This discussion could obviously be extended indefinitely, so I'll just comment on Mike Palij's considered summing up in his last posting:
>Is it possible that Joseph is just a crank and does not make any >valid points about the limitations of contemporary behavior genetics? >That certainly seems to the consensus of the people you cite. They >are after all experts in behavior genetics. However, there are problems >in making arguments based on authority, no matter how expert those >authorities are (think of the arguments made by experts in eugenics >back in the day; who could dispute Pearson's correlations and other >evidence?). Only additonal research and insightful analysis will show > to what degree today's behavior geneticists are correct in their assumptions, > methods, and conclusions. One of the fatal flaws of the eugenics >movement was the notion that Mendalism (single gene basis) could explain >all behaviors, an assumption that was shown early on to be inconsistent >with various data but was still maintained as a basic tenet (to Pearson's >credit, he rejected Mendalism but thought his biometrical approach >would provide the real basis for eugenics). I guess we'll have to wait >to see whether there are any fatal flaws in contemporary behavior >genetics and whether Joseph might have been right (even if purely by luck). I don't see anywhere in the comments I quoted from behavioural genetics researchers that Joseph is a crank, nor that he did not make *any* valid points. In fact Kenneth Kendler acknowledged in relation to Joseph's writings (as I'm sure they all would) that "There are certainly many methodologic issues in our field to be concerned about". What concerned them was the manner of Joseph's critique, for instance, that he "distorts data by omission", and what the reviewer quoted by Stephen Black referred to as his "predominantly black-and-white portrayal" of the evidence. >However, there are problems in making arguments based on >authority, no matter how expert those authorities are (think >of the arguments made by experts in eugenics back in the day; >who could dispute Pearson's correlations and other evidence?). There are two different elements entwined here. Eugenics is a practical programme advocated for society. The question of whether people disputed Pearson's and others' evidence is entirely separate from the question of the advocacy of specific proposals argued on the basis of that evidence. In the current discussion the issue is the evidence. On Mike's first point here, while obviously I take into account the views of the several people I quoted who are steeped in the theoretical disputations involved in their discipline, I didn't base my view simply on this. In relation to the writings of Joseph I have seen, I have read enough on the subject to recognize at least partially the validity of their criticisms of his approach. Also the dubiousness of such characteristically blanket statements made in Joseph's interview in "The Psychologist" as, in relation to schizophrenia, "there is little if any scientific evidence that it is caused by genetic factors." My problem with this statement is not merely the virtual dismissal of evidence that comes from more than one direction, not just the twin studies on which he predominantly focuses, but also the tendentious terms in which he presents the issue. No one suggests that schizophrenia is *caused* by genetic factors - it is always a question of genetic *propensities*. >One of the fatal flaws of the eugenics movement was the >notion that Mendalism (single gene basis) could explain >all behaviors, an assumption that was shown early on to >be inconsistent with various data but was still maintained >as a basic tenet... I don't really see the analogy here. No behavioural geneticist, and more specifically no researchers on the subject matter of "The Gene Illusion", remotely suggests that genetics explains all behaviours, or indeed any specific behaviour or mental characteristic. They are investigating a greater or lesser degree of genetic disposition. Michael Smith commented, quoting me first: >>"Joseph's axe? ... I think his writings indicate that he >>approached the examination of twin and adoption studies >>with a view to confirming these beliefs, with little if any >>attempt to undertake a disinterested examination of the evidence." >I think this is the way all scientists approach their field. >I don't believe that a scientist invested in their work >can "undertake a disinterested examination of the evidence." In a comment related to the above, I also referred to "the extent to which an individual is prepared to try to be as open as possible to evidence that is inconsistent with his or her beliefs." In other words, it is not a question of someone being completely disinterested (impossible), but about the degree to which there is some attempt on the part of the individual concerned to be as disinterested as possible. Note that this was in the context of Joseph's writings, so we're not talking about a scientist's investment in his or her work, but someone purporting to assess the evidence, a very different situation. Looking again at the early sections of Judith Harris's *No Two Alike* I found myself contrasting Joseph's goal-directed writings with Harris's. When Joseph contends that there exists little evidence that autism and bipolar disorders have a genetic foundation, I have little confidence that he presents his evidence unselectively and fairly. In contrast, with Judith Harris I find a willingness to explore the evidence and see where it takes her. And whether or not her conclusions are eventually agreed to be substantially correct, at least I feel confident she has examined a mass of documentary evidence from all directions, and that she has made great efforts to live up to the ideal of disinterested enquiry. Allen Esterson Former lecturer, Science Department Southwark College, London http://www.esterson.org --- To make changes to your subscription contact: Bill Southerly ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
