager), I�d always taken it for granted that psychologists accepted the > existence of emotional repression, but I�m now wondering whether this > remains a much more controversial issue than I had realized. I wonder > what members of TIPS think about this? Specifically, from your > experience, do you think there are still powerful divisions between > experimental psychologists about the existence of repression or other > defense mechanisms? If so, what proportion of experimental psychologists > would you guess accept the reality of such processes? > > Dave Lieberman > > Note: I�m really asking about psychologists� current beliefs, rather than > whether these beliefs are valid, but it�s perhaps worth mentioning (as a > further blow against Stephen, for daring to disagree with me) several > recent reviews that argue that while Freud�s overall theory is undoubtedly > vague, there is nevertheless convincing experimental evidence for the > existence of at least some of the defense mechanisms he postulated: > > Westen, D. (1998). The scientific legacy of Sigmund Freud: Toward a > psychodynamically informed psychological science. Psychological Bulletin, > 124, 333-371. > > Baumeister, R. F., Dale, K., & Sommer, K. L. (1998). Freudian defense > mechanisms and empirical findings in modern social psychology: Reaction > formation, projection, displacement, undoing, isolation, sublimation, and > denial. Journal of Personality, 66, 1081-1124. > > Cramer, P. (2000). Defense mechanisms in psychology today: Further > processes for adaptation. American Psychologist, 55, 637-646. > > A common theme of these reviews is that defense mechanisms have been > widely accepted within social psychology, though they have often > masqueraded under other names such as the false consensus effect (a > version of projection) and positive illusions (a version of denial). > > Does anyone know of recent reviews that reach the opposite conclusion, > that there is no convincing evidence for defense mechanisms to avoid > experiencing painful thoughts or emotions? > > Dr. David A. Lieberman > Department of Psychology > University of Stirling > Stirling FK9 4LA > Scotland > U. K. > > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > --- > You are currently subscribed to tips as: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > To unsubscribe send a blank email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- You are currently subscribed to tips as: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe send a blank email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
